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َ ّلل ٱ

Allah said:
“O you who have believed, fulfill all contracts.” (1)
Surah Al-Māʾidah

:قال هللا تعالي
) ( َٰيٰٓأيُّها ٱلَذِين ءامنُ ٰٓواْ أ ْوفُواْ بِٱ ْلعُقُو ِد
)1( سورة المائدة
The Prophet Muhammad  ﷺsaid:
“Muslims are bound by their conditions, except for a condition that
forbids what is permissible or a condition that permits what is forbidden.”
Jami` Al-Tirmidhi

:قال رسول هللا ﷺ
ً "المسلمون عند شروطهم إال شر
ً
".حالال أو شر ًطا أح َل حرا ًما
طا ح َرم
رواة الترمذي
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Salman Mufleh R. Al-Kahtani
THE SAUDI JUDGE’S DISCRETION IN LIQUIDATED DAMAGES CLAUSES:
AN APPLIED ANALYTICAL STUDY IN LIGHT OF ISLAMIC SHARIA LAW

This dissertation studies the treatment by Saudi judges under Islamic Sharia law of
liquidated damages clauses in contracts, a critical part of modern commercial transactions.
After introducing the basic and secondary sources of Islamic law and discussing the
current treatment of the liquidated damages clause by Saudi judges according to general Islamic
rules and the four jurisprudence schools, this dissertation demonstrates that Saudi judges have
broad discretion in applying jurisprudence rules, particularly Hanbali jurisprudence, the
applicable jurisprudence in the Saudi courts.
Numerous interpretations of the same jurisprudential rule exist, resulting in multiple
judicial rulings for the same jurisprudential rule. Among factors affecting the judicial rulings are
the impact of the judge’s cultural and social background, the judge’s tendency not to rule on
moral compensation, and his strictness in scrutinizing and recognizing the evidence of damages
when ruling on compensation in general and in cases of the liquidated damages clause in
particular, and the scarcity of ruling compensation for future damages along with the role that the
Saudi judge plays in selecting applicable legal rules.
This dissertation presents a survey and field study of Saudi judges’ positions on the
liquidated damages clause and contains it in contracts. The survey indicates that the Saudi judge
has broad discretion when considering the liquidated damages clause. There are differences
among the judges with regard to the liquidated damages clause depending on the type of contract
included in it. The Saudi judge applies the theoretical aspects of legal texts and jurisprudence

x

rules to the facts and practical issues related to the liquidated damages clause influenced by
fatwa.
In response, this dissertation considers several possible solutions. These include
codifying jurisprudence provisions; notating judicial rulings; and requiring Saudi judges to apply
them, particularly in cases of the liquidated damages clause; issuing judicial journals and
notations to increase transparency; and documenting contracts that include the liquidated
damages clause to make them binding without the need for a court ruling.
Finally, the dissertation propose recommendations that, if endorsed by the Kingdom’s
judicial authorities, will help limit the judge’s discretionary authority and facilitate judgment in
estimating the liquidated damages clause as agreed upon by the contracting parties. These
include codifying the provisions of Islamic jurisprudence in the form of sequenced, arranged
legal articles and provisions related to contracts and the conditions they contain, including the
liquidated damages clause. The importance of establishing judicial principles or a legislative
code becomes apparent in terms of the main mechanism for how a judge exercises his discretion
when dealing with a vague legal text or rule that requires interpretation or contradicts another
rule or principle. It is important to emphasize parties’ responsibilities to state the functionality of
the liquidated damages clause in the contract, to continue the notation of judicial rulings and
publishing, and expand notarized contracts that include the liquidated damages clause as an
executive document to limit the discretionary authority of judges when considering what the
parties have agreed upon.
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Keywords
liquidated damages clause – liquidated damages – sources of Islamic law – Sharia –
Discretionary authority – Saudi judge – jurisprudential rules – judicial precedents – codification
of jurisprudential rules – notation of judicial rulings
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Introduction
With the recent expansion of international trade, provisions in contracts for liquidated
damages have increased in importance. This is particularly true for Saudi Arabia. While liquidated
damages clauses have traditionally been used in common law and civil law, they raise issues for
Islamic law when applied in the Saudi courts. Parties always seek to reduce disputes regarding
contractual obligations before the judge to avoid litigation drawbacks in terms of lengthy judicial
procedures and intervention of a judge that may not reflect the contractual parties’ intentions.
The legal system of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is based on Sharia law.1 This provides
the basis for all Saudi laws. However, it is an un-codified law system derived from Sharia sources,
including basic sources and secondary sources.
In addition, there are four main schools of jurisprudence in Sharia: Hanbali, Hanafi,
Maliki, and Shafi’i. Each school interprets Sharia’s basic and secondary sources,2 which
influence Saudi laws, international contracts, and treaties that the Kingdom is a part of.3
Liquidated damages clauses have taken on increased use since a fatwa was issued by the
Council of Senior Scholars in the Kingdom in 1974.4 This allowed liquidated damages clauses
under certain conditions.
In recent years, liquidated damages clauses have been increasingly used in Saudi Arabia.
This has partly been because parties, particularly those in international contracts, want to increase

1

International and Comparative Law at The Hague, 1932.
Secondary sources of Sharia law include Qiyas [analogical reason], Istihsan [juristic discretion], Al-Maslahah AlMursalah [absolute interest], Ijtihad [inference], and Urff [local custom].
3
The Basic Law of Saudi Arabia 1992 (also known as the Constitution), Chapter 2: Monarchy, Article 5 indicates
the transition of power among the sons of the founder King, King Abdulaziz. It has been formulated based on tribal
customs.
4
Fatwa of the Council of Senior Scholars in Saudi Arabia No. 25 issued on August 27, 1974.
2
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certainty in commercial agreements, reduce delay, and avoid litigation. As a result, each party
wants to know the exact compensation due if contracts are delayed or breached.5
This dissertation addresses a critical feature of using liquidated damages clauses in Saudi
Arabia: judges in Saudi courts, deciding cases, can use any of four Islamic schools of
jurisprudence. As a result, rulings may differ in cases with similar facts.
Also, the dissertation highlights two aspects of this for liquidated damages: (1) the broad
discretion given to judges by Sharia law allows them to rule on tort and contract cases without
restrictions. Further, each judge has their own jurisprudence background and legal knowledge,
which may lead to different interpretations; (2) judges can revise liquidated damages clauses and
the compensation amount. Consequently, the judicial rulings might differ from court to court
even if the cases have similar trends in their facts.

1. Significance of the Research
The liquidated damages clause in Saudi contracts is governed by Sharia. However, the
most important principles in this law, as mentioned earlier, are in the Qur’an, for example, “O ye
who believe! Fulfill all obligations.”6 Also, in the Sunnah, Prophet Muhammad  ﷺsaid:
“Muslims stick to their conditions,”7 and the agreements must be kept. The principle refers to
contracts signed between private parties, which states that contained clauses in the contract are
binding for both parties. Therefore, the terms of contract imply that a failure to comply with the
respective obligations constitutes a breach of contract.

5

2 AL-ZARQA, MUSTAFA AHMED, ALMADKHAL ALFIQHIU ALAAM THE GENERAL JURISPRUDENTIAL INTRODUCTION
760 (Beirut, Dar Al-Fikr 1990).
6
Surah Al-Mâ’idah:1.
7
Sunan Abi Dawud: 3594.
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In recent years, Saudi Arabia also has been going through a great economic transition,
especially in the current King Salman era. He has undertaken significant economic
transformations that deal with both domestic and foreign affairs of the Kingdom. Among his
major pledges are the Saudi National Transformation Program 2020 and Saudi Vision 2030, both
of which focus on economic empowerment.
These plans are essential to the future of Saudi Arabia and to other countries that are
allied with the Saudi government. Significant economic changes have occurred since the visit of
the Saudi king to the United States and his meeting with President Obama in September 2015.
That meeting revealed a new economic plan, which includes a provision that foreign companies
are allowed to invest their money in the Saudi markets without having a Saudi partnership. US
companies were the first recipients of direct marketing licenses.8
This study focuses on ways to reform the Saudi legal system to accommodate the needs
of new investors. Previously, investors have been reluctant because of ambiguity linked to the
broad discretion given judges in Saudi courts.
This dissertation explores the relationships between liquidated damages and contractual
liability under the Saudi judge’s discretion. It highlights contractual liability where the injured
party asks the court to enforce a liquidated damages clause. It also highlights the role of
discretion by Saudi judges in assessing damages.
The Saudi Vision 2030 plan, which depicts the economic stability and effective
governance of Saudi Arabia, emphasizes foreign investment policies.9 Also, the US-Saudi
Business Council reviewed this document and discussed several topics and issues, such as
improving the investment environment. Nevertheless, the joint business council reviews the

8
9

Such as Dow Chemical Company, Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company (3M), and Pfizer.
“Saudi Vision 2030,” http://vision2030.gov.sa/download/file/fid/417, Saudi Gov., 25 Apr. 2016, p. 45.

3

diversification of the Saudi national economy concerning the growth of the local sectors and
privatization regarding increased private sector participation.10
Finally, the use of liquidated damages in contracts matters because it has rarely been
researched by academics. As a result, there is an opportunity to offer solutions to help the Saudi
legal system and support Saudi Vision 2030 and foreign investment. If we suppose parties can
better anticipate how to enforce liquidated damages clauses in Saudi contracts. In that case, there
will be a more consistent and dependable economic activity for all parties’ benefit.
Despite the practical importance of the liquidated damages clause, resorting to it by
parties to contracts in the Kingdom has encountered some difficulties. This is in part because of
the discretionary authority of Saudi judges when considering the provisions of Sharia, which
requires examining this issue from a theoretical and practical point of view and determining
whether the compensation agreed upon in the contract should be increased or decreased.
The study lies in the need to include the liquidated damages clause in many contracts
because of its advantages in implementing obligations, reducing disputes, and speeding up
obtainment of compensation in case of breach of contracts. However, doubts arise about the
legality of this condition before the Saudi judiciary and what the discretion of a Saudi judge is.
This is particularly the case in his deciding compensatory amounts in cases of breach or delay in
the execution of contract provisions. Given the great importance of this subject, the matter
requires knowing the liquidated damages clause in Sharia and the legitimacy of its application in
contracts because, again, Sharia is the general law in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Also, there is a need for those dealing with economic activities inside and outside of the
Kingdom to know the extent of the mandatory financial compensation agreed upon by the parties

10

US-Saudi Business Council Reviews Kingdom’s Vision 2030, SAUDI PRESS AGENCY (25 June 25, 2016),
https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?newsid=1513697.
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to contracts when the matter needs to be presented to the judiciary, especially when delays in
implementing provisions occur, so that each party to the contract is aware of this matter.

2. Research Questions
The research aims to study the discretionary power of the Saudi judge in ruling on the
liquidated damages clause by answering the following questions:
1- What are the sources on which the discretionary authority of the judge in Saudi courts
depends?
2- What is the conditioning of the liquidated damages clause in Islamic jurisprudence
and the Saudi judiciary?
3- What is the extent of the discretionary authority of the Saudi judge in responding to
the contracting parties in the liquidated damages clause?
4- What is the extent of a Saudi judge’s reliance on Islamic schools of jurisprudence
when considering this clause?
5- What is the position of the Saudi judge regarding ruling on the value of the liquidated
damages clause?
6- What recommendations can help judges determine the value of the liquidated
damages clause?

3. Research Methodology
I utilize the descriptive, inductive, and analytical approach toward jurisprudential texts
and a field study of judges to explain the concept of the liquated damages clause in Islamic law
and the discretionary authority of the Saudi judge when ruling on it. I will also identify the
positions of the four Islamic schools of jurisprudence with the legal rooting of the liquidated
5

damages clause, to show the extent of the link between what Islamic jurisprudence decrees and
what the Saudi judge applies.
The Saudi judge, with regard analyzing the liquidated damages clause and drawing
conclusions from it, has a duty to support the application of what is agreed upon between the
parties of the contract in a manner that enhances the improvement of the judicial environment in
the Kingdom and contributes to attracting foreign investments to it.

4. Research Roadmap
The thesis is divided into an introduction and five chapters, including the conclusion.
Chapter One presents an introduction that helps the reader to understand Islamic law and
its basic and secondary sources, which the Saudi judge relies upon for issuing his rulings in cases
that include the liquidated damages clause. Also, this chapter addresses an overview of the Saudi
judicial system and the methods for appointing a judge in the Kingdom.
Chapter Two sheds light on the discretionary authority of the Saudi judge and the
numerous interpretations of Islamic sources and jurisprudential rules on which the judge relies in
adjudication disputes in Saudi courts, the impact of the judge’s cultural and social background on
a judicial ruling, compensation for moral and future damages cases, the strictness in accepting
compensation requests, and the role of precedents and judicial principles in limiting the
discretionary authority of the judge.
Chapter Three deals with field study conducted by the researcher on some judges in the
Kingdom which aim at identifying their opinions in ruling liquidated damages clause cases.
Chapter Four presents some solutions to limit the broad discretionary authority of the
Saudi judge when considering cases of the liquidated damages clause such as codifying

6

jurisprudence provisions, notating judicial rulings, issuing judicial journals, and documenting
contracts that include the liquidated damages clause.
Chapter Five, the conclusion, contains the results and recommendations that have
emerged from this research.

7

Chapter One: An Introduction to Islamic Law
The sources of legislation in Islamic Sharia include both sources agreed upon by the
jurists and those that are not agreed upon, as the views of the four schools differed in their
consideration and authority.
Therefore, we find that the sources in Islamic law are divided in terms of whether or not
they are agreed upon into three categories:11
A. Agreed upon sources, which are the Qur’an and the Sunnah.
B. Sources where disagreement is weak, which is consensus and analogy.
C. Sources in which there is strong disagreement, which are the words of the Companions.
The juristic preference, public good, and Prior Legislation of Those Before Us, and
Blocking Pretexts, and the Absolute Interest, and Custom.
These sources or evidence are divided into two parts:
A. Sources or transferable evidence that depends on the text or the transmitted words: the
Qur’an, the Sunnah, the consensus, the sayings of the Companions, and previous Islamic
laws and customs.
B. Mental sources or evidence that depends on the mind of the jurist, his knowledge and his
opinion, based on a text or a transmitted writing. They are Analogies, Absolute Interest,
Blocking Pretexts, juristic preference, and the public good.
These sources or legal evidence are also divided in terms of the strength of their evidence
and divided into definitive evidence and presumptive evidence:
- Definitive evidence means everything that indicates a ruling on the facts of the incident
or the issue without a possibility of contradicting it; for example, God’s saying in the Qur’an:

11

AL-SALAMI, IYAD, ASUL AL-IFQH AL-ADHI LAYASAE AL-FAQIH JAHLAH, DAR AL-TADMURIYA 20 and the pages
thereafter (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 1st ed. 1426 AH-2005 AD).
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“fasting for three days during the Hajj and seven when you have returned, making ten in all —
The indication of the number here on the days to be fasted is a definitive indicator.”
- Presumptive evidence is everything that supports a ruling on the incident or issue,
although another interpretation is possible, but it is unlikely, because of, for example, the word
of Allah in the Qur’an (e.g., “O you who believe! Do not render void your charities by [a show
of] obligation and injury.”12 So the apparent meaning of this text indicates that both pain and
harm invalidate charity alone. But there is another possibility of what is meant by this text, which
is a likely possibility: that charity is invalidated only by combining the two things, pain and
harm, and not just one of them.

1.1. The basic sources of Islamic law
The basic sources of Islamic law consists of the Holy Qur’an and the Sunnah and the
consensus and analogy these sources as they were stated in the Qur’an in the verse “O ye who
believe! Obey Allah, and obey the Messenger, and those charged with authority among you. If ye
differ in anything among yourselves, refer it to Allah and His Messenger.” The part “O ye who
believe, Obey Allah” refers to the Qur’an, and “obey the Messenger” refers to (the Sunnah) and
those in authority among you (the consensus). We will discuss these sources in some detail:

1.1.1. The Qur’an
The Qur’an is defined as the word of God, the Almighty, as revealed in the Arabic
language to his Prophet Muhammad  ﷺthrough the angel Gabriel, the worshiper with its

12

Qur’an Al-Bagrah:264.
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recitation, transmitted by frequency, and combined between the two covers of the Holy Qur’an,
beginning with Surah Al-Fatihah and ending with Surah Al-Nas.13
The revelations to the Prophet Muhammad  ﷺwere recorded in a clear Arabic language,
repeated and narrated over a period of twenty-three years, and the worshiper with its wording
and meaning; And it is preserved from any change or alteration,14 because of the Almighty’s
saying: “It is we who have sent down the Remembrance, and we will preserve it.”15 The Qur’an
consists of 114 Surahs, and its verses are 6236 verses, and the number of its letters is 320,015
and the number of words about 77,439 words.
The authenticity of the Qur’an as a primary source of Islamic legislation is unanimously
agreed upon by the Companions and those who followed after them and the diligent imams.16
Verses have shown the Qur’an itself a record of what the Almighty said: “And We have
revealed to you this perfect Book comprising the truth and wisdom, fulfilling [the prophecies of
the Scripture]. Which was present before it and stands as a guardian over it, then judge between
them according to that which Allah has revealed in the Qur’an, and do not deviate from the truth
that has come to you in order to follow their low desires. For each one of you did We prescribe a
spiritual law and a well-defined way [a code in secular matters],17 and it is the source of light and
guidance.” God Almighty said: “And We revealed the Book [the Qur’an] to you as an
explanation of everything, as guidance, as mercy, and good news for the Muslims.”18

13

Al-Amidi Ali bin Muhammad, irshad alfuhul 'iilaa tahqiq alhaqi min eilm alasuli, Dar al-Kutub, p. 26.
Al-Ghazali, Muhammad, Al-Mustafa fi ‘Ilm Usul, Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, vol. 1, p. 65, Beirut, 1st ed., 1993.
15
Surah Al-Hijr:9.
16
AL-ZUHAILI, WAHBA, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 422 (Dar Al-Fikr, Damascus 1996).
17
Surah Al-Ma’idah:48.
18
Surah Al Nahl:89.
14
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All jurists and other diligent imams refer to the Qur’an to derive legal rulings, and they
do not resort to other sources, except when there is no ruling for the issue they are looking for in
the texts of the Qur’an.
The Qur’an is the first reference for Islamic jurisprudence. If a matter is presented to a
judge, he will first of all refer to the Qur’an to search for its ruling in it. If its ruling is found, he
applies it and does not refer to anything else. What the Qur’an deems permissible is permissible,
and what it forbids is forbidden. And if he did not find the rule on the issue in the Qur’an, he
moves to other sources in light of what was mentioned in the Qur’an from the general rules.
The Qur’an contains two types of rulings: definitive texts and presumptive texts related to
ruling on the issue at hand. A definitive text denotes a specific meaning that can be plainly
understood and does not need interpretation and there is no room for understanding another
meaning. A presumptive text has a specific meaning but may be interpreted and one may be
diverted from this meaning and something else is intended from it.19 So, the connotation may
have assumed more than one ruling, and one of the two possibilities may outweigh other
meanings to the same jurist or judge.20
This presumptive section is often found in subsidiary issues, and it has a great impact on
Ijtihad, so that we often find differences of opinion among scholars, because of their
disagreement in understanding the texts and the hadith, and the jurists’ different understanding of
issues before them, and the ability to derive their rulings, and this is a mercy for people and ease
for them.21

19

KHALIFA, IBRAHIM ABDEL RAHMAN, THE SCIENCE OF FUNDAMENTALS OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 32 (House of
Culture for Publishing and Distribution, Amman, 1, 1995).
20
Al-Amidi, Ali, Al-Hakam, I.D., p. 11 and p. 30.
21
KHALIFA, IBRAHIM ABDUL RAHMAN, IHSAN IN INVESTIGATIONS FROM THE SCIENCES OF THE QUR’AN 301-305, 1,
2002.
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The texts of the Qur’an are divided in terms of generality and detail into four sections.
The first section includes general legislation, most of which is concerned with worship. The
second section includes detailed legislation in a limited way, such as provisions related to selfdefense and international relations The third section includes detailed legislation, such as
provisions related to retribution and limits, personal status and inheritance. The fourth section
includes legislation or provisions such related to transactions and contracts.
Legislation in the Qur’an is built on gradualness, facilitation, and removal of
embarrassment. Muslims view the Qur’an as a book of legislation and of how to live one’s life,
in the past, present and future; The past consists of the stories of the ancients since the beginning
of creation, through the conflicts between the prophets and their peoples, and includes legislation
regulating life today and in the future in terms of our ability to organize and treat the human
situation on earth.22
The legal rulings in the Qur’an concerns commanding an action or refraining from it, or
the choice between doing and leaving,23 and it is divided into five sections: obligation, which is
what a legislator is asked to do on the basis of a divine command or instruction,24 as when the
Almighty says “be constant in prayer”25 and the person is obligated according to preponderance
and priority, not in terms of compulsion,26 such as the Almighty’s saying: “O you who believe!
when you transact a loan for a stipulated term, then write it down.”27 The command to write

22

HUSSEIN, MUHAMMAD KHADER, SUMMARY OF ISLAMIC LEGISLATION 2 (Dar al-Qalam, Kuwait, 4th ed., 1404
AH.)
23
Al-Tabari, Abu Jaafar Muhammad bin Jarir, Jami’ Al-Bayan and Tafseer Al- Qur’an, Amman, Dar Al-Alam,
Beirut, Dar Ibn Hazm, 1, 2002 AD, p. 317
24
Al-Samarqandi, Alaa al-Din Muhammad bin Ahmed, Mezan Al-Usoul fe Nataeg AlOkol fe Usul al-Fiqh, I 1,
1987 AD, Vol. 1, p. 124
25
Surah Al-Baqarah:83
26
Samarkandi, Mezan AlUsul, previous reference, part 1, p. 26
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down the debt is according to the Almighty’s words, “Write it,” indicating the obligation to write
down the debt.
They found a presumption that transforms this matter from obligation to
recommendation, which is Allah’s saying: “If one of you entrusts something to another let him
who is entrusted deliver his trust,” 28 and “[s]o he delegates to the creditor and debtor to write the
debt to preserve their rights, and if they trust each other then there is no sin if they do not write
the debt.”29 And the forbidden: which is what God asked to refrain from doing in the face of
obligation,30 as the Almighty said: “Allah hath permitted trade and forbidden Usury”.31
And what is Makruh: which is what Allah asks a person to leave on a priority and
preponderance basis, not as a matter of obligation.32
Permissible: This is when God gives the responsible person the choice between doing and
not doing something,33 as Allah says, “Who has made unlawful Allah’s beautiful things of
adornment and elegance which He has produced for His servants and the delicious and pure
things of (His) providing.”34
There are three divisions of rulings in the Qur’an:35
1. Faith provisions: related to the obligatory belief in Allah, His angels, books, and
messengers, as well as the Last Day.
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2. Moral provisions: relating to the virtues a person strives for and the virtues he must give
up as vices.36 God also proclaimed: “Allah commands justice, goodness, and generosity
towards relatives. And He forbids immorality, injustice, and oppression. He instructs you
so that you may remember.”37
Practical provisions: related to a person’s words, deeds, contracts and other actions
done.38 The Qur’an is considered the first source of Sharia, and the ultimate reference to which
all sources refer. The Qur’an contains many and varied provisions39 which are necessary for
humanity; to regulate man’s relationship with his Creator, his relationship with others, and with
himself, and his relationship with all areas of life, and any neglect of these relationships will
reflect negatively on individuals and groups.
The legal practical rulings in the Qur’an are divided into:40
Worship provisions the Qur’an commands, such as establishing prayers, giving alms,
performing the pilgrimage to Mecca, and fasting.41 The religious and personal order of the
Qur’an is comprehensive; it contains commandments about such matters as, prayer and the other
pillars of Islam, as in Hajj,42 Zakat,43, and Fasting during Ramadan. Details were left to the
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purified Sunnah of the Prophet. The Messenger of God  ﷺsaid: “Pray as you have seen me
praying.”44 And he ﷺ, said: “Take your rituals from me.”45
1. Family rulings: The rulings the Qur’an state that an individual is a member of a family,
from the time he is a fetus until his death. The Qur’an has detailed these provisions in a
manner unlike others due to the importance of the family as the nucleus of society. It
clarifies an individual’s rights and obligations: from the right to be breastfed, and
extending to matters like, custody, guardianship, upbringing, education, marriage,
divorce, alimony, wills, and other issues related to family and personal status.46
2. Financial Transactions: These are the rulings that show the process for acquiring
property, and the transfer of rights between individuals. The Qur’an contains a statement
of principles and provisions that do not change over time and place, including
compromise in trade-offs contracts: “O you who believe! Do not consume each other’s
wealth illicitly, but trade by mutual consent. And do not kill yourselves, for Allah is
Merciful towards you.”47 Also included are charitable donations, and the fulfillment of
related obligations and actions, Allah Almighty said: “O you who have believed, fulfill
all contracts”48 and documentation of contracts in order to prevent discounts. The
Almighty said: “O you who believe! when you transact a loan for a stipulated term, then
write it down. Let a scribe write (it) in your presence in (term of) equity and fairness. The
scribe shall not refuse to write down.”49 As for the debtor’s performance of trusts, the
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Almighty said: “God commands you to render trusts to those who are entitled to them.”50
The Qur’an left the rest of the details of contracts, their provisions and foundations, and
what is related to the development of economic relations for the Prophet’s Sunnah and
the writings and rulings of jurists.51
3. Constitutional Provisions: The Qur’an mentions constitutional law in general, including
the relationship of the ruler with the ruled, and with other people of power and influence.
In these relations, the Qur’an commanded that there should be four main foundations of
rule:52
1) To work with the principle of consultation in every decision for the public interest. The
Almighty said, “and consult them in the conduct of affairs,53 and the Almighty said, “and
conduct their affairs by mutual consultation.”54
2) To pursue justice in every judicial ruling, which promotes dignity for the individual.
The Almighty said, “Allah commands justice, goodness, and generosity.55”
3) To strive for equality in rights and duties; the Almighty said: “O, people! We created
you from a male and a female, and We made you races and tribes, so that you may come to know
one another. The best among you before Allah is the most righteous. Allah is Knowing and
Aware.”56
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4) To obey the governor in matters where there can be no disobedience; the Almighty
said: “You who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the Messenger, and those in authority among
you.”57
5) To promote peace between nations. 58 The Qur’an clarifies the relations of states with
each other and considers the basis for relations to be peace; the Almighty said: “O you who
believe! Enter into submission, wholeheartedly, and do not follow Satan’s footsteps. He is your
sworn enemy.”59 There may be no resorting to war except in defense of the faith, faith,
symptoms and money, mind, and life. The Almighty said “Whoever commits aggression against
you, retaliate against him in the same measure as he has committed against you. And be mindful
of Allah and know that Allah is with the righteous.”60
In the event of defense against an attack, he ordered us to turn to peace, the Almighty
said: “But if they incline towards peace, then incline towards it, and put your trust in Allah. He is
the Hearer, the Knower.” 61
6) Public financial provisions,62 meaning provisions related to the regulation of financial
issues between the rich and the poor and between the state and individuals, such as property
rights.
7) Provisions for crimes and penalties:63 they are divided into three sections.
(A) Hudud crimes are those in which the interests necessary for human life are
violated, and the Qur’an has defined crimes and specified punishments for them. The judge
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does not accept mitigation or stress for such crimes as adultery, slander, enmity, prostitution,
and theft. The role of the judge is limited to making sure that there is evidence of the
occurrence of the crime.
(B) Retribution crimes, in which a person’s life or safety is infringed, and the
punishment may be retribution or parental retribution because it is a common right between
the state and the victim or his heirs; or obtaining blood money (financial compensation), or
pardoning someone, which is something that is encouraged by Islamic law.
(C) Punishment crimes that are regulated by the legislative or judicial authority and
judicial authority, including the following types:
•

Hudud crimes are associated with suspicion, meaning every crime in which there is
suspicion concerning lack of real evidence, in that case, the criminal charge will
mutate into a disciplinary crime punishable by a penalty determined by the legislative
authority, or the competent judge, such as the crime of adultery, if it is not proven by
four witnesses, and the corruption of theft between spouses or between parents and
offspring or in case of need and poverty.

•

Crimes that are proven in the text and whose punishment is left to the legislative and
judicial authorities, such as espionage, rape, bribery, and breach of trust.

•

New Crimes: Sharia has permitted the ruler, in cooperation with others in power, the
legislative and the judicial authorities to declare a crime every act that harms the
people’s interests, which is a crime punishable by a penalty commensurate with its
scope and gravity.

The Qur’an follows three methods for explaining the rulings:64
Khasawneh, Imad Abdul Karim, The Qur’an’s Approach in Exposing Verses of Judgments, The Jordanian Journal
of Islamic Studies, Volume Five, Issue (2/A), 1430 AH / 2009 AD.
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1. The Qur’anic text mentions general rules and main principles of legislation: such as
consultation; the Almighty said: “They should conduct their affairs by mutual
consultation,”65 and the fulfillment of obligations and contracts; the Almighty said: “O
you who believe! Fulfill your obligations.”66 Given that the realities in society are always
changing, there is room to apply the universal Qur’anic rule in a way that meets the needs
of the people, as determined by jurists and judges in light of the primary and secondary
sources of Islamic law.67
2. The Qur’anic text is detailed and clearly states specific rules, and the Prophet’s Sunnah
confirms this, such as the provisions of inheritance, the degree of punishment within the
Sharia boundaries, process of divorcing a spouse, and the types of women barred from
marrying.
3. The origin of the ruling in the Qur’an has been mentioned by means of a reference or
phrase, and the Sunnah of the Prophet complements the rest of its rulings.68
The context of the Qur’anic text in referring to the rulings is done in a holistic manner in
most cases, leaving the details to the Prophetic Sunnah and other sources of Sharia. If the
meaning of the Qur’anic text is definitive, then there is no dispute about the application of that
text. If the meaning of the Qur’anic text is in debated, jurists and judges might debate their
understanding of that text. Textual interpretation is required to support or oppose a certain view
is a good knowledge of the words of the Arabic language, and what was mentioned in the
Sunnah and other sources of Sharia concerning evidence.

65

Surah Al-Shura:38.
Surah Al-Ma'idah:1.
67
AZMY, TAHA EL-SAYED AHMED, ISLAMIC CULTURE 119 (2006).
68
Al-Razi, AlTafseer Alkabeer vol. 4, p. 165.
66

19

1.1.2. The Sunnah
Jurists unanimously agree that the Prophet’s Sunnah  ﷺconstitutes the second source of
Islamic law, and they cited the Qur’an itself as evidence for that, where Allah says, “O ye who
believe! Obey Allah, and obey the Messenger, and those charged with authority among you. If ye
differ in anything among yourselves, refer it to Allah and His Messenger, if ye do believe in
Allah and the Last Day: That is best and most suitable for final determination.”69
And Allah also proclaimed: “It is not for any believer, man or woman, when Allah and
His Messenger have decided on an issue, to have the liberty of choice in their decision.”70
The Sunnah is defined as everything that was issued by the Prophet Muhammad  ﷺfrom
saying, deed, acknowledgment, or attribute, other than what is found in the Qur’an.71
Types of Sunnah:72
Anecdotal Sunnah are found in the hadiths that the Messenger said in various purposes
and occasions, such as his saying: “There should be neither harming nor reciprocating
harm.”73Another example is his saying, “The reward of deeds depends upon intentions and every
person will get his reward according to what he has intended.”74
The number of distinct hadiths of the Prophet in Sahih al-Bukhari and Muslim75 amounts
to four thousand, and these hadiths contain many provisions that regulate people’s transactions.76
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Actual Sunnah are the actions that the Messenger did in his life after the revelation, such
as praying five times daily, performing the ritual of Hajj, and insisting on at least one witness
and the oath of the plaintiff in some disputes.
Declarative Sunnah is what the Prophet explicitly approved or kept silent about after
something happened to his knowledge and in his time, or what he expressed indicating his
approval and satisfaction, such as the Messenger’s acknowledgment that physiognomy is a way
to prove lineage.77
The relationship of the Sunnah with the Qur’an is one of complementarity. It reveals
ambiguous rulings mentioned in the Qur’an, clarifies their meanings, and explains some of their
words and phrases, or clarifies, or complements and confirms it. So, it interprets the general and
its specialization and restricts and clarifies the absolute. The Qur’an lays down the general rules
and foundations of legislation. The Sunnah clarifies, explains, completes, and confirms that.
Therefore, the Sunnah has clarified many of the provisions of worship and transactions that are
mentioned in the Qur’an but not detailed, such as how to pray, zakat, fasting, pilgrimage, and
types of usury. Thus it circumscribes the absolute application of the Qur’an in, for example, the
execution of legal punishments, or specifies the general Qur’anic text as a hadith: “The killer
does not inherit anything,” here specifying general information in the verses of inheritance.
The established prophetic Sunnah is an argument78 that must be followed, as the Qur’an
is, in deriving legal rulings. Many verses have been mentioned in the Qur’an that command
obedience to the Prophet and the following of his Sunnah, just as the nation and all Islamic
jurisprudence schools have unanimously agreed to prove the authenticity of the Prophet’s
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Sunnah and the obligation to act upon it as a second source of Islamic Sharia. Because Allah
enjoined Muslims to obey the Prophet and his followers, and made obedience to the Messenger
obedience to him, He commanded Muslims to return any matter in dispute to Allah and His
Messenger in the clear Qur’an verse: “He who obeys the Messenger, obeys Allah.”79

1.1.3. Ijma (Consensus)
In this section, we will address what is meant by “consensus” as well as its origin,
conditions, types, and authority:
A- Definition: According to Sharia jurists, consensus arose from an agreement of scholars in
the era following the death of the Prophet ﷺ, on a legal ruling toward an issue in which
there is no text from the Qur’an and the prophetic Sunnah.80 An example is the agreement
of the Companions81 to give a grandmother one-sixth of an inheritance, and to prevent the
sale of fruits before they are ripe.
The consensus is the third source of Islamic legislation after the Qur’an and the Sunnah
and was based on emerging issues that arose after the death of the Prophet. The consensus must
be anchored on a foundation from the Qur’an and the Sunnah, which are the two main sources of
Islamic legislation. Examples are the validity of the Murabaha sale82 and the prohibition of
cannabis and other drugs.83
B- The emergence of consensus in Islamic jurisprudence:
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There was no need for unanimity in the era of the Prophet but, afterwards, a consensus
began to be needed and evolved.
The Era of the Companions84
The role of the Companions emerged after the death of the Messenger as they were
looking at the texts and deduced from them by virtue of their knowledge of the Messenger, the
reasons for revelation and the purposes of Sharia. This stage is considered important for the
emergence of consensus.
If a matter was presented that had no ruling in the Qur’an or Sunnah, the senior jurists of
the Companions would gather and consult with each other until they agreed among themselves,
then agree on its ruling.
1- The era of the followers85
Because of the distribution of jurists and scholars from among the followers in many
regions of the Islamic state after its expansion, the era of the followers often was not
characterized by consensus on emerging issues, so the opinions of some jurists were
disseminated. These jurists became interested in looking closely at hadith and science without
focusing on asking for the consensus of followers on new developments and issues that did not
exist in the eras of the Messenger or the Companions. Often there was no text that pertained to
these issues , so the need was to find a rule or guidelines for jurists.
2- The stage of emergence of jurisprudence schools.
The beginning of arriving at a consensus appeared in the Maliki school, with Imam
Malik’s interest in the consensus of the people of Medina and in the Hanafi school with the
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commitment of Imam Abu Hanifa and his desire for consensus among the people of Kufa. This
was followed by the desire of each imam to adhere to the consensus of those who preceded him,
and after that the circle of consensus began to expand little by little until it included all regions of
the Islamic state.
In the second century AH, the desire to formulate legal rulings based on firm principles
emerged, so the science of jurisprudence originated at the hands of Imam Muhammad bin Idris
al-Shafi’i86 in his book, the fundamentalist message, and he was relying on the four original
sources, one of which the consensus to derive legal rulings.
The authoritative and mature consensus of the various schools of jurisprudence has been
established as a source of Islamic legislation,87 and it is not permissible for anyone from the late
scholars to deviate from the unanimous consensus of the ancient jurists.88 There was a gradual
progression in reaching consensus. Each student of the imams of the legal schools followed and
supported his sayings until the circle of consensus was gradually completed, and it became the
third source of Islamic jurisprudence in formulating rulings, in addition to the Qur’an and the
Sunnah. Yet jurists differ about how consensus occurred, according to three opinions:
The first, and majority, opinion believes that consensus was always possible during the
era of the Companions generation and others.
The second opinion believes that the consensus is limited to the era of the Companions
time only and not in other times.
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The third opinion believes that consensus is not possible because of the vastness of the
Islamic realm and the divergence of qualified jurists, and therefore it was and is not possible to
present all emerging issues that require jurisprudential solutions to all jurists.
I believe that the first opinion is the closest to the truth, especially given the existence of
Islamic jurisprudence councils that consider emerging issues and develop solutions for them.
Also, new means of communication have facilitated the meeting of competent jurists to consider
emerging issues, where the consensus is held by the unanimity of the competent jurists at the
time of the case, regardless of their age, country, or class.
C- Conditions of Consensus
Jurists require the fulfillment of some conditions for consensus on a legal matter to be
taken as a legislative source:89
1. The consensus must be based on a valid document from the Qur’an or the Sunnah.
2. All jurists from among the jurists agree, explicitly or implicitly, on the ruling at a
specific time, explicitly or implicitly.
3. The agreement is reached by the people of Ijtihad from jurists who are fair and
trustworthy.
4. To prove to the diligent jurists the quality of Ijtihad from knowledge of the legal
sciences.
D- Types of Consensuses:
There are many types of consensuses according to how they are achieved and the strength
of their significance. They can be divided into two main types:90
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1- Explicit Consensus: is unanimous or overwhelming among scholars of jurisprudence
through their words or actions on a specific fact or issue, and each scholar expresses his
opinion explicitly regarding the specific Sharia ruling.
2- Silent Consensus: results when some scholar jurists express their opinion explicitly in a
certain era on a specific issue, and others remain silent.
In terms of its significance, the consensus is divided into:
1- Definitive consensus: is an explicit consensus that should be applied to the rule of
jurisprudence.
2- Presumptive consensus: is a silent consensus, which means it is somewhat speculative
because it is the opinion of a group of diligent jurists, not all of them.
E- Authenticity of consensus:
The majority of jurists, past and present, have agreed that clear consensus is an argument
and is supported by conclusive evidence. They cite texts from the Qur’an and the Sunnah91
where there are many indications that consensus is a basic source of legislation when there is no
ruling on the issue in the first or second sources of Sharia. Among these sources of evidence are:
1- From the Qur’an
•

The saying of God Almighty: “Hold firmly to the rope of Allah, all together, and be not
divided”92 is a prooftext for the inference is that Allah commanded people to gather and
forbade them from separating.

•

The saying of God Almighty: “Had they referred it to the Messenger, and to those in
authority among them, those who can draw conclusions from it would have understood
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it”.93 What is meant by those who deduce it are the jurists and scholars who are diligent,
which indicates that their consensus is a guide and a source from the sources of Islamic
law.
•

Allah Almighty says: “And so, We made you a moderate nation, that you may be
witnesses over humanity, and that the Messenger may be a witness over you.”94
2- From the Sunnah of the Prophet ﷺ

•

The saying of the Messenger “ ﷺIndeed Allah will not gather my Ummah upon deviation,
and Allah's Hand is over the Jama'ah and the evidence is that Allah saved the nation from
falling into error and error.”95

•

The saying of the Messenger “ ﷺWhat the Muslims saw as good, so it is good with
Allah.”96 The Messenger  ﷺcommanded the group of Muslims to be bound by what is
invoked, and the consensus of the jurists on a specific ruling for a specific issue is
necessary.97
As for evidence of a silent consensus, the majority of jurists, including the Hanafi and

Hanbali jurists, maintain that it is an argument and reliable evidence, and they inferred that the
silence of the jurist about a fatwa or about a statement of other jurists indicates his approval of
them, and that they are right in what they went to regarding the ruling on the issue under
consideration. He also quoted the Prophet  ﷺsaying, “A group of people from my Umma will
always remain triumphant on the right path and continue to be triumphant [against their
opponents]. He who deserts them shall not be able to do them any harm. They will remain in this
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position until Allah's Command is executed (i.e., Qiyamah is established).”98 The significance of
this hadith is that a nation cannot be devoid of a sect that upholds the law of God, and some
jurists went on to say that a silent consensus is considered an argument and presumptive
evidence, and this is what most of the jurists favored.99

1.1.4. Qiyas (Analogy)
A- Analogy is defined as appending a secondary fact whose ruling is not stipulated with an
original fact whose ruling is so as to equate one of the two incidents as the basis for ruling on
a new incident.100 Alternatively, it is the affirmation of a ruling in which there is no legal
evidence based on a ruling in which there is legal evidence for the sourcing of these two
matters with one cause.
Analogy in this sense is the compromise of jurists between two issues, one of which is
proven by the text in the Qur’an or the Sunnah or through explicit consensus, while the other of
which has no evidence on which to base its ruling. Thus, a jurist appends the ruling of the second
incident to the ruling of the first incident given so that they share the reason for the ruling,
whether it is prohibitive or permissive.
Examples of analogy include the law of that deprives the murderer of any inheritance; to
hurrying something before its time, and thus he shall be punished by deprivation. Another
example is the analogy of the prohibition of drugs with the ruling on the prohibition of drinking
alcohol stipulated in the Qur’an because there is the commonality for intoxication or a loss of
right mind between them.
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The jurist works to clarify the ruling for the issue under discussion by assessing the fact
that has no ruling on an issue that has a stipulated ruling. Therefore, analogy is an Ijtihad course
that is allowed within the limits of the texts of the Qur’an and the Sunnah, with certain rules.101
B- Pillars of Analogy:
Analogy has four essential basic pillars:
The origin, which is the subject of the ruling that was established by the text or the
consensus, and with which the analogy is measured. Like wine, for example, it is a base
against which every intoxicant that is not mentioned in the Qur’an and Sunnah is analogized.
The branch is a new matter in which there is neither text nor consensus, and which is
the analogized object. It takes its judgment: like illegal drugs (narcotics), which were
analogized against alcohol.
The common cause is the description that links the origin and the branch, which
necessitates the application of the rule of the origin to the branch, such as intoxication, which
is the common description between different types of wine or between wine and beer.
Because of their similarities, the rule of forbiddance of alcohol was transferred to it; thus,
wine is forbidden, by analogy, with alcohol.
The original rule, which is the legal ruling on which the text102 was originally based,
that is, prohibition, which is the legal ruling prohibiting drinking or selling alcohol.
Analogy is used in transactions but not in acts of worship, because Allah has the
exclusive knowledge of them.103 One example of analogy in transactions according to the
saying of the Messenger is: “A believer is the brother of the believer, so it is not permissible
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for the believer to rival by outbidding his brother’s sale, and he is prohibited from rivaling
his brother's betroth until he resigns.” The text came with the prohibition of a Muslim’s
engagement over his brother’s engagement or outbidding his brother. A diligent jurist can
analogize the ruling on renting, in which there is no rule on the rule on selling.
So, we find that the origin to be analogized in this example is: it is not permissible to
sell or betroth a Muslim before he decides to resign, and the analogized branch, which is
renting a Muslim over renting his brother. The rule of origin is the prohibition. The reason
for the ruling is the violation of the rights of others and the ensuing enmity between people.
Another example, the Prophet  ﷺsaying: “The killer does not inherit.” The text states
that a killer is deprived of an inheritance in order to prohibit the use of murder as a means to
rush inheriting before its time, so he is punished by depriving him of family money he seeks.
But if the benefactor kills the testator, what is his ruling? There is no text to rule, so that in
this case we use the analogy.
So, we specify that the origin of the analogy is the killing of an heir, which involves,
of course, deprivation of his inheritance. And the measured branch is the killing of the
testator, and the rule of origin is deprivation of inheritance, and the reason for the ruling
between them is to rush the thing before its time in a way that violates Sharia or the law, so
the perpetrator is punished by depriving him of the right to inherit.
C- Divisions of Analogy:
There are many classifications of analogy, including:
1- Dividing the analogy in terms of whether its ruling is speculative or not
The Shafi’i school divides analogies into three types on this basis:
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- More eligible analogies, where the branch is more eligible for the ruling than the
original because of the strength of its cause in it, such as: analogizing the beating of the parents
on the prohibition of expression Uff to them stipulated in the Qur’an for the cause of harm.
- Equivalent analogies is where the branch is equal to the original in the judgment, such
as the analogy of taking an orphan’s money to appropriate it, which is forbidden in the Qur’an
for the cause of spoilage of each of them.
-Minimum analogies is where the branch is weaker in terms of the reason for the ruling
than the original, i.e., less related to the ruling than the original, such as attaching wine or beer to
other alcohol, in the prohibition stipulated in the Qur’an.
2- Clarity of the analogy: two possibilities:
•

A clear analogy is one where the cause is stated or not but is clear.

•

A hidden analogy is one where unless the effect of the difference between the original
and the branch is negated, the reason for it is deduced from the rule of the original, such
as: measuring killing with a heavy machine over killing with a sharp instrument in
general, because both of them cause unlawful intentional death.104
D- The argument of analogy:
Arabic jurists have unanimously agreed on the importance of analogy as a source of

legislation, citing the words of God: “So take a lesson, O you who have insight!”105 There is no
disagreement among the jurists in the era of the Companions, and the followers and their
followers, concerning the permission of Ijtihad and analogy over analogies in the rulings of
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accidents.106 But the jurists differ on the analogy itself, whether it is the work of a diligent jurist
or independent evidence.107
The first opinion expresses that it would only have been formulated by a diligent jurist,
and it is the opinion of the jurist majority, and there is evidence for that:
The first confirming evidence is the Almighty’s saying: “Then consider O people of
sight.” It is inferred from this verse that consideration is looking carefully at the evidence, which
is what the diligent jurist does.
The second evidence is the hadith of Mu’adh, where the Prophet ﷺ, said to him: “If you
are offered to make up for it, then how do you make it up?” He said: “By the Book of God.” He
said: “If you do not find it?” He said: “According to the Sunnah of the Messenger of God, may
God’s prayers and peace be upon him.” He said: “If you do not find it?” He said: “I strive for my
opinion.” Thus, the Prophet corrected it and the evidence is that he added diligence to his own
opinion, and analogy is from opinion, so analogy then is part of the work of the diligent jurist.
The third evidence is in the book of Omar Ibn Al-Khattab, the second caliph of the
Messenger  ﷺ, to Abu Musa Al-Ash’ari: “Understanding what has come to you that is not in the
Qur’an or the Sunnah, then measure things at that.” This is an explicit command to analogize
what is not in the ruling of a text with the things that are similar and stipulated, and this analogy
can only be undertaken by a scholar.
The fourth confirming evidence is that of analogizing the branch to the original. Proving
such as the rule of the original of the branch is not an easy matter, as it is not permissible for the
scholar to add this to that except after knowing that the two matters are similar, knowing the
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reason for the origin, verifying its presence in the branch, and other matters that require analogy,
and all of this too is the work of the scholar
The second opinion sees that analogy is independent legal evidence, such as the Qur’an
and the Sunnah, which was established by Allah to make known his rulings, whether the scholar
looked at it or not.108 They cited this as follows:
1- That analogy is based on the existence of things whose knowledge will lead to the
knowledge of something else, and the scholars’ outcomes does not have to be the same.
2- The analogy was established by a legislator so that the scholar can know the rule of Allah
by looking at it.
The Prophet  ﷺused analogy in many issues, such as prioritizing the obligations of Islam,
including the pilgrimage, over the obligation to pay people’s material debts. The Companions
analogized the caliphate on leading the prayer in order to pledge allegiance to Abu Bakr because
of the similarity between the origin and the branch in the common meaning, which is the
cause.109
From the foregoing it is clear that the role of the jurist is to rule on the issue from the
existing legal sources and is not on the basis of the original ruling. Therefore, the role of the
jurist or judge, using analogy, is to attach a secondary circumstance fact whose ruling is not
stipulated to the ruling in an original circumstance so as equate the two, whether this is a
judgment of prohibition or permissibility. The judge’s or jurist’s discretionary power with regard
to analogy is an authority that is restricted by Islam’s fundamental texts. This is because Islamic
law bases its rulings on sound rational logic, which appears to those who have the most
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thoughtful and lucid perspectives, including jurists, judges, and scholars. This is useful in
refuting the suspicion of incompatibility between the mind and the text, which some may claim
without evidence.
We conclude from the above that the original sources of Islamic law are, respectively, the
Qur’an, the Prophet’s Sunnah, Consensus and Analogy, for each of which the judge’s
discretionary authority varies; it is restricted in the first three sources and expands with regard to
analogy.

1.2. Secondary sources of Islamic law
There are a number of secondary sources in Islamic law that a jurist or judge can resort to
in basing his opinion or judgment. Reliance on these sources varies from one school of
jurisprudence to another.

1.2.1. Istiḥsan (Juristic Discretion)
A- Definition
Istihsan, juristic preference, involves citing the stronger of two pieces of evidence when
the matter at hand is unclear between two pieces of evidence, and one is more appropriate to the
issue raised, so the analogy is left from the near evidence, and the distant evidence is taken for
approval.110
It is an exception to a partial rule from a general rule based on special evidence that
requires it, such as ruling on the validity of Salam contracts (selling something deferred in a
timely manner), Istisna contracts (manufacturing ships, planes, furniture, etc.), leasing, and
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contracts for agricultural land (for cultivation, watering, and planting) as an exception from the
rule on the invalidity of the contract of the non-existent (made to order).111And some defined it
as “abandoning analogy and adopting what is best for people.”112
B- Types of Istihsan
The Istihsan of the jurists is divided into several categories,113 some of which depend
oninterest, some on custom, some on the consensus of the people of Medina, and some that
depend on the preference of expansion of Islam over new peoples and lifting hardship for
them.114
The Hanafi school has taken Istihsan as a source of Islamic legislation, stipulating six
appropriate types of Istihsan:
•

Juristic preference based on a text
This is to avoid a ruling that requires analogy or a general text and works with a specific

text. An example of this is the impermissibility of selling what a person does not have, in
accordance with the saying of the Messenger, “Do not sell what you do not have.”115 By analogy,
selling what a person does not have is such as selling what a female animal is bearing before its
offspring is born. Taking Istihsan as a source requires abandoning previous texts and analogies
for a specific text that permits the sale of what a person does not yet have Salam contract,116 such
as sale if the farmer was selling one hundred Saa’.117 Of the indicated dates, that would be
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delivered after two months or more with two hundred dirhams in advance, so the farmer has
received the price in advance and delivers the goods later.
•

Istihsan based on Consensus
This involves an abandonment of the requirement of analogy or generality in a partial

issue for the sake of consensus, and its example is the consensus on the permissibility of Istisna
contracts in Islamic law.118
•

Istihsan based on necessity
An example is the ruling that requires the purification of basins and wells and pouring

water into them until any trace of an impurity is removed. This is because it is not possible to
wash the well and the basin as you wash the pots.
•

Istihsan based on a hidden Analogy
An example of this is a ruling on the purity of drinking after birds like falcons, even

though analogy requires its prohibition, such as the prohibition of drinking after wild animals
such as the wolf.
The reason for approving the purity of drinking after birds is that the apparent analogy
with carnivores is contradicted by a hidden analogy, which is that the bodies of the carnivores
come into contact with water and their saliva is unclean, while birds drink with their beaks, and
there is no moisture in them, so they did not contaminate water.119
•

Istihsan based on Absolute Interest
An example of this is the ruling to include a joint wage-earner, who does not work for a

specific person but many individuals in return for a wage, such as a laundry attendant and tailor.

Istisna’ is a contract with a manufacturer to do a specific thing for an immediate or deferred price, JOURNAL OF
JUDICIAL PROVISIONS, Article 124.
119
Al-Shawkani, 'iirshad alfuhul 'iilaa tahqiq alhaqi min eilm al'usuli, previous reference, vol. 2, p. 184.
118

36

The basic principle in Sharia is that if a tailor is given a garment to sew and it is damaged
by him without negligence on his part, he is not liable. However, this analogy was abandoned,
and it was said that the owner must be compensated unless it is proven that the damages to the
garment was due to force majeure, such as fire and floods. The basis for this ruling is the
desirability of the interest, in order to preserve people’s money from loss.120
•

Istihsan based on Custom
This involves the abandonment of the requirement of analogy to another ruling that

contradicts it due to the longstanding custom that indicates otherwise.
For example: whoever swears not to eat meat breaks an oath when he eats fish because it
is also meat, but they said: He does not break such juristic preference because the custom
differentiates between meat and fish.121
C- Argument of Istihsan
The majority of jurists from the Maliki, Hanafi, and Hanbali schools agreed to work122 by
inference with different types of Istihsan. As for Imam Al-Shafi’i, it was narrated that he chose
not to use Istihsan while some maintain that he did not deny Istihsan, but rather rejected Istihsan
interpretations that were based on the personal desire of the jurist.123
Those who took the approval of the jurists as a source of legislation, including the Hanafi
School and the Hanbali School, inferred from the Almighty saying in the Qur’an, “Follow the
best of what was revealed to you from your Lord,”124 along with “And follow the best of what
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was revealed to you from your Lord,”125 and in the Sunnah, The Prophet  ﷺsaying “Whatever the
Muslims see as good, it is good with God.”126
Istihsan for them is an argument that relies on a text, consensus, necessity, analogy,
custom, or absolute interest, and for its consistency with the principles of Sharia in taking ease
and leaving hardship.127
The Maliki School has taken Istihsan as a legislative source and used it as an
establishment for many of Maliki’s books and chapters. The founder of the Maliki school, Imam
Malik, said: “Nine-tenths of knowledge is Istihsan.” The Istihsan that Imam Malik adopted in
jurisprudence and fatwa means: to decide with the stronger of two pieces of evidences. In short,
say an event lies between two original circumstances, and one is more similar and the other
origin is further away. However, there might be an apparent analogy, current custom, some kind
of special interest, fear of corruption, or some kind of hurt or damage. In these circumstances, the
jurist changes from ruling by analogy with the near origin, to analogy with that more distant
origin. This requires presenting the inference sent on the analogy based on what is understood as
the intent of the Qur’an and Sunnah, and not just a personal opinion.128
While the Shafi’i school does not see the adoption of Istihsan as a legislative source
because it depends on the personal opinion of the jurist, Imam Shafi’i said: “He who commends
has legislated,” meaning whoever takes Istihsan has created a ruling. He devoted a chapter in his
famous author Al-Umm to invalidate Istihsan.129
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To conclude: there is a difference between the schools of jurisprudence about taking
Istihsan as a secondary source of Islamic law, but the majority accepts it.

1.2.2. Istishab (Presumption)
A- Definition
Presumption means affirming what was proven or negating what was denied. In short, the
legal perspective remains as it was, as a legal ruling established by texts in the past and with
continuing relevance in the present, until there is evidence of a need for modification.130 Such is
the ruling with regard to the livelihood of a missing person until there is proof of his death.
B- Types of Presumption:
First type: Presumption of the original innocence, which is to remain in the non-judgment
until the evidence indicates it, because acquittance is the rule.
Second type: Presumption of what the Sharia indicates to prove the existence of its cause,
and from this comes the saying of the jurists: This principle remains valid until the evidence
indicates otherwise.
C- Forms of Presumption:
1. Presumption of innocence, i.e., ruling with acquitting those charged with legal or
financial offenses, until there is evidence to the contrary.
2. Presumption of the ruling that is evidenced to be proven and there is evidence to change
it. An example is a ruling on confirming marital status. If the wife wants a divorce, with a
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marriage contract in hand, the principle is that it is not proof, and she must have proof
that she is legally married.
3. Presumption of the general until the specification is received, and the presumption of text
until the cancellation.
4. Presumption of a firm consensual ruling in a matter of dispute among scholars.131
D- Some jurisprudence rules based on presumption:
1. Antecedent judgment is supposed to stay as it was, until the need for change it is proven.
2. Certainty is not overruled by doubt.
3. Origin is clearance, i.e., a person should not be preoccupied with an obligation without
evidence.
4. Any new events are regarded as happening nearest to the present. An example: when two
parties dispute about a recent defect, whether it occurred before or after a sale, it is
presumed that it occurred recently.
E- The argument of presumption:
Presumption is an absolute argument according to the majority of jurists, who cite the
Qur’an and the Sunnah as evidence to establish a firm ruling until there is evidence to modify it.
It is valid in proving or disproving individual rights.132
For the Hanafi school, presumption is an argument for defense and denial, not for proof
and entitlement, and that is why it maintains: presumption is an argument to maintain what was,
not to prove what was not. This difference among jurists has resulted in various interpretations
on issues on which the source of presumption is based, including on the provisions of the
missing person and whether positive rights, such as inheritances that have been designated for
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someone. However, it might be asked: is the presumption of his being alive, only benefitting him
in stopping the consequences of his death, such as dividing money intended for him among
other, his inheritors?
The majority of jurists maintained that the rights of the missing person remain before his
loss and also decree that claims resulting from his death should be stopped before ruling on their
occurrence. The Hanafi ruled that his life should remain as a rule for the period of his loss in
relation to his money and his wife only, until evidence of his death or the judge decides that."133

1.2.3. Predecessors Laws
The fundamental Islamic jurists have addressed the pre-Sharia predecessor’s laws
definition, division, conditions, and the extent to which it is invoked as a secondary source of
Islamic law.
A- Definition
The predecessors’ laws are the firm rulings established in the laws of the
preceding prophets and messengers that have been mentioned in the Qur’an or Prophet’s
Sunnah, and for which Sharia has not established their abolition or their approval.
The rulings that Allah legislated for non-Islamic nations, through his prophets, such as
Abraham, Moses, David, and Jesus, were transmitted to Muslims in a correct way, such as the
Qur’an and the Sunnah, and they are one of the sources of Islamic law, according to the opinion
of the majority of jurists. What is true from the law of our predecessors is legal for us unless it is
canceled in accordance with the provisions of Sharia.
Sections of rulings in the divine laws:
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1. Origins: It is submission to God alone and no one else and singling him out with belief in
and service to Him, His Names, His Attributes, and the Last Day. This is a part of what
all the heavenly laws have agreed upon, including the Islamic Sharia.
2. The branches are where the previous heavenly laws differed, which is one of the purposes
of my research here.
B- Conditions for adopting a law from our predecessors
1. The previous laws should not be distorted laws.
2. These laws should be transmitted in a correct manner, such as the Holy Qur’an and the
Sunnah of the Prophet.
3. Their provisions are not to be repealed by Sharia.
C- The argument for the adoption of the laws of our predecessors:
What was mentioned in the laws of previous nations is divided into three sections, and
the extent of their invocation varies accordingly:134
1. What God and His Messenger  ﷺhave narrated about these nations, and what Sharia has
negated: These rulings are not to be taken by the agreement of the jurists, who cite the
Almighty saying: “For the Jews, We forbade everything with undivided hoofs. As of
cattle and sheep: We forbade them their fat, except what adheres to their backs, or the
entrails, or what is mixed with bone. Thus, we penalized them for their iniquity. And
surely, we are truthful.”135 What was stated in this verse about the prohibition on the
Jews Sharia has invalidated.
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2. Rulings that are mentioned in the Qur’an or the Sunnah that, according to legal evidence,
are commanded of us, as they were commanded to the previous nations.
These rulings are unanimously agreed to by jurists as applicable to Muslims, and
the evidence lies in Sharia and not what was mentioned in the previous laws, and from
that His saying, “O you who believe! Fasting is prescribed for you, as it was prescribed
for those before you, so that you may become righteous.”136 This verse shows that
because fasting was obligatory on the nations that came before Muslims, then it was
obligatory for Muslims.
3. Provisions legislated by our predecessors that are not mentioned in the Qur’an or the
Sunnah; and this type is not binding for us according to the Consensus of the jurists.137
4. Rulings that came to us through the Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Prophet and were not
accompanied by evidence of their abrogation or the legality of their adoption; such
rulings are a matter of dispute among the jurists whether it is necessary to be applicable
or not.
The majority of jurists from Hanafi, Maliki, Hanbali and some Shafi’i schools 138 hold the
view that it is permissible to adopt a law from our predecessors as a legislative source if the
conditions referred to above are fulfilled, as evidenced by the following:
1. The saying of Allah Almighty, “They are those whom Allah has guided, so follow their
guidance. Say, ‘I ask of you no compensation for it—it is only a reminder for all
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humankind.”139 This verse infers that Allah Almighty commanded the Prophet
Muhammad  ﷺto follow the path of the prophets who preceded him.
2. Allah Almighty said, addressing the people of Moses: “And We wrote for them in it: ‘a
life for a life, an eye for an eye…”140 It was inferred from this verse that what was
legislated for Islam’s predecessors is legislated to Muslims, because the Prophet ﷺ
commanded retribution on the murderer, except in the case of pardon from the relatives
of the murdered.
3. The legality of taking the temporal division; taking into account the words of Allah in the
law of the Prophet Saleh: “And inform them that the water is to be divided among
them—each share of drink equitably proportioned.”141
This verse included Allah addressing the Prophet Saleh to tell his people Thamud142 that
the water will be divided, and it is permissible to divide the supply of water, even though the
command was addressed to a previous nation.143
4. The application of the Messenger, as cited in the Sunnah, of a ruling in the Torah that
originally was applicable to Jews.
5. Allah Almighty’s saying: “He has appointed for you the same religion He enjoined upon
Noah.”144 The point of inference is that Allah legislated for the Muslims the same as what
he legislated for Noah, so it is clear that his law is a law for Muslims.
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1.2.4. The words of the Companions
A- Definition
The companions are known to the majority of jurists as everyone who met the Messenger
Muhammad  ﷺand believed in him. According to the majority of jurists from among the people
of hadith, it is everyone who met the Messenger  ﷺas a Muslim and died as a Muslim, regardless
of whether the time of his companionship with the Messenger  ﷺwas protracted or not.145 The
period of his companionship extended for a long time.
The fundamentalist jurists talk about the longstanding Companion who had knowledge in
the Qur’an and the Sunnah so that it is possible to build on his sayings, while modernist jurists
for example, those who are interested in the hadith of the Messenger ﷺ, talk about the
Companion who was a contemporary of the Messenger  ﷺeven for a short period. The
Companions had a prominent role in the fatwa after the death of the Messenger ﷺ, especially
with the emergence of many new issues for which no rulings were determined during his time,
such as the amount of a grandmother’s share of an inheritance.
What is meant by the words of the Companion: is his doctrine that he said or did and did
not attribute it to, or narrate it from, the Prophet. It is the sum of the jurisprudential opinions and
the established legal fatwas from the Companions.146
B - Sections of the words of the Companions
The words of the Companions are divided into four sections:
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The first contains sayings of the Companion in matters where there is no room for
differences, such as worship, etc., and this section is an argument for the four jurists, because the
Companion must have heard it from the Prophet ﷺ.147
The second consists of words of the Companion that were generally known, and no one
disagreed with him, and thus this section is used as evidence. The third: the word of a
Companion that other Companions disagreed with and this is not invoked.148 The fourth is the
word of a Companion, which was not well-known and includes room for interpretation. There
was no known opposition to it. Thus, it is the subject of dispute.
C- The argument of the word of the Companion:
The jurists differed about the authenticity of a Companion’s saying if there was no
opposition to it from the other Companions:
Hanifa, Malik, and Hanbali believed that in these circumstances, the saying of the
Companion should be taken into account. They cited the Almighty’s saying in the Qur’an: “You
are the best community that ever emerged for humanity: you advocate what is moral, and forbid
what is immoral,”149 and the Prophet’s words  ﷺin the Sunnah, “The people of my generation are
the best, then those who follow them, and then whose who follow the latter.”150 Just as the
Companions lived through the revelation of the Qur’an and were more knowledgeable about the
Book of God and the Sunnah of His Messenger ﷺ, so their sayings take precedence over the
sayings of others. And it is possible that the saying of a Companion which was not opposed is
from what he transmitted or heard from the Prophet.
Of this type, the Companions’ judgment regarding the ostrich is measured if the forbidden person hunts it with a
camel: “So Omar, Othman, Ali bin Abi Talib, Zaid bin Thabit, Ibn Abbas and Muawiyah—may God be pleased
with them—said about the ostrich: it is killed by a camel, and the gazelle by a goat.” See also Al-Bayhaqi, Al-Sunan
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The second group consists of Shafi’i in his new school, along with other jurists, who
maintain that the word of a Companion is not an argument, citing the Qur’an as evidence in the
Almighty’s saying: “So take a lesson, O you who have insight.”151 This is an order from Allah, to
strive instead of to imitate. The Companions are human beings and are not infallible. Whoever is
not proven to be infallible is not a subject of argument. The Companions themselves
unanimously agreed on the permissibility of each of them opposing the other if it was not
possible to agree on a ruling on a specific issue, as the Companions also supported some of the
followers on their Ijtihad, and these followers had opinions that were contrary to a companion’s
saying. If the saying of a Companion was an argument against someone else, then it would not
be permissible for the follower, by his Ijtihad to contradict that saying of the Companion.152
From the foregoing it is clear that there is a jurisprudential disagreement about
considering the word of the Companion to be an independent and valid secondary source of
legislation in Islamic Sharia, which expands the authority of the Saudi judge in deducing rulings
for the issues and issues he considers.

1.2.5. Blocking pretexts
A- Definition
Pretext is defined by jurists as the prevention of permissible means and methods that may
lead to evil or the order that is forbidden by Sharia. They prevent what is permissible lest a
person extend the permissible to what is not permissible.153 This is because the means take the
ruling of what they lead to; just as the means of the obligation is obligatory, so the means of the
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forbidden is prohibited. The matter that appears to be permissible, but which leads to corruption
or falling into something forbidden, is impermissible in Sharia.154 Blocking pretext is aimed at
helping someone not reach the forbidden matter. This legislative source is based on the principle
that the means take the rule of what they lead to; just as the means of the obligation is obligatory,
so the means of the forbidden is prohibited. that the four schools of jurisprudence have taken this
legislative source in one way or another. However, the Maliki School has expanded in taking this
legislative source.155
B- Means of Blocking Pretexts
The means of Blocking Pretexts are:
1- A means that leads to a definite evil, which jurists unanimously agree is prohibited
because of its harmful consequences both immediately and eventually. For example,
there is a prohibition of digging wells on roads because of the possibility of people falling
into them.
2- A means by which Sharia law came into its legitimacy, either as a matter of necessity or
desirability, according to its degree of interest, and this type is not disputed regarding its
permissibility.
3- A means that leads to a permissible thing, but is intended to lead to a corrupting one, e.g.,
a marriage contract with the intent of making the wife permissible for marriage to her
first husband.156
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4- A means that leads to permissible action and which was not intended to reach a corrupt
one, but often leads to it, and its corruption is more likely than its benefit, and that
includes insulting idolaters in public if it would lead to insulting Allah.
The jurists differed about the third and fourth section, and whether the Sharia came to
prevent it.157 Some schools of Islamic jurisprudence, including the Malikis and the Hanbalis, see
that Blocking Pretexts as legal evidence for e rulings are based. Thus, when the means lead to
corruption, they must be prevented. Others from the Shafi’is and Hanafis schools do not infer
this evidence, unless it is supported with text, consensus or analogy.
The jurists who say that this legislative source should work have inferred this by citing
the Qur’an and the Sunnah, including:
1. Allah almighty said: “And do not insult those they call upon besides Allah, lest they
insult Allah out of hostility and ignorance.”158The significance of the text is that God
forbade believers from insulting the gods of the polytheists, although they deserve to be
insulted, so that they do not curse Allah. This example is included in the first section of
the pretexts as an example that leads to corruption.
2. The Almighty said: “And they should not strike their feet, drawing attention to their
hidden beauty.”159 The implication of the verse is that Almighty forbade women from
hitting their feet, even though it is permissible in and of itself lest men hear the sound of
anklets, and that would provoke their desire.
3. A wise legislator prevented the judge from accepting a gift in order to block the pretext of
taking a bribe,160 and also prevented a judge from ruling on a matter about which he had
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personal knowledge so as to eliminate falsehood by this and other judges. Also, there is a
prohibition of selling weapons in civil war because it facilitates aggression.
C- The argument to block pretexts
The jurists in most Islamic jurisprudence schools agreed to work with the source that
counsel “block/obstruct the pretexts.” In general, disagreement occurred in some of its types,
and in some jurisprudence branches in which the reasons why corruption emerges, and its
strength vary.161
Blocking Pretexts is an absolute necessity in the Maliki and Hanbali schools, and they
have inferred the presence of legal texts in the Qur’an and Sunnah that forbid things that
were originally authorized but should be forbidden because they often lead to harm or evil.162

1.2.6. Masalih Mursala (Absolute Interest)
A- Definition
Interests that are absolute are defined as those for which there is no legal evidence
mandating them and there is no legal evidence to forbid them. But the legislators were silent
about it. They are matters that are not mentioned in the Qur’an or the Sunnah, neither in terms of
an obligation to follow them or to avoid them; the main sources in Sharia simply are silent with
regard to interests.
The classical jurists also call adopting absolute interests “advancing the public good.”
This is defined as the arrangement of the legal ruling in an incident where there is no text or
consensus based on taking into account an absolute interest. The absolute interest itself is defined
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as a benefit, whether it is mundane or eschatological. Public good is the construction of
jurisprudential rulings on the requirements of the absolute interests, which considers every
interest that is not mentioned in the Sharia; also, there is no text on its abolition.163
B – Divisions of absolute interests
Interests are divided in terms of Sharia into:
1- Significant interests that must be observed in a specific basis. They can be compared to
similar interests, an example being an interest in preserving one’s right mind, which is
one of the pretexts for the prohibition against drinking alcohol. All other intoxicants, such
as narcotics, are measured against wine, and they interfere with another legislation
source, which is the source of the analogy.164
2- Invalid interests, which consist of every benefit that the Sharia indicates which is not
considered and taken into account in its rulings. This is because invalid interests bring
greater harm or evil, and the control by which they are known as invalid is their violation
of the text, consensus, and clear analogy. An example is sexual pleasure in adultery,
which is forbidden because it contradicts Qur’anic laws and the Sunnah, and because of
the evils and damages that it entails for the entire family.
3- Interests where the legislator considers gender and does not bear witness to a specific
origin in consideration. An example is the Diwan establishment during the era of Caliph
Omar ibn Al-Khattab to control the salaries and livelihoods of soldiers and the duration
of their service and the creation of prisons.
There are many practical examples in the modern era whose enforcement is based on
the absolute interests as a legislative source, including:
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1- Donating, transferring, and transplanting human organs.
2- Recording people’s major life events, such as marriage, divorce, birth, and death.
3- Obligating the issuance of identity cards and drivers’ licenses for owners of autos and
other vehicles.
4- Circulating coins.
5- Regulating traffic and placing traffic lights to facilitate the movement of people so as to
help preserve their lives.
These examples were not mentioned in the Qur’an or the Sunnah, but they are needed for
people to organize their lives and fulfill their needs. Everything that is beneficial in Sharia and
achieves the purposes of Sharia is supported and confirmed by legal textual support. A
commandment is obligatory or recommended, and everything that proved harmful has texts in
Sharia forbidding it.
C-The factors that call the jurist to adopt the Absolute Interests are the following:
Sharia exists to advance the general interests of the people, who are encouraged to gain
benefits and to avoid harm. The texts and principles indicate the necessity of taking into account
these matters in organizing all aspects of life.
1- Advancing interests that individuals and society need to establish people’s lives on a just
basis.
2- Warding off evil, including things that harm people, individuals or groups, whether the
harm is material or moral.165
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3- Blocking Pretexts, that is, preventing methods that lead to neglecting or violating the
commands of Sharia, or that lead to committing legal prohibitions, even if
unintentionally.
4- Change of the times and circumstances, that is, responding to different conditions facing
the general public from what they were before.
D- Conditions of working with the absolute interests
Some schools of Islamic jurisprudence in Islamic law, such as the Maliki school,
legislated according to absolute interests, when conditions and criteria had been set for them,
so that the interests emitted can be considered a secondary legislative source of Sharia.
Among these conditions were:
1- That the interest is real and not illusory such as the fantasy that there is a benefit from
using illegal drugs.
2- The interest should not conflict with the legal text or the consensus of Islamic jurists.
3- Jurists should not oppose an interest equal to it or greater than it. If a conflict occurs, the
stronger one would prevail, and if the public interest conflicted with individual’s interest,
the former would prevail.
4- The absolute interest is exclusively used in transactions, and legal matters, and cannot be
used in beliefs and the principles of worship.
5- The interest should fit the purposes of Sharia rather than contradict them, including
through its prooftexts.
6- That the interest is reasonable, so that the public will accept it.
7- That the interest aims to preserve a necessary matter and/or remove a critical
embarrassment in the religion.
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8- The interest should be for public matters not private ones.
9- The jurist or judge looking into the interest should be knowledgeable of and diligent about
the provisions of Sharia.
Among the practical cases that are considered evidence of the permissibility of taking
absolute interests as a secondary legislative source:
1- What happened during the era of the Companions when they collected the Qur’anic
verses in one Mushaf.166
2- Having traffic lights and signs to regulate traffic on the roads. Not having them leads to
traffic accidents, which may cause loss of life.
3- Registering life-cycle events, such as registering births and marriages.
4- Civic authorities should withdraw the identity cards of those who are legally charged
with a crime, as well as the drivers’ licenses, and punish those who fail to do so.
5- Coins must be minted and struck. Although this action has no basis in the Qur’an and
Sunnah, the need for it is urgent so that people purchase the necessities of life. Therefore,
the state had to coin a common currency and put in place strict laws to punish forgers, so
that it will retain its value.
D- The argument for taking into account absolute interests
Scholars of Islamic jurisprudence differed about taking absolute interests as a source of
Islamic law.167 Although the Maliki and Hanbali schools are famous for adopting this secondary
legislative source because they were the first to set the conditions and criteria necessary for its
use, the other schools, such as the Hanafi and Shafi’i schools have had reservations about
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invoking and applying this source it in the face of other legislative sources.168 These schools are
based on taking the source of Absolute Interests on the grounds that Sharia was developed as a
mercy to the worlds; where the Almighty said: “We did not send you except as a mercy for
humankind.”169 The Almighty also said: “Allah intends for you ease, and He does not want to
make things difficult for you.”170 These texts, which were included in Qur’an, prove that Sharia
exists to advance the public interest; taking of Absolute Interests achieves this goal.
Those among the jurists who said that it is permissible to work with Absolute Interest
have inferred this from:
1- The Qur’an, where the Almighty said: “Allah intends to lighten your burden.”171 and
“He has chosen you, and He has not burdened you in religion.”172 Adopting Absolute
Interests to settle issues, and issues that have not been directly stipulated in the original
sources of Islamic law, achieves these verses’ objective.
2- The Companions acted in accordance with Absolute Interests on many issues. By
following their interpretations and those who came after them, one finds that they
issued fatwas on many matters as soon as an incident contained a clear public interest,
without necessarily resorting to the source of analogy. When they were considered
without anyone denying it, their actions were considered unanimous. The Companions
introduced rulings for issues that occurred in their time, despite the absence of specific
legal evidence for them in the original sources of Sharia, with the aim of advancing the
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public interest. This confirms the consideration of the sent interests as a secondary
source of legislation.173
3- The criterion of reasonableness: society is constantly evolving, and people’s dealings
and interests change with time and place, even when rulings are grounded in the
original sources of Islamic law. Thus, when many people’s lives have been disrupted by
new circumstances, some Islamic legislation has stopped keeping pace with them. This
is in violation of the purposes of Sharia and harms individuals and societies, which is
something that Sharia forbids. Therefore, it is necessary to take into account the
absolute interests as a factor in issuing new rulings that are compatible with the
purposes and overall objectives of Sharia.174
To summarize: the jurists differed in the extent to which Absolute Interests are taken into
consideration as a secondary and independent legislative source. Most considered Absolute
Interests, such as those of the Maliki school, followed by the Hanbali school, then the Hanafi
school, then the Shafi’i school.175 But they also supported the view of other jurists regarding the
need to be careful in taking this source too extensively because expanding on it requires accurate
understanding, and depth in deduction from jurist or judge, which may not be available in
some,176 who may make judgments that depend more on personal rather than objective criteria.

1.2.7. Urff (Custom)
A- Definition
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Custom is everything that people are familiar with in their lives, including actions or
words, provided they are stable and that they are accepted by reason and instinct. It is what has
settled on the soul and is accepted by the right natures.177 Custom types include:
1- Practical custom is what people used to do without adhering to a specific verbal formula,
as is the case in a hand sale, i.e., taking the commodity and paying its price without an
offer and the acceptance of an exchange between the seller and the buyer.
2- Verbal custom is what people used to say. i.e., in the Arabic language, the word “”ولد
meaning “boy” is used to refer to both male and female children, while it is customary
among people to refer to male children only.
3- General or specific custom means behavioral or verbal custom that may be general or
special in custom. General custom means everything that the majority of people have
known at one time, while special custom means what the people of a particular place,
region, or sect have known.
4- The right custom and an invalid custom. The right custom meant what people are familiar
with it, without forbidding what is permissible or legalizing what is forbidden such as the
requirement of a deposit in an Istisna contract. An invalid custom means what people are
accustomed to but one that forbids what is permitted or permits what is forbidden, such as
taking interest or drinking wine.178
B- Terms of Customs
1- It is required for the adoption of a custom not contradicted by a legal text of the
Qur’an or the Sunnah, or that it contradicts the consensus of the jurists.
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It must be everything that people have come to know without making permissible
what is forbidden or forbidding what is permissible, such as dividing the dowry into
immediate and deferred payments, according to what people are familiar with, and
providing a deposit in an Istisna contract.
2- One must verify the existence of custom in a matter that is commonly observed among
the people in the place in which it is current or often so that most of the people of this
place or country see its necessity and act upon it. When there is not widespread habit, it is
an individual act or a habit rather than a custom.
3- The custom should be present at the time of the act, and not an old custom that has been
abandoned.
4- The custom should not contradict an agreement or declaration that contradicts it between
the parties. Therefore, custom that is known as conditional entails two aspects of
condition. If the contracting parties declare something that is contrary to custom, what
they contracted still must be adhered to.179
C- The argument for custom
The prevalence of custom is an argument in Islamic legislation for its suitability
to people’s needs, lifting embarrassment and hardship, and achieving their interests, as
long as it does not contradict Sharia. The Hanafis, the Malikis, and Ibn al-Qayyim from
the Hanbali school viewed custom as an independent source of Islamic law and cited the
saying of God: “Be tolerant, and command decency, and avoid the ignorant.”180 On the
other hand, the Shafi’i school does not consider custom as an independent source of
legislation.
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According to the Malikis, custom is one of the principles of deduction. Just as it responds
to man-made laws, Sharia considers custom as one of the sources of legislation. Islamic It must
find appropriate provisions for facts and issues in which there is no text in order to legislate
rights and obligations among people in their daily lives so as to help them meet their needs and
advance their interests.
Most jurists consider jurisprudential custom in constructing legal rulings with an effect
that was expressed by the Messenger: “What Muslims see as good is good with God.”181 Thus,
Islamic jurisprudence considers custom as a legislative source when it does not conflict with
explicit texts and established principles.182
There is a discrepancy among the schools of jurisprudence regarding Custom, such as the
Hanafi school, depend on the correct custom to a great extent, of in establishing and ending
rights between people in different areas of behavior and transactions.

1.2.8. The work of the people of Medina
A- Definition
The work of the people of Medina183: most of the jurists agreed upon
considering some issues in the time of the Companions or their followers.184
B- Types of work of the people of Medina
The work of the people of the city can be transferable or deductive. Transferable
work is achieved by transferring of certain provisions by the people of Medina on how
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work was carried out, such as the Saa’, the tide, the call to prayer, and the abandonment
of taking zakat from vegetables.
Deductive work is reached by means of Ijtihad, and the Maliki jurists differed
about the arguments of the deductive action.185
C- The argument concerning the work of the people of Medina:
The Maliki School is the only one that took this argument as a legislative
source.186 It inferred that Medina,187 in which the Prophet Muhammad  ﷺresided until his
death witnessed the revelation of the Qur’an, especially the verses related to rulings and
where the practical application of these verses took place. Also, the Companions had
memorized the revelation and worked on writing it and acting on what it stipulated and
therefore their work will be the closest to the truth.188
From the foregoing, it is clear that there is a doctrinal dispute among the four schools of
jurisprudence regarding the consideration of secondary or dependent sources as an independent
source in Islamic law.
But this difference did not rule out the invocation of these secondary sources to find
appropriate solutions to the new issues in people’s lives that are not mentioned in the original
sources of Islamic law.
Rather, this disagreement in most cases does not focus on not invoking these sources, but
rather that the ruling on the issue under discussion may be found in another source of Sharia,
original or secondary, where these other sources differ from one school of jurisprudence to
another. Such discrepancy between schools of jurisprudence is necessarily transmitted to Saudi
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judges who rely on Islamic jurisprudence, especially the Hanbali school, in establishing their
rulings. We find that a judge may adopt a statement that he deems is closer to the issue or case
presented to him, and then justifies his ruling on this basis.
In all cases, any source of Islamic law, basis or secondary, must be based on the two
primary sources, the Qur’an and the Sunnah. Because the only source of legislation in Islam is
God, through the revelation expressed in the Qur’an, or through the Sunnah, so none of the old or
new diligent jurists should rely solely on his personal opinion, as some of the authors of manmade laws do. The task of Sharia jurists is to uncover God’s judgment in a matter or issue
through Ijtihad, deduction, and interpreting the texts of the Qur’an and Sunnah. 189
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1.3. Review of the liquidated damages clause in Islamic law

1.3.1. The nature of the liquidated damages clause in Sharia
The liquidated damages clause is subject to the general rules in the Qur’an that contracts
must be fulfilled. The Almighty Allah said: “O ye who believe! Fulfill all obligations.”190
In the Qur’an, Allah also forbids taking people’s money unjustly, and declares: “Do not
appropriate one another’s property with inequity and by false means.” Delaying the performance
of an obligation beyond its due date or failure to fulfill a contractual obligation is considered to
be taking people’s money unjustly.
In accordance with the Almighty’s saying, “When you judge between the people you
should judge justly,” and the Almighty’s saying, “Do not let the enmity of a people move you at
all to act otherwise than equitably. Be equitable always.”191
A hadith reports the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ, stressing the importance of respecting
contracts and fulfilling their conditions, where he, may Allah’s prayers and peace be upon him,
said: “Muslims will be held to their conditions, except the conditions that make the lawful
unlawful, or the unlawful lawful.” Prophet Muhammad  ﷺsaid, “There should be neither
harming nor reciprocating harm.”192
The liquidated damages clause is a modern terminology trend, and it is considered one of
the new cases to the Islamic financial transactions and jurisprudence. The terminology was
formed and devolved in comparative laws filed and conveyed it is way to several Islamic
countries’ legislations.193 The liquidated damages clause was not known to the ancient jurists of
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Sharia, although the concept was known to them and their discussion of it was reflected in the
chapters of the liquidated damages clause in Islamic jurisprudence books.194
This kind of clause was not much needed before modern times due to the simplicity of
economic life in Islamic societies. Given contemporary economic life, with its complexities,
intertwined relationships, and the negative effects resulting from the failure or delay of one of the
parties to the contract to fulfill its obligations toward the other becoming widespread, the need
for this type of condition arose.195
The liquidated damages clause has many names due to differences in the concept and the
realities to which it was applied. Those who think it is compensation for damages call it
“liquidated damages,” and those who think it is a penalty call it the “penalty clause” or “delay
fine.” Since it was often placed as a condition in a contract within the terms of the contract on
compensation due, or an appendix thereto, the most popular term has become “liquidated
damages clause.”196
The liquidated damages clause is defined as an arbitrary compensation agreement for the
expected damages and thus compensation estimated in advance by the contracting parties that the
creditor is entitled to in the event the debtor does not fulfill his obligation or delays it. This
condition may be included in the original contract and may be in a later contract, but it is
required that the compensation to be agreed upon before the breach occurs it. It constitutes an
additional obligation, according to which the two contracting parties agree to determine the legal
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compensation to be due in case of voluntary breach of the prejudicial party to the stipulated
party.197
By analyzing this definition of the liquidated damages clause, it becomes clear that:
It is an obligation, a binding condition that usually is an addition of the original contract.
This is legitimate compensation stipulated to avoid what would be an invalid liquidated damages
clause that leads to usury, the charge that its amount is in excess of the damages incurred, or an
unfair financial loss of the injured party.
If unfairness appears in the estimation of compensation when the damages occurs, it must
be adjusted by a judge to match the damages. And (harmful): a precaution against the state of
non-harm, which leads to the non-entitlement of the liquidated damages clause unless harm is
assumed as it is in the liquidated damages clause in the marriage contract in the Kingdom, as
discussed below.
Islamic jurists have determined that the liquidated damages clause includes
characteristics making it permissible according to:198
•

An additional characteristic is that it is a subordinate obligation to the original obligation
and cannot be independent of it, and thus follows the original obligation in its existence
and nonexistence.

•

It is compensation for the damages arising from a breach of an obligation, not a penalty.

•

The agreement between the creditor and the debtor has taken place before the occurrence
of the breach or damages, so that the amount of compensation is determined in the
original contract or in a subsequent agreement, before the damages occur, and it is due
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upon the occurrence of the damages or breach, whether this breach is a result of nonperformance of the obligation, or of partial or defective execution.
•

It is related to concrete, measurable damages and is not due without actual or assumed
damages.

•

There are two opinions on whether traditional Muslim jurists spoke about these liquidated
damages clause or mentioned some of its forms and issues under other names:
In the first opinion, Islamic jurisprudence did not define the liquidated damages clause at

all, and there was no talk about any of its types. What was mentioned in the jurisprudence
concerned similar issues, such as the deposit. They are similar to, but hardly identical, to penalty
clauses.199
In the second opinion, while traditional Islamic jurisprudence did not know the liquidated
damages clause by that name, nor did it know all its forms, types, and conditions, it did know a
number of its forms.200 The most prominent of these was in the Sahih book when a man said to
another man: postpone your travel journey by sheltering and tying up your traveling camels in
my stalls, and if I do not join you on your journey, I will pay you hundred dirhams. And when
the time came, he did not travel with him. So, the traveler man complained to a judge named
Shuraih. After confirming the validity of the complaint, the judge ordered the other man to pay
the conditioned amount and said: “Whoever optionally, and without duress, stipulates a certain
condition on himself, must fulfill the condition.”201 The basis for contracts and transactions in
Islamic law is validity until evidence is established to the contrary.
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1.3.2. Sharia distinguishes between the liquidated damages clause and other similar terms

A. Liquidated damages clause and sales on deposit
A deposit and a liquidated damages clause are similar in that both are conditions that
require the person who breaches them to pay financial compensation, and that both are intended
to urge the contracting party to implement it. Also, selling the deposit may be interpreted as a
penalty clause for estimating compensation in the event of reversal of the contract (the price of
reversal). However, they differ in that the deposit exists prior to the contract and the liquidated
damages clause is attached to it. The deposit is also intended to enable one of the contracting
parties to rescind the contract, while the liquidated damages clause is intended to urge the
contracting party to implement on time and to compensate the creditor in case of breach.
The deposit is the equivalent of the right to rescind the contract. The obligation to pay the
deposit is valid even if the rescission of the contract did not result in any damages. As for the
liquidated damages clause, it is an estimate of compensation for damages that has occurred. It is
not worth pursuing the compensation unless the damages have occurred, and the deposit may not
be reduced. And the amount specified in the liquidated damages clause may be reduced in
proportion to the damages. In the sale of the down payment, the buyer has the right to abandon
the purchase in order to pay the deposit, in contrast to the liquidated damages clause. The
obligated person is not obligated to required his commitment to the contract by paying the
compensation resulting from the agreed condition.202
B. Liquidated damages clause and financial threat (penalty payment)
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There are similarities and differences between the liquidated damages clause and the
financial threat clause in Islamic jurisprudence:
Among the similarities is that each of them is a sum of money paid due to a breach of
contract, and that each is intended to urge the other party to expedite the execution of what it has
committed to. One difference is that the existence and extent of financial threat is determined by
a judge. By contrast, in the liquidated damages clause, the two contracting parties agree in
advance. Also, it is possible that the fine in the financial threat may exceed the amount of
damages, so the judge can increase the fine the longer the obstinacy of the debtor pertains, to
force him to carry out his obligation, unlike the liquidated damages clause. In addition, the
financial threat is a threatening temporary ruling that is not enforceable unless it is converted into
a final compensation. As for the liquidated damages clause, it is usually implemented as it is
without any increase or decrease unless the judge deems that there is a need to amend its amount.
The amount specified in the financial threat clause is usually reduced upon execution,
because it is much more than the actual damages. As for the liquidated damages clause, it is
usually implemented as it is without an increase or decrease unless parties have agreed
differently.

C. The liquidated damages clause and the late fine in administrative contracts
The late fine is an amount of money estimated by the public administration in advance
and is included in the provisions of the administrative contract, as a penalty imposed on a
contractor with the administration if he is delayed in executing the contract. It is a privilege that
the administration enjoys even if it has not suffered any damages as a result of the contractor’s
delay in execution because the damages is presumed to be related to the operation of a public
utility.
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The administration has the right to impose a late fine without the need of a warning or
resort to legal proceedings to issue a judgment to implement it because it is based on a legal text
that authorizes the administration to impose it. However, the administration adheres to the value
stipulated in the contract, so it cannot demand an adjustment of the amount on the basis that the
damages exceed the amount of the fine, and the contractor cannot prove that the administration
did not suffer any damages as a result of the delay in execution.
Saudi jurisprudence and the judiciary administrators have established that the
administration has wide discretionary powers in imposing the late fine. It is not entitled to
impose a late fine if the reason for the delay is because of the administration itself or if there was
force majeure, or the contractor proved that the delay was due to an extension requested by the
contract party and approved by the administration, or that the delay was caused by someone
else.203

1.4. Methods of appointing a judge in the Saudi legal system
We will discuss the conditions for appointing a Saudi judge; the range of the judiciary in
the Kingdom; the composition of the judiciary; the mandatory provisions of Sharia law for
judges and the independence they enjoy; the judge’s duties; the termination of his service; and
some of the problems that the Saudi judiciary suffers from.
A- Conditions for appointing judges in the Kingdom
According to Article 31 of the Saudi Judicial Code, issued in 2007, a judge must be a
Saudi citizen; a non-Saudi should not assume the judiciary. He must be of good conduct and
behavior and have the full capacity to judge according to the provisions of Sharia. Also, a judge
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must be knowledgeable of legal precedents and be able to derive these rulings from the Holy
Qur’an and the Sunnah through Ijtihad (interpretations of matters not covered by the Qur’an).
Also, he should judge between people by only what Allah and His Messenger have revealed, and
he should not be ignorant of the rulings in Sharia.204
The Prophet  ﷺsaid, “There are three types of judges: one of will go to Paradise and two
to Hell. The one who will go to Paradise is a man who knows what is right and judges
accordingly; but a man who knows what is right and acts tyrannically in his judgment will go to
Hell; and a man who gives judgment for people when he is ignorant will go to Hell too.”205
Sharia also requires justice in the judge, so he is outwardly honest, refrains from the
forbidden, keeping away from sins and doubts, living in contentment and not prone to anger.206
The law also stipulates that a judge must hold a certificate from one of the Sharia colleges
in the Kingdom or a college equivalent to it, provided that in the latter case passes a special
examination prepared by the Supreme Judicial Council. The judge must be at least forty years
old if appointed to the rank of an appeal judge, and twenty-two if appointed to another rank.
Finally, he must not have been convicted of a crime against religion or honor, or had a
disciplinary decision issued against him to dismiss him from a public position, even if he has
been rehabilitated.
And whoever holds the rank of judicial lieutenant (the first level in the judicial career
ladder), which is the first degree in the is required to have obtained a university degree with an
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overall grade of no less than “good” and a grade of no less than “very good” in jurisprudence.207
A 2020 amendment to Article 35 of the Judicial Law reads:208
A person who occupies the rank of Judge is required to have spent at least
one year at the rank of Judge or worked in comparable judicial positions for at
least four years, or taught jurisprudence or its principles in one of the colleges in
the Kingdom for at least four years. Or he shall have a master’s degree from the
Higher Institute of the Judiciary, or from one of the Sharia colleges in the
Kingdom in the field of jurisprudence or its origins, or he shall have a diploma
from the Institute of Management in the field of law, with a study period of no
less than two years, from those who hold a degree from one of the Sharia colleges
in the Kingdom with an overall grade of no less than “good” and a grade of no
less than “very good” in jurisprudence and its principles.
It is clear from this text that there is a concern with qualifying judges in the field of
Islamic law, whether by teaching Sharia subjects or studying them at the master’s level.
However, graduates of schools of law and law at the bachelor’s level are still not allowed to be
appointed as judges, even if they are able to hold a master’s degree in law but can attain this
position only on condition that they hold a bachelor’s degree in Islamic law.
Accordingly, new judges can be appointed to courts in the Kingdom from those who hold
a doctorate or master’s degree from the Higher Judicial Institute, teachers of jurisprudence in
university colleges, and those who hold a diploma in legal studies from the Institute of
Administration, and those who hold a bachelor’s degree in Sharia.
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The probation period for a judicial lieutenant is two years from the starting date of his
work after a decision is issued by the Supreme Judicial Council appointing him to this position.
If, during this period, he is deemed incompetent, the Supreme Judicial Council issues a decision
to dismiss him from the judiciary. Those appointed from among the judges other than the judicial
lieutenant shall initially be on probation for one year, and if their eligibility is not established
during this period, their service shall be terminated by royal order.209
B- Degrees of the judiciary in the Kingdom
The ranks of the judiciary in the Kingdom, as specified in Article 23 of the law, consist,
is ascending order, of a judicial lieutenant, a judge (C), a judge (B), a judge (A), a court attorney
(B), a court attorney (A), the president of a court (B), Chief of Court (A), Judge of Appeal, Chief
of Court of Appeal, or Chief of the Supreme Court. Appointment and promotion in the ranks of
the judiciary are carried out by royal order, based on a decision of the Supreme Judicial Council.
In promotions, the council takes into account the order of absolute seniority, and in case of equal
qualifications or performance indicator reports, the oldest candidate is promoted.
C- Composition of the judiciary in the Kingdom
The judiciary in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia operates as a dual judiciary, with an
administrative judiciary that considers all cases in which the administration is a party. This is in
accordance with the text of Article 13 of the Board of Grievances law, which states that the
Board of Grievances is an independent administrative judiciary body, directly linked to the king,
and the judiciary and its judges joined with the guarantees stipulated in the judicial law, and they
abide by the duties stipulated therein. The Board of Grievances administratively supervises the
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administrative judiciary, and the Administrative Judiciary Council technically supervises the
work of administrative judges.
The administrative judiciary consists of:
•

the Supreme Administrative Court

•

the Administrative Courts of Appeal

•

the Administrative Courts
The general judiciary considers all other cases. The Ministry of Justice administratively

supervises the general judicial law in the Kingdom, and the Supreme Judicial Council technically
supervises the work of judges and functional affairs.
The public judiciary, according to Article 9 of the judicial law is composed of:
•

The Supreme Court.

•

The Courts of Appeal.

•

The courts of first instance, which are:
A - General Courts
B - Criminal courts
C - Personal status courts
D - Commercial courts
E - Labor courts.
The courts of the general judiciary are competent to consider issues that are referred to

them in accordance with the judicial law, the Saudi civil procedures law, and the law of
Consensual Procedures. The Supreme Judicial Council may establish other specialized courts
after the approval of the King.
D- The provisions of Islamic Sharia are mandatory for the judge in the Kingdom
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According to Article 7 of the Basic Law of Governance in the Kingdom Constitutional
Rules,210 the king and the leaders of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia derive their authority from the
Qur’an and the Sunnah. These people are the rulers of this law and all the laws of the state.
Article 46 of the same law states that the judiciary is an independent authority, and there is no
authority over judges in their judgments other than the authority of Sharia.
Article 48 of this law states “the courts shall apply to cases brought before them the
provisions of Sharia, as indicated by the Qur’an and the Sunna, and whatever laws not in conflict
with the Qur’an and the Sunna which the State may enact.” It is apparent from these texts how
important it is that the judge be aware of the provisions of Sharia, as he is bound by its
provisions in adjudicating all the cases presented to him.
E- The independence of judges
Article 1 of the Saudi Judicial Law issued in 2007211 states that Saudi judges are
independent, and there is no authority over them for the provisions of Sharia and applicable laws,
and no one has the right to interfere with the judiciary’s functioning.
Article 2 stipulates that judges are not subject to dismissal except in certain cases, such as
violating laws and not showing up for work. It is not permissible to transfer them to other
positions, except with their consent or because of their promotion,212 and it is not permissible to
quarrel with judges because of the nature of their position, except in accordance with the
conditions and rules related to their discipline.213
F- The duties of judges
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Judges may not combine their judicial position with the practice of commerce, or any
other work that is inconsistent with the independence and dignity of the judiciary. The Supreme
Judicial Council prevents any judge from undertaking work that conflicts with the duties and
proper performance of the judicial position.214
Judges also may not divulge the content of their deliberations. Their work of judges is
monitored once or twice annually by the Judicial Inspection Department of the Supreme Judicial
Council. The Council looks at a number of criteria, including the judge’s ability to adapt the
case, his proper conduct, application of regulations and instructions, good wording, reasoning in
his rulings, the validity of judgments, and accuracy of coverage of requests, and completion and
mastery work and other performance of job duties. The judge’s adequacy is assessed as
excellent, above average, average, or below average.
G- End of service for judges
In accordance with Article 69 of the Judicial Law, the service of a member of the
judiciary ends when he reaches the age of seventy, or upon his death, acceptance of his
resignation, acceptance of his request for retirement, his inability to serve the judiciary, or his
inability to perform his work after the expiration of the sick leave or obtaining a rating of below
average in the adequacy report three times in a row, or termination of his services for
disciplinary reasons.
Saudi laws have granted judges complete independence and wide discretion in
considering the cases before them, as the Saudi Courts Law differ from the common law and
civil law, as it follows a model of legal systems that does not depend solely on judicial
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precedents (general law) or on the national code (civil law), but on legal texts and jurisprudential
rulings that represent the opinions of scholars of jurisprudence schools in Islamic law.
The Saudi judge adjudicates the cases before him on the basis of his understanding and
analysis of the legitimate texts and opinions of jurisprudence as guided by his conscience that he
is closest to God’s judgment in the case, regardless of any other influence. While judges have a
duty to implement approved laws, their duty to implement the provisions of Sharia represents
their ultimate goal. Therefore, the judge may refrain from applying some national laws if he
believes that they contradict the provisions of Sharia, taking into account the hadith of the
Prophet Muhammad, which states that there should be “[n]o obedience to a creature in
disobedience to the Creator.”215
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Chapter Two: The Authority of the Saudi Judge to Assess the Liquidated Damages Clause
During the Consideration of the Case in Court
A Saudi judge enjoys wide discretionary authority with regard to liquidated damages
clause compensation while looking into the dispute. He derives this broad authority from Sharia,
which allows the judge the freedom to resolve the dispute before him within the framework of
Sharia and in a manner that does not conflict with the Qur’an and Sunnah; and with the help of
jurisprudence rules in Islamic law and the various schools of jurisprudence.

2.1. The approach of Islamic law in court
A Saudi judge, when deciding a dispute, works within the scope of a broad approach that
allows him to research the legal and jurisprudential texts in Islamic law and to select the
appropriate solutions to the dispute before him, including issues around the liquidated damages
clause.
2.1.1. The broad approach to the work of the judge during the consideration of the dispute
The judiciary in Saudi Arabia relies on the provisions of Sharia that are derived from the
Qur’an and the Prophet’s Sunnah in settling contract disputes and the provisions they contain,
including the liquidation damages clause.
The Saudi judiciary adopts the provisions of Sharia, which is stipulated in the Basic Law
of Governance in the Kingdom, as the supreme law in the country. Thus, the judge refrains from
applying any texts that contradict it.
The Kingdom is unique not only when compared to other Arab countries, but also to
other Islamic countries. This makes it closer to the legal system applied in Islamic countries in
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the early Islamic era, which combines the characteristics of the Anglo and the Latin legal
schools.
However, the lack of codification of Sharia provisions has led to significant differences in
interpretation and application by some judges, who must refer to the jurisprudential references
codified in the four schools of jurisprudence to search for solutions for the issues before them.
They also must base their rulings on clear texts and jurisprudential rules related to the subject of
the dispute.
King Abdul-Aziz, the founder of the Kingdom, issued many instructions with the aim of
regulating judicial work and limiting the broad discretion approach practiced by the judge during
trials. In 1925, King Abdul-Aziz issued “Temporary Reform Articles for the Sharia courts,”
aimed at identifying the sources of judicial rulings.216 In 1926, King Abdul-Aziz ordered the
courts to continue implementing Ottoman law in the Hejaz, which primarily used the Al-Hanafi
School, before the issuance of the law of “The Status and Formations of Sharia Courts” in 1927.
This is the first administrative law for the judiciary in the Hejaz and involves an abolition of the
Ottoman law.
Nevertheless, the King wanted the courts to abide by the provisions of Sharia without
being restricted to a specific school of Islamic jurisprudence; rather, they must rule according to
what appears to them relevant from any school, and there is no difference between one school
and another.217 However, his desire was not easy to implement since a good number of scholars
wanted to stick to the Hanbali school.
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In order to avoid this broad approach to settling disputes a Saudi judge might take in
searching for jurisprudential texts among the four schools, King Abdul-Aziz attempted to codify
the provisions of Sharia by selecting those laws and regulations that most derived from the texts
of the Qur’an and Sunnah and were most appropriate for advancing people’s interests. But this
approach was rejected by scholars, which forced the King to specify the Hanbali school and its
jurisprudential books as the basic reference point for the judiciary in the Kingdom. However, this
did not prevent judges from referring to other schools of jurisprudence if they did not find the
appropriate solution to the issue presented to them in the Hanbali School.
The king drew up a general rule for judicial rulings so that they are generally carried out
in accordance with the provisions of the Hanbali school. In the event a judge bases his ruling on
another school, should delineate the basis for this ruling.
The king also identified the sources approved in the Hanbali school to which the judge
refers when issuing any rulings, namely:
•

Al-Mughni book by the jurist Al-Muwafaq Ibn Qudamah (620 AH).

•

Al-Sharh Al-Kabir book by the jurist Ibn Qudamah (682 AH).

•

Muntaha Al-Iraadat book by the jurist Al-Futuhi (972 AH), and the commentary by the
jurist Al-Bahooti (1051 AH).

•

Al-Ikna’ by the jurist Al-Hijjawi (948 AH) and the commentary by Al-Bahouti. Whatever
the two books agree on, or mention about the other, that point should be applied. In the
event that the two books disagree, what is mentioned in the book of Muntaha Al-Iraadat
book is to be applied.

•

Zad al-Mustaqni’ book called (Al-Rawd Al-Murba’) by the jurist Al-Hijjawi and the
commentary by the jurist AlBahooti.
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•

Dalil Al-Talib book called (Manar Al-Sabeel) by the jurist Mar’i Al-Hanbali (1032 AH)
and the commentary by the jurist Ibn Dwayan (1353 AH).
King Abdul-Aziz adopted these references from Hanbali jurisprudence due to the

spread and influence of this school in the Kingdom, the ease of reviewing its books, and the
clarity of the inferences in them. He intended to limit the broad approach that allows judges
to search for solutions to cases presented to them in other schools and the resulting difference
in judgments of similar cases.
The Hanbali school is the broadest of the four schools of jurisprudence in approving
the conditions of contracts according to the principle that conditions are meant to be
permissible unless there is evidence that something is to be prohibited. However, there are
multiple opinions within the Hanbali school itself. If a judge does not find the appropriate
solution to the issue in the texts of the Hanbali school, he may search for a solution in
another school of jurisprudence.
Given that a Saudi judge has a wide discretionary authority, he is not obligated to
abide by judicial precedents, whether issued by him or other judges, and can apply his
personal interpretation of Sharia to any specific case. Therefore, different rulings arise even
in similar cases.
The role of informed reasoning or Ijtihad by some judges and the difference in their
rulings in similar cases has led to calls for the codification of Sharia rules. The aim would be
to reduce difference between judges’ rulings and to increase the predictability of rulings and
remove doubts about their nature. As a result, the king announced at that time the formation
of a committee whose mission was to codify the provisions of Islamic Sharia by selecting the
most likely evidence from the four schools. In 2007, a new law on the judiciary was
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issued,218 which included a number of key amendments, including the restructuring of the
judicial law and the establishment of the Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal in addition to
the specialized first instance courts.
The work of the Sharia Codification Committee developed, as it was entrusted with
codifying these provisions in detail, and judges were also obligated to abide by the general
principles issued by the Supreme Court in many cases.
In addition, judges in the Kingdom are bound to abide by the laws that are issued by
royal decrees after being approved by the Council of Ministers and the Shura Council, which
are called “regulations” instead of legislation. The texts of these laws texts must not
contradict the provisions of Sharia and regulate many topics, such as commercial law, as well
as labor law, company law, and intellectual property law.
These attempts aim at limiting the broad approach in Islamic law to elicit rulings, that
gives the Saudi judge wide discretion in basing his judgment on a particular issue on what is
prevalent in the various schools of jurisprudence. The contracts and the conditions included
in the liquidated damages clause still are directly subject to the provisions of Sharia and to
the judge’s wide discretionary authority within the scope of its provisions.

2.1.2. The movement of the jurisprudence in Sharia rules
There appeared in Islamic jurisprudence a movement of scientific reasoning in the
provisions of Islamic law to confront the developments and issues that emerge in society based
on the sources of Islamic law that were referred to previously. These sources permitted the jurists
to use reason in proposing solutions to societal issues when there was no definitive evidence to
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support their reasoning or only what was regarded as a speculative text. This includes authorship
in the jurisprudence, which means in the Arabic language the basis and is defined as laying down
a general rule in brief texts that include general legal rulings on accidents or issues that fall under
a particular subject. It includes the general rulings on incidents or issues that are not stipulated in
the Qur’an, Sunnah, or by Consensus219
Jurisprudence maxims are derived from various sources of Islamic law, some of which
are directly based on the first source of legislation, the Qur’an. Examples are:
•

The rules “Hardship begets ease” and the rule “Harm must be eliminated.” Some are
directly based on the Sunnah, such as the principle of “Certainty is not overruled by
doubt” and the rule “Yield is guaranteed.”
Moreover, it involves what is based on other sources of Islamic law, such as consensus,

analogy, the sayings of the Companions, and other principles of jurisprudence, such as the rules
“Rights decisively lean on provisions” and “Whoever voluntarily, and without coercion,
stipulates a certain condition on himself, must fulfill this condition.”
These rules are of paramount importance to the Saudi judiciary, as judges often rely on
initial jurisprudential rules to justify their rulings. Many benefits have been achieved from the
application and citing of these rules, including:
•

Controlling the widespread, multiple issues in jurisprudence and working to organize
them in brief and specific rules.220
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•

Facilitating the memorization of the branches and details of jurisprudence for the jurists
and judges.

•

Helping the jurists and judges to understand the fatwa methods and enable them to derive
the branches in a sound manner of the principles, and facilitate deriving the branches
based on the normative jurisprudence maxims to avoid the contradiction that may arise
owing to deriving from partial matters.
These jurisprudence maxims, in terms of their breadth and comprehensiveness, fall into

two parts:
1- Rules that include many issues and from various jurisprudential sections that are
applicable to the four schools of jurisprudence.
2- Rules that include issues related to specific sections of jurisprudence, and some jurists
have called them “special rules.”
Examples of the first are rules that include all chapters on which jurisprudence is largely
based. They are called the five Normative Maxims of Islamic law, namely:
•

Acts are judged by the intention behind them.

•

Certainty is not overruled by doubt.

•

Hardship begets ease.

•

Harm must be eliminated

•

Custom is the basis of judgment.
There are rules that are less comprehensive than these five major rules, which are partial

maxims under which many issues fall, of which there are forty, including:
•

Ijtihad is not abrogated by Its like, other Ijtihad.

•

If the Halal and the forbidden are combined, the forbidden will prevail.
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•

Altruism in relatives is detestable, and in non-relatives, it is desirable.

•

Punishments of boundaries drop when there is doubt of culpability.

•

The significance of a person’s words takes priority over negligence.

•

The guarantor has the right to hold earnings since he is guaranteed.

•

Silent cannot be interpreted as saying.

•

What is forbidden to take is forbidden to give away.

•

When someone rushes into something before its due time, he is punished by depriving
him of it.

•

An Imam’s disposition toward people is contingent upon interest.

•

A wrongful conjecture cannot be considered.

•

In matters that are not divisible, selecting some of it is like selecting all of it, and
dropping some of it is like dropping all of it.

•

When a perpetrator and a “causer” coincide, the judgment shall fall on the perpetrator.

•

The settlement of discord is desirable.

•

Avoiding harm is better than fixing the damages.

•

Contentment with something is satisfaction with what derives from it.

•

Duty is left only to duty.

•

What is proven by Sharia takes precedence over what is proven by conditions.

•

What is forbidden to use is forbidden to take.

•

An infeasible phase cannot entirely overwhelm a feasible one.
Judges in the Kingdom often rely on these jurisprudential rules in formulating their

judicial ruling, such as in these examples:
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1- A plaintiff filed a lawsuit demanding that the decision of the defendant, a government
agency, to cancel his practice accounting license on the basis that he did not reside in the
Kingdom for the required statutory period be rescinded. He had suffered a heart attack,
which required him to rest completely in his home country and which prevented him
from traveling and returning to the Kingdom until the doctors authorized him to do so.
This constitutes a compelling legitimate excuse that the authority did not examine before
issuing its decision. The court ruled to annul the defendant’s decision and, in support of
its ruling, cited the Sharia rules: “Hardship begets ease,” “When a matter tightens, it will
widen, and vice versa,” and “Necessities render prohibited things permissible.” The court
stated in the reasons for its ruling that: “What is included in the aforementioned report
constitutes a compelling legal excuse. Because, according to the Basic Law of
Governance, the laws in force in the Kingdom are governed and restricted by the
generalities, principles and rules of Sharia, which discourage a person’s embarrassment,
and the legitimacy of licenses and unanimity not to be assigned to hard work, in addition
to not being assigned something unbearable, as ability is a condition for assignment in
accordance to the Almighty’s sayings, “God does not burden a soul beyond its capacity,”
and “God does not want to place you in hardship.” The jurists from the branches of
Sharia laid down a comprehensive rule that “Hardship begets ease” and includd rules
under it such as “When a matter tightens, it will widen and vice versa,” and “Necessity
renders prohibited things permissible.” Since the defendant did not provide evidence that
it examined the plaintiff’s excuse before issuing its decision, subject to his grievance and
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based on what was mentioned, the court has ruled the invalidity of the decision, the
subject of the grievance, which necessitated its cancellation. 221

2- A plaintiff filed a lawsuit that claimed the defendant was obligated to compensate him for
the damages resulting from her granting building permits for four floors of real estate
opposite the plot of his house, while he was only licensed for two floors, as he was
unable to benefit from the yard of his house because it became exposed because of the
property opposite to him. The defendant argued that the licenses were granted in
accordance with legal requirements, and requested the lawsuit be rejected. However, the
court ruled to obligate the defendant to pay the plaintiff an amount of compensation for
the damages and based its ruling on the following Sharia rules: “Permissibility excludes
liability for compensation,” and “Harm must be eliminated.” The court stated in the
reasons for the ruling that it is necessary to redress the damages arising from the actions
of the administration’s actions, based on the principle of equality of individuals before
public burdens and costs. This confirms that the plaintiff was harmed by a decrease of the
value of his house before and after the corresponding construction. Therefore, the
defendant had to redress the damages incurred by the plaintiffs, and since jurisprudence
and judgment is established that there is to be no harm, that damages must be eliminated,
i.e., the damages must be removed by compensating the plaintiff for the current
deficiency in the value of his home. This does not affect the statement that the defendant
bears the guarantee, as she is the owner of the real estate opposite the plaintiff’s house.
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Since there is no aggression in his conduct, and the lack of aggression from the owner of
the building opposite the plaintiff’s house, seeing as she did what she was authorized to
do. Thus, she is not considered a trespasser, because decided on the basis of “what is the
consequence of an authorization is not guaranteed,” and legal permissibility contradicts
guarantee.” The court, in order to estimate the compensation, decided to take the average
estimate of the expert, and ruled to obligate the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs
to pay that amount of compensation to the plaintiff for the damages incurred by him.222
3- A plaintiff submitted a lawsuit that claimed the defendant was obligated to return the
capital that he handed over to him for the purchase and sale of electrical appliances,
based on the contract concluded between them, due to the non-delivery of any profits.
This lack of profit, he claimed, resulted from the negligence of the defendant in failing to
demand payment from customers who were very late in their payments. The court ruled
to obligate the defendant to pay the plaintiff a specified amount, relying on the maxims,
“What is commonly practiced is deemed as a stipulated condition,” and the rule “What
has been taken shall be handed back.”223
4- A plaintiff filed a lawsuit demanding the termination of a contract concluded with the
defendant because of the latter’s late payment of the sum agreed upon in the contract.
However, the defendant pleaded that there was an agreement between him and the
contractor to deliver payments that was in violation of the contract by dividing the first
payment stipulated in the contract. The plaintiff demanded that the contract be rescinded,
and that the defendant be obligated to pay what was left of his debt after reinstalment the
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engineering office and evaluating the entire work. The court ruled that the contract
concluded between the two parties should be rescinded due to the defendant’s failure to
provide the payments at the time agreed upon in the contract, and cited in support of it
ruling, “Rights decisively lean on provisions”224
The fatwa of the Council of Senior Jurists in the Kingdom, which affects the judges, also
is based on jurisprudential rules. In its fatwa related to the liquidated damages clause, it stated
that this clause is one of the conditions that are considered in the furtherance of the contract, as it
is an incentive to complete the stipulations of the contract on time, citing the jurisprudential rule
“There should be neither harming nor reciprocating harm,225 because failure to implement or
actual delay leads to missing an opportunity or expected gain, which is a damage that requires
compensation.

2.2. The four schools of Islamic jurisprudence
Jurisprudence maxims appeared in Islam from the beginning, at the hands of the
Messenger Muhammad ﷺ, when the Qur’an was revealed with its legal rulings. The Prophet ﷺ
made these rulings clear to people, detailing their conditions, and indicating how they should be
implemented through words, actions, approvals, or disapprovals.
The schools of jurisprudence began to emerge because of changing life circumstances
and the need to clarify emerging issues.
Islamic jurisprudential schools appeared in later ages; they were not known at the time of
the Companions or the followers, and a number of the followers had followed the approach of
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some Companions who were known for their knowledge of Islam. The actual emergence of the
schools of jurisprudence that are known today came after the dispersal of the followers’ scholars
in countries after the expansion of the area of the Islamic state and the decisions of a number of
jurists to be the authoritative voices of their sects through their teachings. Others focused on their
origins and developing rules for them, until the rulings of each sect were known separately.226
The schools of jurisprudence in Sharia are based on deriving legal rulings from the
evidence contained in the Qur’an and Sunnah according to specific jurisprudential rules and
principles. The adherents of school of jurisprudence agreed on doctrine, principles and Sharia,
but might differ in the detailed deduced rulings.
The term Maddhab, or school of jurisprudence, appeared in Islamic jurisprudence during
the tenth century AD. It means an approach to understanding the provisions of Islamic law and
the method that a scholar or a number of scholars, school of jurists, will use in legal deduction
and inference, and the branches that are added to the “trunk” of the law, given the fundamentals
on which the doctrine is based.
The schools are distinguished from each other due to differences among their leading
expositors in terms of the methods of Ijtihad and logical deduction, and not in total evidence.
The special Ijtihad method and the choices of each imam of a school in what he takes from the
accessory evidence is what distinguishes between “the principles of the doctrine” and “the
principles of jurisprudence.”
The schools of jurisprudence in Islamic jurisprudence passed through three stages:227
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•

The creation and formation stage: This phase, which extended over three centuries, until
about the year 1259 AD, was marked by the organization and arrangement of doctrinal
jurisprudence. It also saw the authorship of a number of works that dealt with
controversial issues with other sects.

•

The imitation stage. The Ijtihad at mothed were frozen at the beginning of the thirteenth
century AD when jurisprudential scholarship and interpretation was limited to following
the jurisprudential heritage of the ancients by explaining, abbreviating, or organizing it,
without new additions, despite those decisions often being far from the realities of
everyday life.

•

The stage of renewal at the beginning of the nineteenth century AD, when Islamic
jurisprudence started making its way toward new developments to keep up with the times
and examine emerging issues given the progress of human knowledge and contact with
other civilizations. A group of jurists emerged who led the renewal movement and
warned against stagnation.
As we have seen, four major schools of jurisprudence have appeared in Islamic law and

have received attention, codification, research, and study. They have won wide acceptance
among the people since their establishment to the present time. Each school includes rulings
related to worship and others related to transactions228.
Each school expresses the way the imam who led it understood legal texts, and his
method of deriving the rulings, which are used by the followers of the school.

Khaled bin Abdel Moneim Al-Rifai, “The reason for adopting the four schools of thought and not others.”
www.alukah.net.
228
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Doctrine is defined in Islamic jurisprudence, as the totality of legal rulings and issues that
were issued by an imam or scholar of Islamic jurisprudence, in addition to the issues attached to
it from the followers of the doctrine based on the rules and principles established by the imam.229
It should be noted that the schools of jurisprudence agreed among themselves on the
peremptory provisions of the Sharia. The disagreements were limited to the details involved. In
addition, numerous followers took it upon themselves to spread the knowledge of the four
schools, unlike what happened with other scholars and imams, whose influence waned.230
Among the reasons that led to the difference between the Islamic schools are:
•

Language-related reasons: as in other languages, the Arabic language contains words that
share several meanings, which contribute to multiple interpretations.

•

Standards for methods of narration of hadith differ from jurists school to another. A
scholar might not have had access to a particular hadith of the Messenger and thus issued
a fatwa based on a verse or another hadith, or he may have adopted an analogy.
Alternatively, he might have had access to it and rejected it because of a defect in it, such
as interruption or poor memorization of the account of the narrator. Differences may also
arise between scholars because of their differences in understanding the meaning of a
hadith.

•

Concerning reasons related to the controls adopted in reasoning, and the fundamental
rules laid down for Ijtihad; the jurists of the four schools could differ in the fundamental
rules from which legal sub-rulings are deduced from detailed evidence because they
viewed the authority of those rules differently.
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The difference among the leaders of jurisprudential schools has contributed to some
support of Sharia with more practical rulings and legislation that removes societal distress and
hardship by providing solutions to personal and societal problems, no matter how circumstances
and conditions change, and the dispute does not indicate a contradiction in Sharia sources, but
rather shows legal flexibility and breadth.231
A. The Hanafi School, attributed to Imam Abu Hanifa Al-Numan ibn Thabit (699-767 AD),
is based on six sources: the Qur’an, Sunnah, Consensus, Analogy, Approval, Custom ,
the Words of the Companions, and the laws of those who came before us. This doctrine
leaned toward the adoption of rational principles, i.e., reasoning to deduce an opinion
when the text does not provide clear direction. It also tightened the guidelines for
adopting hadith due to the growing complexity of life, the development of Islamic
civilization and the fear of incorrect transmission of hadith from the Prophet. Also,
concerning the companion’s doctrine, if it is contrary to the generality, then it is
privatized. By this, he intends to allocate some general evidence because of the work of
the Companion, because they believed that the Companion would not have done an act
contrary to the generality of the evidence, except because of his knowledge of what he
singled out for what he had learned from Prophet Muhammad, Peace and Blessings of
Allah be upon him.
The doctrine takes after Istihsan, as it is intended to relinquish the ruling on an issue, if it
is judged similar to it to another ruling due to a reason that requires mitigation of that issue. And
if a jurist narrator contradicts what he narrated, such that in his actions he contradicts what he
narrated, then his actions matter more than his narration.
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Among the most famous Hanafi scholars are Al-Tahawi, Shams Al-Imaam Al-Halawani,
Fakhr Al-Islam Al-Bazdawi, Abu Al-Hasan Al-Karkhi, Al-Hassaf, Shams Al-Imam Al-Sarkhi,
Fakhr Al-Din Qazi Khan, and the scholar Abu Bakr Al-Razi.232
Among the jurists of this doctrine is Abu Yusuf Yaqoub bin Ibrahim Al-Ansari, who was
the first to be codified in Hanafi jurisprudence. Some of his most famous books are those about
Kitab Al-Kharaj and Muhammad bin Al-Hasan Al-Shaybani, and he deserves much credit for
codifying the doctrine of Imam Abu Hanifa, Al-Sagheer, Al-Mabsout, Ziyadat and Zafar, and
Al-Hasan bin Ziyad. Among the most important books of this sect are Al-Mabsout, Al-Zayyat,
Al-Jami Al-Saghir, Al-Jami Al-Kabeer, Al-Sir Al-Saghir, Al-Sir Al-Kabeer, and An-Nawadir by
Imam Muhammad bin Al-Hassan, the book Al-Kafi by Hakim Al-Shahid, Al-Mabsout book by
Sarkhasi, the book Bada’I Al-Sana’i by Al-Kasani, and the book by Hashiyat Ibn Abidin, called
Rad Al-Muhtar ala Al-Durr Al-Mukhtar, and others.233
B. The Maliki School is attributed to Imam Malik bin Anas Al-Asbahi (711-795 AD). The
Maliki school depends on the following sources: the Qur’an, the Sunnah, and the
consensus of the Companions and their work, even when not mentioned in the Qur’an
and Sunnah.
Considering that their Ijtihad and what they agree upon is a consensus. The work of the
people of Medina was considered a source that Medina witnessed from the revelation of the
Qur’an, especially the verses related to rulings and their practical application, in addition to the
narratives that the Companions had of memorizing revelation, writing it down, and acting on
what it stipulated as well as analogy.
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Verdicts and judgments given by Islamic religious scholars. Analogy, Imam Malik had a
method of analogy that distinguished him from the imams of other schools of jurisprudence. He
saw the permissibility of measurement from the details, which becomes a source that can be
measured within guidelines, and its measurement is not limited to the stipulated provisions.
Unspecified public interests, for all they are achieved by the provisions of Sharia, and
everything else that advances Sharia, the evidence came to support and confirm it, and the
command to do it is obligatory or recommended, and everything that was proven harmful, the
evidence came to prohibit it. Istihsan, which is intended by Malik to exclude a license from the
original and the total evidence, that is, it is not a rule in itself, and custom, which is what
Muslims are accustomed to in their lives, assured that the matter is stable in the soul and
accepted by reason and instinct.
Prohibition of evasive legal maneuvers: the reasons that lead to action. If it is permissible,
the means to achieve it are also permissible, and if it is forbidden, the means are prohibited too.
Istishab is intended to prove what was proven or to negate what was denied, that is, the
matter remains as it was. Imam Malik’s doctrine is considered a moderate way between the
people of opinion and the people of hadith, due to its reliance on hadith.
Imam Malik’s students who wrote down his knowledge and fatwas. Among his most
famous students were Abdullah bin Wahb and Abdul Rahman bin Al-Qasim Al-Masry, and
Abul-Hasan Al-Qurtuby.
The most famous scholars of the Maliki School are Abdullah bin Wahb, Ziyad bin Abd
al-Rahman, Abd al-Malik Ibn Al-Majshon, Abdullah Ibn Abd Al-Hakam, Asbagh Ibn Al-Faraj,
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Othman Ibn Al-Hakam, Abd Al-Malik Ibn Habib, Abd Al-Salam Ibn Habib, and Muhammad Ibn
Abd Al-Aziz Ibn Utbah, and Ibrahim bin Salamah.234
The origins of deduction according to Imam Malik are of one of two types: textual
origins of transmission, or intellectual origins of jurisprudence. Consequently, the Maliki school
includes deriving opinions through the adoption of Public Interests, Approval, Analogy,
Prohibition of Evasive Legal Devices, and Istisihab.235
Among the jurists of this doctrine are Abu Saeed Abdul Salam bin Saeed, bin Habib bin
Hassan bin Hilal, bin Bakar, bin Rabia, Al-Tanoukhi, bin Abi Zaid, Abu Abdullah AlQayrawani, and Asad bin Al-Furat bin Sinan.236
C. The Shafi’i school
It is attributed to Imam Muhammad bin Idris al-Shafi’i (767-820AD) and charts a
middle ground between the doctrine of Hanifa, which used opinion, and the doctrine of
Maliki, which tended stick close to the hadith. In its deductions and methods of inference, the
Shafi’i school relies on the principles laid down by Imam Al-Shafi’i in his famous book Al
Risala and Al Aum, which is considered the first integrated book on the science of Islamic
jurisprudence. Among the most famous other books of his are the book Fath Al-Aziz fi Sharh
Al-Wajeez by Al-Rafi’i, Rawdat Al-Talibeen and Al-Majmoo by Al-Nawawi, Al-Muhadhd
and Al-Tanbah by Shirazi, and Tuhfat Al-Muhtaaj by Ibn Hajar Al-Haythami.
Al-Shafi’i has two sub-schools of thought, an older one in Iraq and a newer one in Egypt.
Among his Iraqi students were Al-Hassan, known as Al-Zafarani, and Al-Hussein, known as Al-
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Karabisi. Among his Egyptian disciples were Ismail bin Yahya Al-Muzni, Youssef bin Yahya
Al-Bwaiti, and Al-Rabi` bin Suleiman Al-Muradi.
The Shafi’i school of thought is based on the Qur’an, the Sunnah and the general
Consensus of what is known of the religion by necessity, and not only the Consensus of a
particular country. Also included are the sayings of the Companions that were transmitted by one
of them without disagreement from the others. Analogy is also adopted, which is to measure a
judgment on a matter stipulated in the Qur’an or the Sunnah, or what was transmitted from the
Companions without disagreement, or where Consensus was achieved.
The most famous scholars of the school of thought among the scholars of the Shafi’i
school of thought are Ibrahim bin Khalid Al-Kalbi, Al-Rabi’ bin Suleiman Al-Jayzi, Abu Zara’a
Al-Qadi, Abu Bakr Muhammad bin Ali bin Ismail Al-Shashi, Al-Rabi` bin Suleiman Al-Muradi,
and Al-Bouti.
D. The Hanbali school
This school is attributed to Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal (780-855 AD) and is the last of the
four schools historically. Ibn Hanbal believed that jurisprudence should be based on the Qur’anic
text, the Sunnah, the general principles or sources of the Hanbali School of jurisprudence, and
the Companions’ numerous fatwas when there are no other supporting texts, and there is no
dispute. If the closest statement does not appear to be true, the difference between the sayings is
mentioned without giving preference to one. Also, the transmitted or weak hadith is taken into
consideration, while giving preference to analogy in the event that there is no evidence,
consensus, or the saying of a Companion that contradicts it. Analogy is considered in the absence
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of previous sources, and the prohibition of evasive legal devices, so as to prevent providing the
means that lead to the commission of an evil deed.237
Among his most famous books is Al-Musnad, who compiled an encyclopedia of the
hadiths of the Messenger. One of the most famous Hanbali jurists who spread this school of
thought was Ibn Taymiyyah and his student Ibn Al-Qayyim Al-Jawziyya. The most important of
his disciples are Salih Ibn Imam Ahmad, his other son Abdullah, Abu Bakr Al-Athram, AlMarwadhi, Ahmad Ibn Muhammad Ibn Al-Hajjaj, and Ibrahim war.
The most important books of this doctrine are Mukhtasar Al-Kharqi, which was
explained by Ibn Qudamah in his book Al-Mughni and Kashaf Al-Qinaa by Al-Bahouti; AlFuroo by Ibn Muflih, and Al-Rawd Al-Murabba by Al-Hijjawi. The most famous scholars of the
Hanbali school are Ibrahim bin Ishaq Al-Harbi, Ishaq bin Ibrahim bin Hani Al-Nisaburi, Ahmed
bin Humaid Al-Mashkani, Ahmed bin Muhammad bin Al-Hajjaj Al-Marwadhi, and Ahmed bin
Muhammad bin Hani Al-Athram Al-Ta’I.238
From the foregoing, we can see that the differences among jurisprudential schools in
many rulings and branches have scientific and objective reasons necessitated by the practical
needs and circumstances surrounding each sect. These differences in legal jurisprudence rulings
are an advantage. The resolution of a legal issue is not limited to the application of one school of
jurisprudence, but rather a judge may borrow from any school for the sake of capacity and
flexibility, especially when applying his rulings and insights when considering cases before him,
especially those related to the complex conditions of contracts.
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2.3. The judge’s discretionary power in the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence
Discretionary authority is defined in Islamic jurisprudence as a space in which there is no
legal text or evidence that empowers the judge to choose an appropriate ruling for the matter
before him.239 It is feasible to imagine a judicial work devoid of his discretionary authority. The
judge’s discretion is the judge’s continuous intellectual interpretation carried out with his
assessment of the facts of the dispute in question to verify through the evidence presented,
describing, and coherently analyzing them in accordance with the legal rule that he feels must be
applied. He concludes his mental activity by ruling on his basis of his assessment of the effects
contained in those texts.
Sharia focuses the judge’s discretionary power. As the Prophet said, “When a judge
utilizes his skill of judgment and comes to a right decision, he will have a double reward, but
when he uses his judgment and commits a mistake, he will have a single reward” for his effort to
seek justice.240

2.3.1. Multiple interpretations by judges of the same jurisprudence rule
A Saudi judge has wide discretion when he considers a case before him, whether in terms
of choosing the texts or jurisprudential rules that he deems most suitable for application or in
linking it to the text or rule that he deems to be relevant and applicable.
A judge usually cites many texts from Islamic law, including the Qur’an, which has
established his authority in Surah Al-Anbiya, where the Almighty said, “And David and
Solomon they passed judgment upon the tilled land on which the people’s sheep had strayed. We
239
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bore witness to their judgment, and We made Solomon to understand it, and to both gave
judgment and knowledge.”241 The subject of that case was a request for compensation in a
lawsuit of tortious liability resulting from what the sheep had destroyed from the plaintiff’s
crops. The Prophet David, worked hard to estimate the amount of compensation, just as the
Prophet Solomon worked to estimate it too. Allah Almighty praised Solomon for agreeing to
David’s judgment of justice, and the Almighty said in them “and to both We gave judgment and
knowledge.” This noble verse has established the principle that the basis for the right to judge is
an understanding of the facts and the legal texts appropriate to them and application of the text to
the matter at hand.
In another incident that confirms the discretionary power of the judge, some companions
of Mu'adh Ibn Jabal said: “When the Messenger of Allah ( )ﷺintended to send Mu'adh ibn Jabal
to the Yemen, he asked: ‘How will you judge when the occasion of deciding a case arises?’ He
replied: ‘I shall judge in accordance with Allah’s Book.’ He asked: ‘What will you do if you do
not find any guidance in Allah’s Book?’ He replied: ‘I shall act in accordance with the Sunnah of
the Messenger  ﷺ.’ He asked: ‘What will you do if you do not find any guidance in the Sunnah
of the Messenger of Allah  ﷺand in Allah’s Book?’ He replied: ‘I shall do my best to form an
opinion and I shall spare no effort.’ The Messenger of Allah  ﷺthen patted him on the breast and
said: ‘Praise be to Allah Who has helped the messenger of the Messenger of Allah to find
something which pleases the Messenger of Allah.’ ”242
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In light of these texts, the Saudi judge can exercise discretionary authority within the
scope of jurisprudence in the four schools of thought and the Hanbali school in particular, by
balancing among texts, jurisprudence, and discernible facts.
The four schools have permitted the discretionary authority of the judge, as they
recognize that there is a possibility of facts and actions that are in dispute without texts to
provide a clear way to rule. This requires the judge to search for appropriate solutions by
investigating the facts in dispute and issuing a ruling that is compatible with it within the
framework of the purposes of Islamic law. How the judge will rule will vary according to case
nature and his knowledge of the rulings of Sharia jurists in similar cases.
The jurists of the four schools inferred the legitimacy of the discretionary authority of the
judge in Islamic jurisprudence with a such evidence as:
1- In the Qur’an, where the Almighty said, “And David and Solomon they passed
judgment upon the tilled land on which the people’s sheep had strayed. We bore witness to their
judgment, and We made Solomon to understand it, and to both we gave judgment and
knowledge.”243
2- The Sunnah, where the Messenger ﷺ, said: “ ‘When a judge utilizes his skill of
judgment and comes to a right decision, he will have a double reward, but when he uses his
judgment and commits a mistake, he will have a single reward, for his effort to seek justice.’
Likewise, When the Messenger of Allah  ﷺintended to send Mu'adh ibn Jabal to Yemen, he
asked: ‘How will you judge when the occasion of deciding a case arises?’ He replied: ‘I shall
judge in accordance with Allah’s Book.’ He asked: ‘(What will you do) if you do not find any
guidance in Allah’s Book?’ He replied: ‘(I shall act) in accordance with the Sunnah of the
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Messenger of Allah  ﷺ.’ He asked: ‘(What will you do) if you do not find any guidance in the
Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah  ﷺand in Allah’s Book?’ He replied: ‘I shall do my best to
form an opinion and I shall spare no effort.’ The Messenger of Allah  ﷺthen patted him on the
breast and said: ‘Praise be to Allah Who has helped the messenger of the Messenger of Allah to
find something which pleases the Messenger of Allah.’ ” The hadith is explicit in the legitimacy
of the judge’s discretionary authority in what there is no text for. Al-Sarkhasi said it contains
evidence for the permissibility of opinion and to work by analogy in what there is no text for
guidance.244
3- What was narrated on behalf of Umm Salamah, she said: Two men came to the
Messenger of Allah, Peace and Blessings of Allah be upon him, arguing over inheritances for
them, and they had nothing except their claim. Umm Salamah reported the Messenger  ﷺas
saying: “ ‘I am only a human being, and you bring your disputes to me, some perhaps being
more eloquent in their plea than others, so that I give judgment on their behalf according to what
I hear from them. Therefore, whatever I decide for anyone that by right belongs to his brother, he
must not take anything, for I am granting him only a portion of Hell.’ So, the two men cried and
said each of them to his companion, ‘My right is yours.’ The Prophet ﷺ, said, ‘As for if you did
what you did, then divide and pursue the truth.’ ”245
The point of evidence in the hadith is that he stated explicitly that he judges by his Ijtihad
on what was not shown to him through revelation; Ijtihad is a source of legislation in the absence
of a text. Thus, the judge has the discretion to rule according to what is not mentioned in a text.
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The judge’s discretionary authority includes considering the liquidated damages clause
that is defined in Islamic jurisprudence as one of the restricted conditions of a contract.246 To
achieve a legitimate interest, it obligates one of the contracting parties to give to the other
something of value.247
The liquidated damages clause associated with the contract in Islamic Sharia appears in
detailing provisions and effects the provisions of the contract. The purpose of this condition is to
restrict the provisions and effects after the contracting party is free to choose his contractual
obligations. Some examples are: if a seller stipulated that a buyer reside in the sold house for a
month, or to ride an animal to a known place, or to confirm and document what the contract
requires to fulfill it. For example, if the seller stipulated the deferred price as a mortgage, or a
guarantor, or stipulated some things that are not required by the contract, such as buying
firewood on the condition that it is broken.248
A Saudi judge has wide discretion in the judicial process, especially in contracts and
financial transactions, because the legal texts and codified legal rules are limited and the
unfortunate facts and mishaps in practical life are many, varied, and recurrent. The Saudi judge
also has the duty to apply the provisions of Sharia in an appropriate and fair manner so that
everyone who has rights takes his right from his opponents, relying on the judge’s discretionary
authority in interpreting the legal text; then the judge should apply it. If none exists, or if one
possibly exists but its application is speculative and not definitive, the judge must look into the
sources and regulations of Sharia. He also must examine not only the Sharia sources that have
already been referred to, but also relevant others in order to reach an appropriate verdict.
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248
(The Theory of Conditions by El-Shazly, p. 55-56) (Al-Wasat / Al-Sanhoury / 2/874).
246
247

101

The judiciary, including the Saudi judiciary, has agreed on the principle of the binding
force of a contract as a law that is applicable by its parties, a principle based on the religious and
moral considerations to abide by a covenant.
This was emphasized in the Qur’an, where the Almighty said: “Fulfill contracts.”249
However, there may be some problems in implementing a contract and the conditions it contains.
What occurs then is that a dispute arises between its parties due to the failure by one or more, or
the interpretation of some clauses, and they turn to a judge to resolve the matter. The judge’s role
is to discern and interpret what the parties to the contract were unable to express properly and
clearly, or what they agreed upon, but which violates the provisions of Sharia, or requires
reference to the rules of justice and fairness.
When the Saudi judge intervenes to try to resolve the contractual dispute, he balances
what the parties to the contract have agreed upon with his understanding of the legal texts and
rules governing the subject of the dispute. He broadly interprets these texts and rules in most
cases, and their interpretation may differ from one judge to another depending on his
understanding of their content and also the context in which the contract was negotiated. In the
event of parity between the two wills, one or both parties to the contract possibly will not
understand their common will. Thus, the judge works to restore the balance between the disputed
parties is on the basis of the jurisprudence rule: “In contracts, intentions and meanings, not words
and sentences, shall be taken into consideration.”
This rule indicates that even if contracts are made with words and phrasing, what is
considered in these contracts is the intent of the contracting parties, not just their words.250
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However, another judge may interpret this jurisprudential rule differently, and the
question arises: Are the words used by the contracting parties considered reliable, or do the
intentions and intended meanings outweigh what they wanted to reach? Does the inner will of
the people, or one party, take precedence over his stated will, or vice versa? What are the
objective and personal factors on which the Saudi judge relies to determine the common
intention of the parties to the contract at the time of contracting? How should he approve the
amount of the liquidated damages, so that it can be judged without an increase or decrease in
amount, liquidated damages, or change in determining his responsibility or increasing them, a
penalty. Therefore, the Saudi judge uses his discretionary authority to look into the dispute by
saying that the will of the parties to the contract has been affected by ambiguity or doubt that led
one of them to request that the matter be referred to the judiciary for a ruling. Consequently, the
judge is obliged to do everything possible to find a solution to the dispute according to his
understanding of the contract and of the legal texts and rules on which he can make a ruling.
For example, a ruling was issued in a Saudi court, where the plaintiff submitted her
claim, requesting that the defendant be obligated to return the amount stipulated by the liquidated
damages clause that was deducted from her dues based on the supply contract concluded
between them. The defendant argued that the clause was applied in violation of the plaintiff's
reservation mentioned in her offer on a clause of the contract, and the defendant accepted the
offer without opposing the reservation made by the plaintiff. In spite of this, she signed the
liquidated damages clause, adhering to the terms of the contract submitted by the plaintiff. The
court ruled that the defendant was obligated to pay the amount of the condition that was deducted
from the plaintiff’s dues. In support of his conclusion, the judge cited in his ruling a number of
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jurisprudential maxims, including what is proven by Sharia is preceded by what has been proven
with a condition and what is proven with certainty does not rise except with certainty251.
In the context of the judge’s endeavor to obligate the parties to what they agreed on in the
contract of the penalty clause, he, using his discretionary authority, examined the parties’
demands, the amount of the condition, the amount of damages, and the extent of extenuating
circumstances or force majeure circumstances that prevented the execution of the obligation.
All of these factors are governed by legal texts and rules whose interpretation may differ
from one judge to another, depending on the legal text or the rule that he chose to apply to the
case before him. Nevertheless, the judge, as he seeks to identify the true will of the parties
regarding the liquidated damages clause to the joint contract, which should respect their common
will at the time of contracting and not at the time of a demand for implementation.
When the will of one party changes so that this common will prevails over the rest of the
other jurisprudential maxims, unless their agreement initially violates a definitive legal text, this
entails respect for the contract that constitutes a source of commitment as is the case with the
law. Hence, it is important for Saudi jurisprudence to adopt specific and clear rules to apply to
the liquidated damages clause, even though that limits the judge’s broad authority in selecting
and interpreting the jurisprudential rules that can be relied upon when ruling on the liquidated
damages clause.252
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2.3.2. Different judicial rulings for the same jurisprudence maxim
The position of the four legal schools of jurisprudence may differ concerning the
adaptation of the incident or the issue at hand, or the liquidated damages clause in particular.
Therefore, the discretionary authority of the Saudi judge in this regard varies according to the
school of jurisprudence that he considers or applies as the most relevant given the evidence, and
also the one closest to the sources of Islamic law.
The Hanafi School permitted a number of types of conditions in contracts and obligated
their fulfillment, including particular conditions that a contract requires, such as if he buys
clothes on the condition that he wears them, or buys an animal with the condition that he rides it.
Also, the condition’s purpose has to suit the contract’s purpose, meaning the condition is not
required by the contract itself; however, it does confirm and establish something as obligatory.
For example, a seller adds a condition that the buyer has to give a guarantee.253
The conditions allowed textually by Sharia, even if they are not required by the contract
and are not suitable for it, such as a condition of fixed price, and the condition under which
custom took priority, which is every condition that people deal with and are accustomed to, and
under which there is a benefit for one of the contracting parties. If it is not required by the
contract, does not suit it, or there is no text about it, then it is a valid condition that must be
fulfilled, for example, having to buy leather to make shoes.254
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The Hanafi school also specifies a number of rescinding clauses,255 including those that
concern the corruption of financial exchange contracts, such as the condition that leads to
deception and dispute; that the condition, for example, in the sale at the time of the contract is
something whose existence can be determined at once, such is the case where a person buys
olives on the grounds that they will contain a specific amount of oil. As for contracts that are not
intended for financial exchange, such as marriage, gift, trust and others, the condition is invalid,
but the contract is valid.256
In the Maliki school of thought, conditions are divided into valid and invalid terms
because they lead to misleading information and much deception, including:
A condition that contradicts the intent of the contract, and is completely unacceptable,
such as a person who sold a car on the condition that the buyer does not ride it. 257 The condition
that violates the price, such as if a person sold it and stipulated that the price be loaned to him, or
a legally prohibited condition, such as a condition that leads to a forbidden person, as if he sold a
house, and stipulated that the buyer not occupy it.
The prohibited condition, which is a condition that leads to a forbidden act, such as the
one who sold a house and stipulated that the buyer occupy it as a place for illegal activity, as well
as the condition that leads to ignorance, and ambiguity, such as the condition of postponing a
price indefinitely.258
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We find that the Shafi’i school divides the valid conditions into four types:
A- A condition required by the contract, which is a valid provision of the contract, and thus
does not prove anything new. Rather, it confirms what is required in the contract without
any stipulation, such as the buyer’s requirement, for example, that the seller should use
the purchased asset as he wants.
B- The requirement of specific performance regarding the contract during the time of
contracting, such as the condition that the horse is fast.
C- A condition that is in the interest of the contract, for example, the requirement of a
mortgage, a guarantor, and attestation.
D- An invalid condition of the contract, one that contradicts the contract requirement, or is
contrary to it and is not in its interest; alternatively, one that Sharia did not intend to
permit, and which has a purpose intended to benefit unfairly one of the contracting
parties.259
In the Hanbali school, the proper conditions include the following:
A- Conditions required by the contract, such as the condition of exchange in the sale, and the
payment of the designated price.
B- Conditions that are in the interest of the contract, even if not required, such as the seller’s
requirement that the buyer provide a mortgage or a specific guarantor for the deferred
price.
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C- Conditions in which there is a permissible benefit that is not contrary to the requirement
of the contract, and conditions that are not in the interest of the contract, as when the
seller stipulated that he reside in the sold house for a month.
The jurist Ibn Taymiyyah and the jurist Ibn Al-Qayyim have stated that the origin of the
conditions is validity and permissibility, and conditions are not forbidden or invalidated unless
evidence indicates their prohibition and corruption. 260
It is instructive to review the conditions associated with contracts, including the
liquidated damages clause in the four schools of jurisprudence, on which the extent of the
judge’s discretionary power expansion or narrowing derives from while considering the incident
at hand. We find that most of them went on to say that the origin of the conditions is valid,
except for what is indicated by the evidence of prevention. Some jurists said that the condition
principle is not permissible unless the evidence suggests its permissibility, including
Azzaherriya, a minority doctrine in Islamic jurisprudence.
There were also differences of opinion among some researchers regarding the attribution
of sayings to the four schools. Some attributed the saying that origin in the conditions is validity
to all four schools of thought, while some attributed the saying to them or to some of them that it
is forbidden. This matter is reflected in the judge’s discretionary authority when considering
cases related to liquidated damages clause. The ruling may differ from one judge to another
when confronted by similar facts according to his interpretation of the applicable jurisprudence
rule.
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By having an overview of the four Islamic schools of thought, it becomes clear that the
Hanbali School, the applicable school in Saudi, is the broadest of the four schools regarding
fixing and correcting corrupt conditions and clauses instead of completely voiding the contract.
Adding to that, jurists of the Hanbali school, such as Sheikh Al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn
Al-Qayyim, have enunciated a rule with which they create a new method of thinking to correct
those conditions and clauses. Also, Hanbali jurists made the origin of the conditions and clauses
permissibility except what evidence indicates that it is forbidden. And this rule is the baseline for
origin in the conditions. Thus, the invalid condition in their view is one of two things. Either it is
contrary to the purpose of the contract, because in its permissibility it combines two
contradictory matters: the affirmation of the intended action and its negation, so nothing
happens; or it is that is contrary to the texts of the Sharia.261
The Maliki school comes after the Hanbali school in fixing and correcting corrupt
conditions and clauses, followed by the Hanafi school, and finally the Shafi’i school. Among the
most prominent evidence that quoted by scholars who said that the conditions were valid are:
A- The Qur’an says: “O you who believe! abide by all your contracts.”262
B- From Sunnah, the hadith, “Muslims must keep to the conditions they have made, except
for a condition which makes unlawful something which is lawful or makes lawful
something which is unlawful.”263
C- Also, the Hadith, “The most important conditions to be fulfilled by you are the ones
indicated in the marriage contract.”264
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The conditions are a matter of custom, not of worship, and the origin in transactions
is permissibility and validity until the evidence indicates the prohibition, and that is based on
the Almighty’s saying, “while He has explained to you what is forbidden to you.”265
Therefore, many of the later jurists in these schools say that the liquidated damages
clause is permissible based on the principle that the conditions are permissible except when
evidence indicates that it is forbidden, and there is no evidence to indicate the prohibition of
the liquidated damages clause by text, so it is permissible. Moreover, people have become
acquainted with setting liquidated damages clause in many contemporary contracts, such as
contracting and supply contracts, and this transaction is known by the liquidated damages
clause. Thus, the matter constitutes a legally valid custom because it does not contradict legal
evidence, invalidate an obligation, or allow what is forbidden.
The Islamic Fiqh Academy of the Organization of the Islamic Conference has
decided266 it is permissible to stipulate the liquidated damages clause in all financial
contracts, except for those in which the obligation is a debt, because in this case it is
considered explicit usury, which is prohibited in Sharia. Therefore, we find that the
liquidated damages clause is permissible for one of the parties to the contract and not for the
other, for example in contracting contracts, this condition is permissible for the contractor,
the supply contract for the supplier, and the Istisna' contract for factories if the debtor does
not fulfill what he has committed to or delays its fulfillment. However, it is not permissible in
an installment sale because of the delay in the debtor paying the remaining installments,
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whether due to insolvency or procrastination, which is in accordance with the decision of the
Council of Senior Scholars in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.267
Therefore, the discretionary power of a Saudi judge expands and narrows according
to his view of the rule of the liquidated damages clause, which is divided into two parts. The
first is a penalty clause in debt contracts, if one of the contracting parties stipulated a certain
increase on the principal of the debt upon non-payment, or delay in repaying the debt on
time, for example, an increase in the loan contract or the amount in the sale contract with a
deferred price or the Salam contract.268
In this case, the judge should rule that this condition is not permissible because it
represents an increase in the principal debt in exchange for deferment, and this is clearly
usury in Islamic Sharia.269
The second part relates to the provision of the liquidated damages clause in areas
other than debt contracts, for example, if one of the contracting parties stipulated that in the
event of the contractor delaying the completion of the work, he must pay the clause’s
amount. According to the opinion of the majority of contemporary jurists and members of the
Council of Senior Scholars in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a liquidated damages clause will
be judged by the judge as permissible, because it is a valid condition that must be fulfilled.270
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This is what was also decided by the International Islamic Fiqh Academy of the
Organization of the Islamic Conference, 271 and it is the view of the Fiqh Council of the
Muslim World League 272 and the decision of the Egyptian Dar Al Iftaa.273
What Saudi judges infer to justify their rulings are what they inferred from the four
schools of thought and from those citations:
1- Ruling on the liquidated damages clause is one of the reasons for urging the fulfillment of
covenants and contracts in fulfillment of the words of Allah, “O you who have believed,
fulfill all contracts.”274
2- The origin of the conditions is validity and permissibility, so it is not prohibited from
them except when the Sharia indicates that it is forbidden, and there is nothing in the
Sharia that indicates the prohibition of the liquidated damages clause, so it remains
permissible.275
3- What was narrated on behalf of Al-Bukhari 276 when a man said to another man: postpone
your travel journey by sheltering and tying up your traveling camels in my stalls, and if I
did not join you on your journey, I will pay you hundred dirhams. And when the time
came, he did not travel with him. So, the traveler man complained to a judge named
Shuraih. After confirming the validity of the complaint, the judge ordered him to pay the
condition amount and said: “Whoever optionally, and without duress, stipulates a certain
condition on himself, must fulfill the condition.”277
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4- The ruling on the liquidated damages clause by the judge closes the doors to chaos and
manipulation of the rights of individuals.278
5- The clause is one of the conditions that is considered in the interest of the contract
because it serves as an incentive to complete the contract at the specified time.279
6- Custom permits it, as people have become acquainted with setting penalty conditions in
many of their contracts, and it is a permissible and legally valid custom because it does
not contradict legal provisions, does not invalidate an obligation and does not enact what
is forbidden.280
7- Failure to implement or delay the terms of the contract and what it leads to in terms of
real loss, missing expected earnings, and other missed opportunities represents damages
that require compensation. The Prophet  ﷺsaid “There should be neither harming nor
reciprocating harm.”281
8- The Islamic Jurisprudence Academy considered the subject of the “penalty clause,”
which includes that the liquidated damages clause in the law is an agreement between the
contracting parties to estimate the compensation for the damages he incurs if the other
party does not fulfill what he is committed to or delays in its fulfillment. The Council
confirmed its previous decisions regarding the penalty clause contained in its decision in
Salam No. (85) (2/9): “The agreement on the delay in delivering the object of the contract
is not permissible because it is a debt, and it is not permissible to stipulate an increase in
debts upon delay [in repaying them].” Also, it reaffirmed its decision regarding Istisna'
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contracts (65) (3/7): It ruled then that the Istisna' contract may include a penalty clause in
accordance with what the two contracting parties had agreed upon, unless there are force
majeure circumstances and its decision regarding installment sale No. (51) (2/6): “If the
indebted purchaser delays paying installments after the specified date, it is not
permissible to obligate him to any increase over the debt with a previous condition or
without a condition, because that is usury that is forbidden. It is permissible for the
agreed condition to be associated with the original contract, as it may be in a subsequent
agreement before the damages occurs. The liquidated damages clause may be stipulated
in all financial contracts, except for contracts in which the original obligation is a debt,
seeing as this is outright usury. The decisions of the Fiqh Council have made it clear that
the harm that may be compensated for may include actual financial harm, real loss
incurred by the aggrieved party, and missed earnings. However, it does not include moral
damages. Also, the liquidated damages clause is not implemented if it is proven that this
breach of contract was due to a reason beyond the party’s control, or if it proves that that
no harm befell the other party due to the breach of contract. The court may, at the request
of one of the parties, amend the amount of compensation if it finds a justification for that
or if the damages was exaggerated.”282
Accordingly, the discretionary authority of the judge in the four schools differs according
to how expansive this school is in its interpretation of the classic text of Islamic law or the
narrowness in its interpretation and the extent to which this school takes its opinion or Ijtihad
from them.
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Therefore, we find that the four schools, in terms of correcting the conditions associated
with the contract, are divided into two factions:
•

A faction comprised of the Hanafi and the Shafi’i schools that narrows the conditions and
adheres to the principle of the unity of the transaction, so it only permits a condition
required by or befitting the contract.

•

A faction comprised of Maliki and the Hanbali schools that expands on correcting the
conditions, and does not adhere to the principle of preserving the unity of the deal, so the
conditions are permitted unless they are contrary to the requirement of the contract or
contradict Sharia.
There are detailed differences between the Hanafi and the Shafi’i schools as well as

between the Maliki school and the Hanbali school. The Hanafi and Shafi’i schools both allow a
condition that is required by the contract, and they also allow the condition that fits the contract.
But the Hanafi school only allows it to be an exception, and the Shafi’i school of law permits it
originally without exception. Thus, the Hanafi school is distinguished from the Shafi’i school by
giving way to the condition in which it became a normal route of conduct, and permitting it with
approval as well. The Shafi’i school speaks about the condition that the need calls for. It is a
condition for the benefit of the contract, and Shafi’i school mixes it with the condition that fits
the contract. This school corrects conditions that the Hanafi school cannot correct. As for the
Maliki and Hanbali schools, they take the principle that the origin in conditions is validity, and
invalidity is the exception. Further, the Hanbali school is more inclined to correct the conditions
than the Maliki school.283
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Also, this discretionary authority may differ within one school, so it expands on the
subject of contracts and conditions in the Hanbali school and sometimes narrows in other
subjects. All this affects the rulings of the Saudi judiciary, which may differ from one judge to
another in similar cases according to his interpretation of the same jurisprudential maxim.

2.4. The discretionary power of the Saudi judge to rule on the liquidated damages clause
It is helpful to look at comparative laws on the discretionary authority of the judge in
ruling on the liquidated damages clause before examining the discretionary power of the Saudi
judge on the penalty conditions in other countries. For example, French law allows the judge to
reduce the stipulated compensation if it is excessive or increase it if it is too small.284
Belgian law, before a recent law amendment, prevented a judge from increasing or
decreasing the value of the agreed clause between the parties to the contract, except in the event
of partial non-performance by one party of his obligation. 285
However, after criticism of this provision, the law was amended in 1999, and Article
1231 of the amended Belgian Civil Code allows the judge, on his own or at the request of the
debtor, to reduce the value stipulated in the liquidated damages clause when it clearly exceeds
the amount that the parties expect is needed to repair the resulting damages in case of failure of
fulfillment and in case of review by the judge. However, it is not permissible for the judge to
order the debtor to pay an amount less than the amount due in the absence of the liquidated
damages clause, though he may reduce the value of the condition upon partial fulfillment of the
basic obligation.286
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German law has allowed the value stipulated in the clause to be reduced to a reasonable
amount 287 as does Swiss law, which gives the judge the discretion to reduce the value of what he
feels is an exaggerated liquidated damages amount.288 Italian law similarly allows the judge to
reduce the exaggerated amount in the condition of the agreement.289
In Egyptian law, the judge is permitted to reduce the value set by the liquidated damages
clause, as it stipulates that the creditor is not entitled to the agreed-upon compensation if the
debtor proves that the creditor was not harmed. The judge may reduce this compensation if he
proves that the estimate has been greatly exaggerated or that the original obligation has been
partially implemented.290 The law also gives the judge discretionary power to amend the agreed
compensation by increase, but this power is restricted to the creditor proving that the debtor has
committed fraud or a grave mistake. If the damages exceed the value of the agreed
compensation, the creditor may not claim more than the value of the condition unless it is proven
that the debtor has committed fraud or a grave mistake.291
In American and English laws, a distinction is made between liquidated compensation,
which may not be reduced or increased, as it is binding on the parties to the contract, and the
penalty clause. In the United States, many contracts such as those in construction and supply,
include the liquidated damages clause, because it is difficult to estimate and prove some damages
in a fair manner. The purpose of choosing the liquidated damages clause is to assess the damages
that are difficult to estimate or prove if there is a breach of contract or non-performance by either
party of its obligations. Some U.S. courts believe that the value of the liquidated damages clause
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should be proportional to the actual or anticipated damages. If the value of the liquidated
damages clause is exaggerated, the court nullifies this clause, declares it as a penalty clause, and
limits the amount of recovery to the actual damages.
This leaves a great deal of discretion to the judge, on a case-by-case basis, to determine
what compensation is permissible, and what would be “manifestly excessive” or “manifestly
excessive.”292
The same applies to the English courts. We find that they rule that if the arbitrary
agreement compensation is significantly in excess of the value of the damages and is not based
on a reasonable assessment, it is considered a penalty condition and not a liquidated damages
clause and therefore it can be modified. In particular, in international contracts and the English
judiciary, it is well established that the judge has a right to monitor the assessment of the
liquidated damages clause’s amount. The judge’s assessment must be based on a faithful
expectation of the amount of damages that may occur to the plaintiff from the defendant’s
breaching the contractual obligation. Most European courts have adopted this approach. It gives
the judge discretionary power to review the liquidated damages clause when its amount seems
excessive.
The Saudi judiciary, which derives its perspective from the four schools of Islamic
jurisprudence, combines the two prevailing trends in comparative laws. A judge may increase the
amount of the liquidated damages clause if the plaintiff proves that the incurred damages exceed
the liquidated damages clause’s amount and vice versa; the liquidated damages clause's amount
may decrease if the defendant proves that the plaintiff did not suffer harm or damages that is
equivalent to the described amount of the liquidated damages clause in the raised case. Thus, the
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liquidated damages clause is switched to a penalty clause, as it is in English law. On the other
hand, the agreed amount may be judged without an increase or decrease, as in American law. If
none of the parties to the contract pleads the unfairness of the clause or the judge finds, after a
plea by one of them, that the amount of the clause is fair and not exaggerated. This judicial
approach is in accordance with the Saudi Council of Senior Scholars’ fatwa, which authorized
the use of the liquidated damages clause and gave the Saudi judge the discretionary authority to
monitor its implementation in the event of a complaint by one of the parties to the contract.
The Saudi judiciary differentiates between agreed-upon compensation, driven by civil
law, and a delay fine, in administrative law. The latter represents a penalty condition for the
contractor’s breach of contract that is related to the punctuality of the execution of the actions
subject of the contract.
Damages are required in order for the liquidated damages clause to come into play in
civil law; however, it does not require the creditor to prove those damages. Rather, whoever
claims that the damages occurred, must prove it, or the judge shall rule the value of the clause
without increasing or decreasing it.
While the occurrence of the damages is not required for the creditor to be entitled to the
fine for lateness, the penalty represents a guarantee for the execution of the administrative
contract on the agreed dates in order to ensure the proper functioning and regularity of the public
facility. The Saudi Government Procurement and Competition Law, stipulates in Article 72: “If a
contractor delays in executing the contract beyond the specified date, a delay fine shall be
imposed on him that does not exceed (6%) of the value of the supply contract, and does not
exceed (20%) of the value of other contracts, and those percentages may be increased with the
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prior approval of the Minister, provided that this increase shall be made clear to the competitors
before submitting their bids.”
Article 73 of the same law states that “If the contractor, in the service contracts of
continuous execution, fails to fulfill his obligations; a fine not exceeding (20%) of the contract
value shall be imposed on him, with deduction of the value of the unimplemented works, and this
percentage may be increased with the prior approval of the minister, provided that this increase is
explained to the bidders before submitting their bids.”293
This fine is applied in administrative contracts as soon as the delay occurs, even if this
delay does not result in any damages and without the need for warning or taking any other
judicial procedures. The administration shall sign it without the need for a judicial judgment if
the contractor breaches his obligation, and the contractor is not expected to prove that no harm
has occurred from his delay in fulfillment of the contract; that is because the fine is only
dependent on the administration’s discretion.
Based what has just been provided, it is noted that most legislation allows the judiciary to
monitor the amount of the liquidated damages clause and adjust the compensation to be
appropriate for the damages that occurs as a result of breaching the obligations contained in the
contract.
That is the case too with some laws in other countries that prevent the judge from
reviewing the amount of the liquidated damages clause, as in Belgian law before its amendment.
That law did not give the judge discretion with regard to the liquidated damages clause; the
Belgian Court of Cassation succeeded in circumventing the ban imposed on the judge to estimate
the amount of penalty clauses by according to him the power to exclude unfair clauses. On the
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day of the conclusion of the contract, and on the basis of an exclusively compensatory concept of
penalty clauses, the Belgium judge, can determine that the clause containing an excess amount is
not compensation and cancel it for damages to public order.294
Hence, it is clear that most laws give the judge discretionary authority to consider the
amount of the agreement and to determine due compensation if one of the parties demands to
restore the balance to the amount in the agreement. That party can do so by proving that the other
party did not inflict harm or inflicted less harm that the condition allows, or that the other party
proves that he incurred more damages than the amount of the clause that was agreed upon.
However, some comparable laws consider that it is not possible to increase the amount of the
liquidated damages clause because it is an agreement to exempt from liability, unless there is
fraud or gross error on the part of the debtor, in this case, the burden of proving the damages is
on the party claiming it.
In the Saudi judiciary, it is difficult to rely on the rule of “Agreements must be kept”295 to
restrict the judge’s authority to control the value of the liquidated damages clause. That is
because the concept of compensation agreed upon between the parties must take into account the
rules of justice in Islamic Sharia. If the amount of the liquidated damages clause is exaggerated
and the injured party proves this, then the judge rules to rebalance the contract to avoid giving
one of the parties gains he does not deserve. This is in accordance with the principle of the
inadmissibility of enrichment without reason, and the principle of abuse of the right by the
stronger party to the contract, and in application of the saying of The Prophet  ﷺsaid “There
should be neither harming nor reciprocating harm.”296
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Therefore, the Saudi judge has the power to amend the amount of the agreement by
increasing or decreasing the figure according to legal and regulatory guidance. But the judge’s
discretionary authority to amend the condition is not absolute, as it requires the occurrence of
specific cases that are subject to amendment. If it is proven to the judge that the debtor has
implemented his obligation partially or fully, but in a way different from what was agreed upon
in the contract, the judge can intervene and use his discretionary authority to reduce the amount
of the liquidated damages clause. This reduction undoubtedly must be consistent with the
intention of the joint will of the parties to the contract, as it is fair and just that the judge does not
bestow upon the creditor with the full value of the liquidated damages clause if the debtor has
fulfilled part of his obligation. Thus, here part of the liquidated damages clause is applied in a
way that corresponds to the amount of what the debtor has breached.
The judge who oversees the matter also has the discretionary authority to reduce the sum
of the liquidated damages clause if he deems it was exaggerated, as the compensation sum must
be equal to the damages actually incurred. The judge also has the discretion to increase the
amount stipulated in of the clause if he deems that the value of the condition stipulated in the
contract is not equal to the actual damages. Finally, he has the power to nullify the agreement if
it is proven to him that the breach of obligation was the result of fraud or grave mistake on the
part of the creditor.
However, a question arises about the extent of the judge’s authority in reviewing the
value of the condition. Does he intervene only when one or both of the parties to the contract so
request, and the amount is “manifestly exaggerated, or little compared to the damages” or when
fairness clearly requires it. Or does he only intervene when the law states that he can intervene
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when it finds that there is an imbalance in the obligations of the parties with regard to the
liquidated damages clause?
There appears to be some agreement on granting the judge’s discretion in reviewing the
amount of the unfair clause, but there is disagreement about determining the framework within
which a judge can carry out this review. Thus, the question arises about the extent of the judge’s
authority to reduce the amount of the liquidated damages clause to the level of damages that was
expected when the parties agreed on its (i.e., compensating the damages actually incurred by the
creditor), or whether he should take into account that the penalty clause has another function,
which is to urge the debtor to carry out his obligation in the specified time, and thus the judge
might raise the value of the judgment a little more than the amount of damages incurred.

2.5. The cultural and social background of the Saudi judge and its impact on his judicial rulings
and discretionary authority
The personality of the Saudi judge is affected by the cultural framework of the society in
which he lives, where he acquires impact and knowledge and behavioral patterns that affect his
approach to the issues he considers, including his grounding in the provisions of Islamic Sharia.
All these will affect the rigor of the scrutiny he exercises when examining the evidence presented
by the plaintiff to prove the damages he has sustained, his strictness in estimating the amount of
damages, the scarcity of his judgment to compensate for future damages, the absence of
compensation for missed opportunity, and his role in choosing the jurisprudential and legal rules
that he applies on the subject of the dispute.

2.5.1. The impact of the cultural, social, religious, and scientific character of the judge on
the judicial judgment and the judge’s discretion
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The laws of the Kingdom have established the concept of the independence of the
judiciary. Article 46 of the Basic Law of Governance stipulates that “the judiciary is an
independent authority, and there is no authority over judges in their judgments other than the
authority of Islamic law.” The first article of the judicial code states that: “Judges are
independent and there is no authority over them in their judiciary except for the provisions of
Islamic Sharia and the applicable laws, and no one has the right to interfere in the judiciary.”
These texts gave judges in the Kingdom a strong sense of independence in the cases they
consider. This expanded the scope of their interpretation of the provisions of Islamic Sharia
when applied to the facts and cases presented to them in the courts when there is no definitive
text that can be applied.
Article 31 of the judicial law stipulates the following requirements for becoming a judge:
A. Be of Saudi nationality by origin.
B. Have engaged in good conduct.
C. Have the knowledge and training to judge as stipulated by Sharia.
D. Have obtained a certificate from one of the Sharia colleges in the Kingdom or another
equivalent certificate, provided that in the latter case he passed a special examination
prepared by the Supreme Judicial Council.
E. Be at least forty years old if his appointment is in the rank of an appellate judge, and
twenty-two years old if his appointment is in one of the other ranks of the judiciary.
F. Not have been convicted of a crime against religion or honor, or had a disciplinary
decision issued against him to dismiss him from a public position, even if he had been
rehabilitated.
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These requirements aim at filling the judiciary only with people who have the character
of seriousness, integrity, strong religious conviction, and other good qualifications. In the past,
some people who were nominated as judges refused to work in that capacity for fear of being
unfair to anyone because of their rulings. Therefore, the internal religious conviction of the Saudi
judge and fear of Allah plays a major role in seeking justice in the rulings he issues.
Noteworthy too is the requirement of a certificate or special examination. This condition
excludes those who have graduated law school only from working as judges, although there is a
need to allow them to work in this sector due to the presence of many laws issued by the
legislative authority in the Kingdom in such fields such as corporate, labor, traffic, and
commercial laws. Applying these laws requires study and knowledge, and it is not enough to
study their legal origins, which the students at Sharia colleges do learn about. However, some
Sharia colleges in the Kingdom have recently introduced some regular law subjects into their
curricula with the aim of raising the qualification of judge and increasing their legal knowledge.
The Shura Council recently approved a proposal297 to amend Paragraph (D) of Article 31
of the Judicial Law regarding the conditions a person in charge of the judiciary to read: “He must
have a certificate from one of the Sharia colleges in the Kingdom or another equivalent
certificate, or a certificate in the discipline of regulations, law or rights from one of the colleges
in the Kingdom, or another equivalent certificate, provided that he passes a two year
qualification program in jurisprudence and its principles and Sharia rulings at the higher judicial
institute. With the exception of those holding a bachelor’s degree in Sharia, the qualification is
required to pass a special exam prepared by the Supreme Judicial Council.” This amendment
aims to contribute to providing qualified judges in both Sharia and law in all areas of disputes,
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including commercial, labor, banking, insurance, and intellectual property law. It does so by
providing graduates of law schools the opportunity to apply to work in the judiciary after
obtaining sufficient legal qualification to occupy judicial positions.
Currently, to be appointed as judge, a person is being selected from among those who
hold a degree from one of the Sharia colleges in the Kingdom with a general grade of no less
than good, and with a grade of no less than very good in jurisprudence and its principles, and
those who hold a doctorate or a master’s degree from the Higher Institute of the Judiciary. Those
nominated for higher judgeships must be holders of a doctorate or a master’s degree from one of
the Sharia colleges in the field of jurisprudence or its origins, and teachers of jurisprudence or its
origins in one of the colleges in the Kingdom.
This focus on the qualification of the judge is reflected in his ability to settle disputes
before him and his interpretation of texts and the applicable rules. Given the judge’s
independence in his work, it requires that his work be governed by his conscience and his fear of
Allah, with no external influence. However, leaving judges unsupervised and without verifying
the integrity of their procedures and the rulings they issue may open the door to the occurrence
of issues and contribute to the failure to achieve justice. Therefore, Article 6 of the judicial code
states that the Supreme Judicial Council looks into the functional affairs of judges, such as
appointment, promotion, discipline, delegation, secondment, training, transfer, leave, and
termination of service.
In accordance with the established rules and procedures, in order to guarantee the
independence of judges and at the same time oversee them broadly, Article 6 authorizes the
Council to issue a regulation for judicial inspection that allows the Council to monitor the work
of judges.
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Saudi judges rely on Sharia as a source of judicial rulings and draw on what these texts
contain of jurisprudential material that is rich in provisions and rules that are flexible in
application and subject to modification according to changes of time, place, conditions, and
customs. They are bound in their rulings by the controls mentioned by the jurists of the four
schools in light of the social, cultural, and religious circumstances surrounding the judge, which
prompt some potential candidates for judges to decline to work in the judiciary or to resign for
fear that someone will be wronged in their judgments or because they feel unable to derive
judgments from the rules of Sharia in an appropriate manner.
We find that these factors affect a judge’s ruling, especially one who is able to understand
the legal texts broadly and comprehensively; such judges benefit from this jurisprudential
abundance of sources and interpretations of them. They are able to expand the application of
texts to many new cases and facts that were not known in previous eras of the jurists, including
the liquidated damages clause. That is the case because some texts carry many provisions and
rules whose application vary from one judge to another.
The judge chooses what he deems is the most just course according to his legal
perspective. His ruling reflects the judge’s culture, his religious and scientific qualification, and
the social circumstances surrounding him.

2.5.2. Compensated damages and the tendency against moral compensation in the Saudi
judiciary
The Saudi judge has wide discretion in estimating the amount of damages that may accrue
to the aggrieved party as a result of non-performance of the contract or non-execution of one of its
clauses by the debtor, including the damages that occur as a result of non-fulfillment of the penalty
condition. The damages that the judge may set is divided into material damages, which are those
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damages that directly affect a person financially, and moral or moral damages, which affect a
person in his reputation, honor, affection, financial, social, and/or commercial position.298
There is disagreement in Islamic jurisprudence about the permissibility of compensation
for moral damages, although there is an agreement on the permissibility of compensation for
material harm. Those jurists who see the inadmissibility of compensation for moral damages
have noted that Sharia does not take the principle of financial compensation for moral damages,
but rather the principle of punishing the perpetrator for material loss. Others view the
permissibility of compensation for moral damages in Islamic jurisprudence because the hadith of
the Prophet  ﷺwhich said “There should be neither harming nor reciprocating harm.”299 This
approach also used general terms stating that damages should not be limited to material harm, as
the jurisprudential rules stipulate that “there is no specification without provision,” and “the
general rule remains the same as long as there is no restriction.”300
Those who said that compensation for moral damages is permissible cited the following:
1. In the Qur’an, the Almighty said, “if you fear that they will maintain the limits set by Allah,
then there is no sin on them for what she ransoms with...”301 In this verse it is permissible
to take a financial penalty from a wife who has caused moral damages to her husband.
Therefore, he must be financially compensated when she is required to do so.302
From Sunnah, the Prophet  ﷺsaid: “There should be neither harming nor reciprocating
harm,”303 and “Everything of a Muslim is sacred to a Muslim: his property, honor and blood. It is
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enough evil for any man to despise his brother Muslim.”304 Moral damages is one of the types of
damages that is forbidden by Sharia and falls within the scope of the prohibition indicated by the
hadith. And honor is the place of dignity in the human being and all that is related to his moral
stature. The prohibition of display in the honorable hadith came in conjunction with two things
that do not contradict a jurist in determining the principle of compensation in them in general,
namely compensation for crimes against the human body and property. Moral damages are no
less painful than physical damages, in fact, they may be more so in some cases.305 Therefore, the
introduction of compensation for moral damages is a deterrent to those who transgress the rights
and moral interests of others, especially today with the spread of social media, which may be
amongst the most used tools to distort a person’s character and dignity. As for the jurists who
said that it is not permissible to compensate for moral damages with money, they quote the
saying in the Qur’an as evidence that moral damages do not involve financial and imperceptible
loss, and that compensation in Islamic jurisprudence is only for financial damages that have
actually occurred. Islamic law has established separate punitive penalties for moral damages, and
it is up to the judge to determine the appropriate penalty to prevent such damages in order to
achieve justice.306
Furthermore, the penalties established by the Islamic Sharia laws against those who
commit acts that cause moral damages are sufficient to redress the harm and redress the assault
on a person’s dignity. Sharia established penalties for the transgressors of people’s honor and
reputation for such offenses as slander and dealt with procrastination in the execution of
contracts or obligations with imprisonment, selling the financial assets of the procrastinator, and
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other means that preclude the judgment of financial compensation in moral damages. This is the
case given to more imperceptible things that cannot be easily estimated because they do not
leave tangible traces unlike compensation, which is approved by Islamic jurisprudence and acts
to compensate tangible material harm.
Nevertheless, some jurists, when discussing the evidence and sayings of those who favor
compensation for moral harm, pointing to such jurisprudential examples as pain, shame, and hair
loss, which also are subject to financial compensation for moral damages, do not negate the need
for compensation for material damages as well. In fact, some of what has been described as
moral damages is in fact material harm that can be compensated according to existing laws,
including the infliction of pain by beating or slapping, even if it does not leave a trace visibly
mars the part of the body.307
This dispute in Islamic jurisprudence about compensation for moral damages is reflected
in Saudi courts, with some judges allowing such compensation and others not.
Nevertheless, judges in the kingdom base their rulings on precedents that are widespread
in the books of jurists of all schools of Islamic jurisprudence, although they rely more on the
sayings of the Hanbali school. However, a judge is allowed to make diligence in this, and the
judiciary has begun to adopt financial compensation for moral damages. This is despite the fact
that the Islamic Fiqh Academy of the Organization of the Conference has decided that the
damages that may be compensated under the liquidated damages clause are material damages,
real loss, and lost earnings without including psychological or moral damages.308
There are some late Islamic jurists who think that compensation for moral damages is not
permissible because the basis of compensation is reparation, replacing lost money with current
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money, the equivalent to restoring the situation to what it was. However, pain, honor, and
reputation have no price, so the courts are satisfied with a symbolic compensation. Viewing them
is irreplaceable, and some of them permitted it on the grounds that it is a disciplinary punishment
for a violation of personal dignity, a punishment that protects society.309
If the conditions referred to previously for compensation for damages are met, then the
Saudi courts rule for financial compensation. Some courts have recently begun to rule for such
compensation for moral damages. Among the most important of these rulings is what the
Administrative Court of Appeal held, that one of the major rules in Sharia is the rule: there can
be no damages, whether material or moral, so compensation for moral damages is found in
Islamic jurisprudence, especially if it is a consequence of material damages.310
The Administrative Court of Appeal also affirmed this same principle when it stated in a
ruling that moral compensation is for all harm that affects a person in a non-material interest
such as honor and intimidation, and that the generality in the jurisprudence rule that “Harm must
be eliminated” is not limited to material damages.311
In this regard, one ruling obligated a medical authority to compensate a person for
receiving the wrong test results where the plaintiff agreed to undergo a prenuptial examination
and then was surprised by the reports issued by the authority stating that he had AIDS. He did
not, although this only was discerned after he went through numerous tests in several labs and
private and governmental hospitals, which showed that he was healthy and HIV-free. This
proved the defendant’s mistake, and it has been proven that the plaintiff sustained moral
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damages as a result of the defendant’s error; the wrong reports had negative effects on the
plaintiff and his family, and this demonstrated the three pillars of responsibility, including fault
and damages. Since the courts of the Board of Grievances have adopted the principle of
compensation for moral offense in Judgment No.: (282/2/2/1432AH) Case No.:
(4961/2/S/1431AH) and corroborated by the Court of Appeal No.: (2/44) for the year 1433 AH,
the matter resulted in the Chamber ordering the defendant to compensate the plaintiff for moral
damages.
The court judges worked hard to estimate the value of the compensation due to the
plaintiff for the moral damages he had sustained, as this was measured by the amount of his
monthly salary that he was receiving during the period in which he lived in turmoil and did not
know what his condition would be, from the moment he was informed of the result of the wrong
medical evaluation until the date of his being informed of the correct results.312 But when the
debtor does not clearly prove the moral damages that he sustained, the Saudi judge does not
award him compensation. In execution of that, the Saudi Board of Grievances decided to reject
the request for compensation for the moral damages suffered by the plaintiff, because he was
unable to provide evidence that he received real and specific damages, as the judgment stated:
“As for the plaintiff’s request, compensation for moral damages in the amount of four hundred
thousand riyals, the court held that the compensation must be for real tangible damages. The
plaintiff did not submit anything to rely on it except for his statement to the court, which caused
the court to reject his request.”313
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With regard to moral damages, the Saudi Court of issued its ruling issued on 8/8/1434
AH, rejecting the plaintiff’s request for compensation, and halting the financial penalty for the
defendant, because the defendant falsely accused him of burning his car in front of the Okaz
Organization for Press and Publishing, without any evidence or evidence, which led to a
tarnishing of his reputation at his workplace, and among his colleagues and his family. The court
rejected the plaintiff’s request due to lack of any evidence.314
Therefore, the Saudi judge may rule for compensation for moral damages resulting from
breach of the liquidated damages clause, in accordance with legal perspectives he adopts from
these two opinions. Some Saudi judges have decided to award compensation for moral damages
according to what they deem necessary and appropriate. They have taken into account what the
Board of Grievances, the administrative judiciary in the Kingdom, informed the heads of the
administrative courts about the permissibility of material compensation for moral damages in
cases and matters not related to material damages, provided that it is subject to the assessment of
the court according to the circumstances of the incident, while the ruling for compensation for
moral damages is based on moral damages. Therefore, the judge in the Kingdom, when
estimating the amount, in the event that moral damages are proven, will take into account the
material and social and situation for the victim, the size, type, and nature of the damages,
whether it is personal or familial, and whether the damages have been caused at the workplace of
the injured person or his commercial or social activity.
In application of this approach, Article 164 of the executive regulations of the
commercial court law in the Kingdom stipulates that the court must decide on the request for
compensation for material and moral damages, and estimate compensation, including litigation
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expenses. Thus, the judge is obligated to hear the case for moral damages, and to assess the
damages arising from it.
From the aforementioned, it can be said that there are some conditions that must be met
in order to be able to compensate for moral damages in the Saudi judiciary. Moral damages are
not estimated by and of themselves, but rather are linked to the material damages incurred by the
plaintiff.

2.5.3. Rigor, severity, and scrutiny in recognizing evidence of damages
The Saudi judge is strict in ruling compensation for the damages incurred to the injured
person. In order to award compensation, the following conditions must be met:
•

There is a breach of the right or interest of the injured party.

•

That interest must be legitimate. If the interest is illegal or in violation of public order or
morals, then there can be no compensation.

•

The damages are direct and certain to occur, so it has actually occurred.

•

Proving the occurrence of the damages, as the Saudi judiciary requires the clear presence
or prospect of the damages for the debtor to be liable for the breach of an obligation.
However, it can be assumed that the damages will occur in some cases, especially in the
liquidated damages clause in administrative contracts.

•

The debtor does not have a legitimate excuse for not fulfilling his obligation, such as force
majeure, the fault of a third party, or the fault of the victim himself.
Therefore, the Saudi judge may rule for compensation on the liquidated damages clause,

provided that there is a valid contract that includes specific obligations to which each of the
parties to the contract is bound. The judge establishes the responsibility of the breaching party in
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the event of non-performance or violation of his commitment and examines the plaintiff’s claim
that there is a default or breach on the part of the defendant. The judge also establishes the type
of this breach, whether it is total or partial, or the defective execution or delay in execution,
through a discussion of the parties to the dispute before awarding compensation.
Proving a contractual error depends on whether the debtor’s obligation is to achieve a
result, to exercise care. The former requires the creditor to achieve the result that he contracted
for. If he does not achieve this, the debtor’s contractual responsibility is being held.
All that the creditor in this case has to prove is that the result has not been achieved; he is
not obligated or required to prove the debtor’s mistake, or that non-performance of the obligation
was due to force majeure, or the fault of the creditor, or third parties.315
The Saudi judge also monitors the extent to which the damages have been achieved, as
damages are considered the main pillar of liability in Islamic jurisprudence. If evidence of the
damages claimed by the plaintiff is not available, the judge does not rule for compensation. In
application of this, the Saudi Court of Appeal concluded, in its ruling issued in 1434 AH, that a
tenant of the property was not liable for the damages that occurred to the rented property due to
force majeure. The property owner had stipulated to the defendant that she was not responsible
for any emergency circumstances, and that she received the property after the contract’s
expiration in a sound and good condition. It was stated in the ruling that: “This defense’s
stipulation in the contract that it was not responsible for any emergency circumstances has no
effect, because according to Sharia requires a guarantee that is not changed by the conditions and
vice versa.” The court cited what was mentioned in some books of Islamic jurisprudence (AlRawd al-Murabba’ 5/366), because what is not required to be guaranteed does not make it a
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condition guaranteed, and what must be guaranteed does not negate the guarantee provided that
it is negated.316
Because the Prophet arose and glorified Allah as He deserved and then said, “Why do
some people impose conditions which are not present in Allah’s Book of Laws? Whoever
imposes such a condition that is not in Allah’s Laws, that condition is invalid even if he imposes
one hundred conditions, for Allah’s conditions are more binding and reliable.”317
With regard to establishing damages, although it may be proven by all means of proof,
including testimony, presumptions, inspection, and experience, the judge requires the injured
party to clearly prove the damages inflicted on him. This is what the Saudi Board of Grievances
decided in its ruling issued in 1427 AH when it said: “[T]he compensation is based on three
pillars without which it cannot be established: the error, the damages, and the causal relationship
between the defendant’s mistake and the damages caused to the plaintiff. The plaintiff must
prove the damages.”318
The subject of the liquidated damages clause should also be legally permissible, as the
court ruled that the requested agreement corresponds to delaying the payment of the debt, and
this is not legally permissible and is an invalid condition, The court thus decided to dismiss the
plaintiff’s request. The judge based his judgment on:
1. The saying of the jurist Ibn Abd Al-Bar from the Maliki school: “[E]very addition
of an asset or a benefit that the lender (creditor) requires over the borrower (debtor) is Usury,
with no dispute on this matter.”319
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2. The decision of the Islamic Fiqh Academy No. 85 which included: “It is not
permissible to agree to a condition for delaying a Muslim’s delivery of the sum stipulated in
the contract.”320
The plaintiff objected to the judgment, but the court of appeals decided to ratify it.321 This
is in accordance with the Saudi Enforcement law and its executive regulations.322
In another case, which involved a contracting contract limited to a specific period, the
breach of this period entailed a liquidated damages clause that “if the defendant, the ‘contractor’
delays delivery on the specified date, an amount of one thousand riyals shall be deducted from
his entitlements for each day of delay.” The court has confirmed the entitlement of the liquidated
damages from the existence of the error represented in the debtor’s delay in execution and that
this resulted in the occurrence of the damages, even if it was a future damages, but it is
considered because it is a direct damages. Therefore, the causal relationship between the error
and the damages was found, and the debtor was warned of the necessity of execution, but the
clause was not implemented. The court also held that the amount of the agreed-upon condition
was greatly exaggerated, and thus felt it necessary to reduce it. Noting this, the judge assigned
the assessment of this penalty clause to an expert committee, which came out with three options
regarding the amount of compensation to be awarded to the plaintiff:
Option one: The judge would decide what was agreed upon between the two parties, that
is, the amount of the agreed condition.
Option two: The judge would order a compensation of 10% of the contract value based
on the value of the delay fine estimated in the administrative contracts of government projects.
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Option three: The judge would fix the amount of the actual damages caused to the
plaintiff as a result of his failure to benefit from the rents of these villas for the duration of the
delay.
The judge chose the second option and confirmed his ruling by the Court of Cassation.
Another case involved a contract for the supply and installation of a stone. The contract
between the marble factory and the villa owner included a liquidated damages clause stipulating
a fine of two hundred riyals 323 for each day of delay, and the defendant was late in implementing
this contract. The two parties had agreed that the delay period would start from the end of the
contract, i.e., about five months, and the plaintiff had demanded the imposition of a fine in the
event of a delay. However, the defendant stated that the reason for the delay was due to an
extraneous reason beyond his control, represented in much rainfall over twenty days. This was in
addition to the plaintiff’s delay in paying the defendant’s fee, and the increase in the work that
the plaintiff requested from the defendant, which were outside the work stipulated in the
contract. Since the judge found that some of the delay period was due to a reason outside the
defendant’s control, he deducted from the claimed compensation what corresponds to the
liquidated damages sum involved this period.324

2.5.4. Not accepting the plaintiff’s requests
The plaintiff often finds it very difficult to get his claims accepted by a Saudi judge
regarding compensation for damages in general and with regard to the liquidated damages clause
in particular. The judge often asks the plaintiff to detail his case in writing and to delineate it
precisely before entering into the discussion of the subject. That is because of a difference in
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views between the plaintiff and the judge regarding the benefit of the liquidated damages clause.
The plaintiff sees that its main benefit is to exempt him from proving the damages he has
suffered, as it is assumed that the debtor’s failure to implement the contract includes damages to
the plaintiff. That in turn is because the original execution of the liquidated damages condition as
agreed upon by its parties and breaching that execution itself constitutes the harm by the
plaintiff. Therefore, the damages, and then the judgment of the amount of the liquidated damages
clause, is proven as soon as the debtor fails to implement his obligation. If the defendant claims
otherwise, he must prove his case, because damages are assumed from the plaintiff’s point of
view.
In some other legal systems, the harm resulting from non-performance of the obligation is
equal to what was agreed upon in the liquidated damages between the two parties. But the judge
does not necessarily see the validity of what the plaintiff is claiming. Rather, the plaintiff is
required to prove the damages he claims to have suffered due to the debtor’s failure to fulfill his
obligation.
Here the question arises about the forms of compensation for damages in the liquidated
damages clause, the conditions for its entitlement, and the extent to which the Saudi judge
accepts what the plaintiff claims about it.
There are three possible scenarios regarding the liquidated damages clause:325
A-

The compensation agreed upon in the liquidated damages is much greater than the value

of the damages resulting from negligence or error in execution the contract, so it amounts to
a financial threat. Here, the Saudi judge will not accept the plaintiff’s claim for the total
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amount but will reduce it to equal the amount of damages due the plaintiff, taking into
account the fatwa of the Council of Senior Scholars. This indicated that the judge has the
right to reduce the value of the liquidated damages clause if it is intended as a financial
threat.
This move by the Saudi judge is consistent with the opinion that the threatening function
of the penalty clause is beginning to diminish in the face of the judge’s compensatory function,
as his penalty role appears only casually, and this is done through his ability to award
compensation for breach of contractual terms. This is how the penalty function is achieved only
when the condition is agreed upon, with an amount greater than the legally due compensation, so
the condition works to the extent agreed upon. Then, within the limits of the amount in excess of
the due compensation, it becomes for the defendant a kind of contractual penalty. As for the
compensatory function of the liquidation damages clause, it is achieved when this clause is
estimated at an amount equal to the amount of damages expected to occur as a result of
breaching the execution of the original agreement.
B- The agreed compensation is equal to the expected damages. Here, the judge will respond
to the plaintiff’s request by ruling for awarding him the amount of the liquidated damages
clause, but after he uses the experts opinions on the extent of the damages, finds it equal
to the amount of the liquidated damages clause.
C- The compensation agreed upon in the condition is less than the expected damages. Here,
this is despite the fact that the liquidated damages clause is considered as mitigating the
plaintiff liability in the event of his failure to implement his obligation. However, the
Saudi judge may accept that the plaintiff has proved that the damages he sustained are
more than the amount of the liquidated damages clause. If the plaintiff does not demand
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more than the amount of the clause, then the judge might decide to compensate him for
the amount of damages he actually sustained. Alternatively, the judge may rule only the
value of the liquidated damages clause, even though it is proven that it is not equal to the
damages inflicted on the creditor/plaintiff. In this regard, the General Court in Makkah Al
Mukarramah issued a ruling obligating the defendant to pay only the specified amount in
the liquidated damages clause, despite the fact that it was proven this sum was less than
the damages caused to the plaintiff. Where the court used experts to decide this, and after
it was proven that the damages was higher than the amount of the clause, it still ruled for
the value of the penalty clause only.326
The doctrinal disagreement about the principle of free will to contract and that the
contract is the law of the contracting parties affects the Saudi judge when he considers the
dispute. Those who say that the principle of the contract must be fully respected will rule for
compensation specified in the liquidated damages clause, as soon as the breach takes place, even
if the damages had not occurred. Considering the condition is a consensual estimation of the
amount of compensation that is due for the damages resulting from a contracting party’s breach
of his obligations, what will pertain is the liquidated damages clause or condition that was made
at the will and desire of its parties. Hence, it must be enforced as it is and may not be modified,
in execution. This is because of the binding force of contracts, which prevents them from being
modified except with the agreement of the two parties or the text of the law.
Those judges who think that this principle should not automatically go into effect because
it might lead to injustice by the stronger contracting party against the weaker one will require the
occurrence of the damages in order to judge the value of the liquidated damages. However,
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judges will differ on the amount of compensation and whether it is necessary to equal the
damages or not.
The judge who thinks that the agreed-upon clause is compensation for damages and
suspends his authority to amend it to equal the damages. The judge who considers that the
compensation will have some of the effects of a penalty has the power to amend the amount, but
at a lower rate, so it is not necessary to be equal between the actual damages with the amount of
the liquidated damages clause. As for a judge who saw that it was a binding agreement that had
nothing to do with the damages, he saw that the judge had no authority in the amendment of the
specified damages. Therefore, it cannot be said that the judge will respond to the plaintiff's
requests and simply affirm the amount of the liquidated damages clause without modifying it,
there are cases where which the judge can intervene to increase or decreased this value,
including:
1. The case of partial execution of the obligation by the debtor, where the judge has the
power to reduce the value of the agreement from the agreed-upon amount. The judge considers
it is his duty to intervene to harmonize the value of the condition and make it commensurate
with the amount of the obligation that has not been implemented and the resulting damages
incurred by the creditor.
2. Sometimes, the judge finds the liquidated damages clause’s amount is exaggerated, as
it falls within his discretionary power to respond to the plaintiff’s requests to pass judgment on
the full amount of the liquidated damages clause. If this occurs, the judge might reduce the
amount of the liquidated damages clause, which is exaggerated, compared to what is deemed
fair and adequate compensation for the plaintiff. The excessive amount of the liquidated
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damages clause requires the judge to go outside the scope of his compensatory function to
impose a penalty and to amend it limit it to his compensatory function.
3. In the event that the plaintiff requests an increase in the amount of the liquidated
damages clause, if it is found that the damages incurred by the plaintiff exceed the amount of the
liquidated damages clause and the plaintiff proves these damages, the judge will rule in his favor
and increase the amount of the liquidated damages clause, making it equivalent to the proven
damages. But if the plaintiff does not prove these damages or does not request an increase in the
amount of the liquidated damages clause, the judge will not rule in his favor. Even if it is proven
to the judge through experience that the damages inflicted on the plaintiff are higher than the
stated amount of the agreed-upon clause between the parties, the judge will take into account the
rule that the plaintiff shall not be awarded more than what he claims.327
4. In the event that the liquidated damages clause is void due to its violation of the
provisions of Sharia, then the judge will not respond to the plaintiff’s request that he rule on the
liquidated damages clause. The plaintiff must prove the damages incurred by him, without
adhering to the liquidated damages clause, to be considered by the judge according to his
discretionary authority and according to the evidence presented to him, and the loss suffered by
the plaintiff and the loss of gain.328
Here the question arises about the nature of the agreement. Some consider it a proper
liquidated damages clause for the damages incurred by the creditor, while others view it as a
threatening condition aimed at urging the debtor to carry out this obligation on time, and still
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others view it as both an incentive to the debtor to execute his commitment on time and
compensate for the damages incurred if he does not.
To answer these questions, we should go back to knowing the common will of the parties
at the time of contracting. Some set the liquidated damages clause to determine the amount of
compensation due only in the event that the contract is breached. In this case, the judge is to
determine by the amount of the liquidated damages clause without increasing or decreasing this
amount, unless this condition is in violation of the provisions of Sharia.
That was the case when a Saudi court heard a dispute regarding a marriage contract.
Where the wife stipulated an amount of one million riyals in the event that the husband divorced
her, and although the value of this was exaggerated, the judge estimated that it is compensation
for the wife in return for the damages she incurred as a result of her divorce, and not as a penalty
where the amount can be reduced. Ultimately, the Court of Appeal returned the case to the Court
of First Instance to review the ruling on the possibility that the purpose of the condition was to
threaten the husband and thus to deter him from initiating a divorce. Hence, the option to
decrease its amount because it is exaggerated existed, but the Court of first instance clarified that
the figure was meant as compensation for the wife in the event of her divorce, citing the hadith
of the Messenger  ﷺsaid:
“Muslims must keep to the conditions they have made, except for a condition which
makes unlawful something which is lawful or makes lawful something which is unlawful.”329
The condition is like reconciliation and the woman did not accept marriage except after
stipulating such a condition. He inferred from what the Bahouti jurist mentioned from the
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Hanbali school of thought that the condition that the woman benefits from that does not
contradict the marriage contract, but rather is a valid and necessary condition.330
Also, the ruling in this condition comes in application of the jurisprudence rule
“Fulfillment of rights by enforcing conditions,”331 but if it turns out that the purpose of the
contracting parties in setting the condition is to threaten the debtor and urge him to carry out his
obligation at the specified time, then the judge may reduce its value to the extent that he deems
necessary to achieve justice and equity, as indicated by the fatwa of the Council of Senior
Scholars in the Kingdom.332
In the event that the objective of the contracting parties in setting the condition is to
combine compensation and a financial threat to push the debtor to carry out his obligation, the
matter is be returned to the authority of the judge to assess the appropriateness of reducing this
requirement in light of the circumstances of each case. The judge should set the amount
according to the damages suffered by the creditor and the loss of gain due to the debtor’s breach
of his obligations, despite some difficulties that he may encounter in distinguishing between the
condition’s compensatory and threatening functions.
So far, the Saudi judge has met the plaintiff’s requests for compensation for breach of the
liquidated damages clause, provided that the following conditions are met, so that his request can
be considered, and compensation awarded:
1) Actual financial damages have occurred, resulting from non-performance or delay in
implementing what the debtor had committed to. This does not include moral damages in most
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cases, although there has been a kind of development in the Saudi judge’s view of compensation
for moral damages, as we mentioned earlier.
2) The cause of the damages is due to a breach of the obligation, and there is no
legitimate excuse that prevented the debtor from carrying out his obligation, such as emergency
or force majeure circumstances or the fault of the creditor himself or others.
In general, the judge does not respond to the plaintiff’s requests for compensation when
the damages is not evident or is only probable, and this is what was included in the ruling of the
Audit Board of the Board of Grievances in the Kingdom Whereas, the lower court ruling was
upheld by rejecting the plaintiff’s request for compensation for the decrease in his sales because
the court had not considered whether those damages actually had occurred to him due to the
violation attributed to the defendant. The audit committee confirmed that the defendant did not
import the counterfeit goods that the plaintiff claims affected his sale of his goods until after a
period of reduced sales by the plaintiff had occurred. This indicates that the violation attributed
to the defendant had no direct impact on reducing the plaintiff’s sales and causing damages to
him.333
The judge in Saudi Arabia also focuses on achieving fair and equal compensation for
damages, regardless of the plaintiff’s requests. In this regard, the Audit Committee of the Board
of Grievances confirmed that when the purpose of compensation is to be equivalent to the
damages and not exceed it, the authority assesses the damages incurred at 20 percent of the value
of the contract and considers that this is sufficient to redress the damages suffered by the
plaintiff.334
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2.5.5. The judge’s scrutiny in estimating the amount of damages claimed by the plaintiff
The Saudi judge needs to be strict in assessing compensation for the damages amount
claimed by the plaintiff. In this regard, the General Court in Makkah Al-Mukarramah issued a
ruling obligating the defendant to pay the amount of the liquidated damages clause, after the
court had ascertained that the clause was just to give the verdict. The plaintiff instituted a lawsuit
against the defendant, requesting to fulfill the contractual obligation by doubling the property
rent rate. This obligation comes into effect after the lease expires due to this clause mentioned in
the lease agreement dealing with late vacating of the rental property. The defendant had delayed
leaving after he was notified of the increase in rent and the existence of a penalty clause in the
contract obligating him to pay double rent if he was late in leaving the rental property.
By submitting the case to the defendant, he acknowledged its validity. He pleaded the
nullification of the condition because his delay was due to a dispute between the two parties over
an increase in rent. The judge ordered the defendant to pay the amount of the condition, twice the
daily rent mentioned in the rental contract, from the date of the lease expiration until the rental
property was vacated. Support for the judge’s ruling is found in the Almighty’s saying in the
Qur’an: “O you who have believed, fulfill all contracts,”335 and “Muslims must keep to the
conditions they have made, except for a condition which makes unlawful something which is
lawful, or makes lawful something which is unlawful.”336
Though the defendant’s statement regarding recognition of the lease agreement and the
increase in rent clause, the clause was based rightfully, also because property experts stated in
their estimation that the rate rent asked by the plaintiff is less than comparable rental properties.
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Therefore, the judge ruled, obligating the defendant to pay the penalty clause. When the
defendant contested the verdict, the appeals court upheld the verdict.337
The judge was strict in ruling the amount of the liquidated damages clause and did not
just follow what had been agreed to the parties to the contract. Rather, he asked for an expert
opinion so as to make sure that the value of the liquidated damages clause was not exaggerated.
But when he learned, through the opinion of experts, that the value of the daily rent for the
property exceeded the value of the agreement, he did not increase the amount stipulated by the
agreement, but rather specified the contractual sum that the two parties agreed upon.
In another case, the plaintiff sued the defendant because he breached the land lease
contract by not paying for the three years. The plaintiff requested the court to have the defendant
be obligated to pay the agreed amount in the liquidated damages clause due to the contractual
breach. By presenting the case to the defendant, he acknowledged the validity of the land lease
contract and requested some time to respond to the plaintiff’s claim. However, the defendant did
not respond to the plaintiff’s claim in the next court session. Thus, the court decided that the
liquidated damages clause from the land lease contract was unlawful. The court reasoned that the
original obligation for which the liquidated damages clause existed was, in fact, a debt for not
fulfilling the obligation. Thus, the liquidated damages clause when it comes to debts is not
legally permissible in Sharia due to the Prophet saying, “Muslims must keep to the conditions
they have made, except for a condition which makes a forbidden matter permissible or makes a
permissible matter prohibited.” and Islamic Fiqh Council Resolution No.: 12/3/109. Therefore,
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the judge ruled to reject the plaintiff’s claim of the liquidated damages clause. The plaintiff
objected, but the court’s decision was reaffirmed the Court of Appeal.338
This ruling is consistent with the opinion of Sharia jurists, which was previously referred
to, and which does not allow the liquidated damages clause to act as debt because it is a type of
usury that Sharia prohibits.
In another case, the judge decided to reduce the value of the liquidated damages clause,
as the plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant’s company, requesting the termination of a
contract for the supply and installation of doors concluded between the two parties, and the
payment of the price paid, and obligating the defendant to pay the amount of the agreed-upon
clause for each day of delay. The defendant was late in executing the work within the agreed
period, and the company failed to assign someone to represent it before the court while
informing its representative of the case, so it was decided to consider it in absentia. When
evidence was requested from the plaintiff, he submitted the contract of agreement and a receipt
deed consistent with what was stated in his claim. When requested to do so, he also took an oath
to attest to the validity of the case. The judge quoted the Almighty saying: “O you who have
believed, fulfill all contracts,”339 and the Prophet  ﷺas saying, “Muslims must keep to the
conditions they have made, except for a condition which makes a forbidden matter permissible
or makes a permissible matter prohibited.”340
What is meant by the liquidated damages clause is to urge the one who is bound by it to
fulfill his commitment. The judge decided to adjust its amount in a way that did not harm the
defendant. The judge decided to obligate the defendant company to pay the value of the agreed-
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upon condition estimated by the experts, and not the higher figure set between the parties,
because he thought that the agreed-upon value was exaggerated. The plaintiff objected, but the
judgment of the Court of Appeal was upheld.341
From this case, it is clear that the Saudi judiciary imposes strict control over the amount
that can be awarded to a person claiming compensation, especially with regard to compensation
for moral damages. For a long time, Saudi judges had been reluctant to compensate for this kind
of damages in the first place. This is despite the guideline of the Saudi judiciary on the principle
that the contract is the law for the contracting parties and the Islamic dictum that “Muslims must
keep to the conditions they have made.”342
However, in practice, we find that the Saudi judge is strict in responding to requests for
compensation submitted by the parties to the conflict. Compensation in contractual matters is
limited to the expected direct damages at the time of contracting without considering future
damages, unless the damages is due to fraud by the debtor or that occurred as a result of a serious
error from him, and the creditor was able to prove that. Here, the judge can consider requests for
compensation for those unexpected damages the plaintiff has suffered. The Saudi judge relies on
what is prevalent in Islamic jurisprudence and what he believes will bring a just result.
If the Saudi judiciary recognizes in principle that compensation must cover all damages
incurred by the injured person, including the loss that he incurred and what he missed in terms of
legitimate profit. However, the possibility of compensation for simply missing the opportunity is
still under discussion.
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2.5.6. The scarcity of rulings for compensation for future damages
Future damages is defined as the actual loss suffered by the plaintiff at a later time due to
the breach of the contract; it has also been called the expected loss.343 Others defined it as the
harm whose consequences are delayed until a later time due to breach of contract, or it might be
seen as the harm whose causes were realized at the time of the contract, and whose consequences
were delayed until after then.344
Compensation for future damages falls within the scope of the contract in some
comparative laws, including the English law, Future Compensation Legislation in 1996. Three
conditions are required:
1. The causation condition. This means that the future damages is within the scope of the
contract and has arisen due to breach of contract, i.e., the breach by the defendant being
the direct cause of the damages. If the plaintiff himself has caused the damages, of course
there is no need or justification for compensation.345
2. Certainty, i.e., that future damages within the scope of the contract are definitely fixed,
i.e., neither hypothetical, nor just probable. The description of certainty here includes
both present damages and future damages. For this last type of damages, the causes must
inevitably lead to its occurrence in the future. Thus, potential damages are excluded from
the scope of compensation, as well as possible distant damages.
The creditor must avoid or mitigate future damages. This condition is one of the basic
conditions included in English law for compensation for future damages within the scope of
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the contract and is considered a duty of the creditor so that the creditor takes all reasonable
means that reduce the damages that arose due to breach of contract by the debtor in order to
obtain compensation. Also, the creditor is obligated not to do any unreasonable act that
would lead to an increase in the damages.346
In order for the Saudi judge to rule on the plaintiff’s claim for compensation for
future damages, a number of conditions must be met:
1. The damages caused to the plaintiff must be real (having caused the plaintiff a loss),
certain, and in the present, as well as in the immediate future.
2. The Saudi judiciary requires that the damages be certain, whether they have actually
occurred or the possibility of their occurrence in the future is inevitable. These damages are
present, in contrast to potential damages, for which there is no confirmation of their inevitable
occurrence, and the Saudi judiciary does not compensate for. The damages that may be
compensated in the liquidated damages clause include the financial damages, the real loss
suffered by the aggrieved party, and the sure profit he missed. However, the compensation is to
be equivalent to the damages suffered by the plaintiff and not in excess of it. Therefore, the
Board of Grievances’ Audit Board ruled that the plaintiff should be compensated for the
damages incurred by an amount representing 20 percent of the contract value and considers that
this is sufficient to redress the damages he suffered.347
3. The compensated damages should be direct and foreseeable damages, which is that
damages that are a natural result of breach of contract, which is considered the same in any case
unless the creditor or the injured party could have avoided them by exerting a reasonable effort.
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Direct, unforeseen damages is not a normal and natural result of a breach of contract and is
considered as such if the creditor or injured party cannot avoid it by exerting a reasonable effort.
For example, compensation paid by airlines and postal companies for the total or partial loss of
baggage or parcels. Postal companies pay the usual value of such parcels. If, after the loss of
these parcels, it turns out that they contain valuable jewelry, and the owner of the jewelry did not
notify the carrier of the presence of such jewelry in the parcel, the carrier is only responsible for
the reasonable value of the parcel. Since the carrier does not expect any valuables to be included
in the packages, such valuables are not usually transported in this way.
There are types of damages that may overlap, such as future damages, aggravated
damages, and damages resulting from missing an opportunity, and the Saudi judge’s assessment
of compensation claims may differ for each of these. Future damages fall within the scope of the
contract whose causes are all realized at once, but whose consequences and effects have been
delayed, all or in part, until after the breach of the contract. This means that the future damages
within the scope of the contract are subject to increase in itself, a snowballing effect, with the
extent of the future period unknown; it may be long or short, depending on the circumstances.
As for the aggravated damages, it is damaging whose causes, results, and effects are all
realized at once, but it is liable to increase after the issuance of the judicial ruling for compensation.
Thus, the idea of aggravating damages within the scope of the contract takes one of the following
two forms:
1. That the damages will likely increase after the issuance of the judicial ruling on the claim
of compensation because the elements constituting the damages will be more pronounced.
2. The damages will not increase except after the issuance of the judicial ruling in the claim
of compensation, so the damages in terms of its constituent elements remain as they were at the
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time of its occurrence. But there is an increase in its monetary amount, which thus differ from what
it was at the time of its occurrence, due to the change in the value of money as a result of certain
economic conditions.348 This means the overlap of the aggravated damages with future damages
within the scope of the contract, in that both of them are subject to change during a period of time.
The Saudi judiciary may compensate for future damages within the scope of the contract,
as they constitute an actual damages. But it does not compensate for the aggravated damages as a
result of the difference in the monetary amount of the damages from what it was at the time of its
occurrence on the basis that that is like usury, which is prohibited by Sharia.
A- The damages must also be proven with certainty in order for the Saudi judge to award
compensation for future damages; this must be achievable, and quantifiable, whether it
results from a present or subsequent loss.
B- The judge does not accept the consideration of the compensation claim for the possibility
or expectation that the damages will occur... Nevertheless, the Saudi judge may consider
the request for compensation for the aggravated damages in and of itself by accepting the
plaintiff’s new damages claim in a specific and clarifying reasoning before issuing the
judgment. However, if the judge refuses to accept the plaintiff’s new claim, the Saudi judge
will refer the plaintiff to file a new lawsuit regarding his new damages claim.
In this direction, the Board of Grievances Audit Board rejected the lower court’s ruling to
compensate the plaintiff for a decrease in sales of his merchandise due to the defendant promoting
counterfeit merchandise similar to the plaintiff’s. The lower court has not been able to ascertain
that damages had actually occurred to the plaintiff due to the violation attributed to the defendant.
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It was proven that the plaintiff’s sales had decreased before the defendant imported the
goods in question and continued thereafter, which indicates that the violation attributed to the
defendant had no direct impact on reducing the plaintiff’s sales and on causing damages to him.349
The audit body ruling came after perusal of the lower court’s ruling and the objection submitted
by the defendant and its study of the case documents. It did not agree with the lower court in its
ruling for the plaintiff to compensate for the lost gains in the manner mentioned in the judgment
under review.
It already had been proven that the plaintiff could not verify his claim of loss due to nonperformance of the contract, whether concerning the material objects the plaintiff claimed to
have supplied or the amounts said to have been paid to others. Based on this, if the plaintiff did
not inflict material damages or loss due to due to defendant’s act, the plaintiff does not have the
right to compensation. The case is the same as saying that she should be compensated for what
she missed from the profits, which is a probabilistic because there is no way of knowing whether
she in fact would have realized profits and, if so, how much. Realizing legitimate profit in terms
of origin—even if it is something that is unknown not only in terms of its amount but also in its
realization and its attainment, as is well known—can only happen with work and effort. In light
of the risk and what God ordains of success as a result of these and other factors, there is
inconsistency in the ruling to compensate the plaintiff for what she missed from the expected
profit. This is especially the case because the judge cannot know the causes and thus cannot
ascertain the material loss as a result of her work or effort.
In view of the violation of the judgment under review of this consideration, the
Commission found that it had to be overturned.350 It is usual for harm to occur all at once, except
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for a few cases in which harm occurs in stages, even though its real cause arose from the
beginning. This may result in a series of damages that follow each other, and the plaintiff will
claim compensation for those damages until the judgment is issued.
The Saudi judge usually responds to the plaintiff’s requests in this kind of case, provided
that the amount of compensation awarded is determined. But if the plaintiff is unable to prove
the extent of the damages inflicted on him because some of it is future, then the judge does not
rule for him. But he may reserve for him the right to file an independent lawsuit to claim
compensation for the damages after he is able to prove the amount of damages incurred by him
and thus determine the amount of compensation claimed.
The Saudi judiciary accords the judge a wide discretionary authority in estimating
compensation for the damages claimed by the plaintiff in a way that helps ensure fair reparations.
When the judge decides to redress that harm and determine the appropriate amount of
compensation to achieve this goal and restore balance to the parties to the contract, the first
manifestation of that power is the freedom to choose the appropriate method for awarding
compensation, taking into consideration the real loss suffered by the creditor and the loss of
profit, which were directly caused by the failure to fulfill the obligation.
The judge also must take into consideration the circumstances specific to each dispute.
He must estimate the compensation on a case-by-case basis according to the debtor’s default and
the damages caused to the creditor. This was confirmed by the ruling of the Audit Board of the
Board of Grievances, which indicated that the compensation includes the missed profit, the loss
that occurred, and the incurred or realized loss.351 This means the amount of the shortfall
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incurred by the victim’s money or body as a result of the debtor’s action. Loss of profit or loss
means everything the injured party hoped for, with proper reasons, to obtain profit or profit, but
this does not amount to the right to claim compensation for potential damages. The judge may
use expertise in determining how much compensation is needed to settle the case and is not
obligated to respond to the litigants’ requests that include the recommendations set by experts, as
long as the judge is satisfied with the report submitted by them. In practice, the Saudi judge
usually rules with what the experts reached in their estimation of the compensation due, and this
is one of the examples of the judge's discretion.
The assessment of compensation goes back to the trial judge, who decides each case
according to its own circumstances and an assessment of the damages caused or expected from
the debtor, while determining the importance and amount of the alleged future damages The trial
judge must determine the elements of damages in estimating compensation because they are
among the issues of law that are subject to the control of the higher court. However, assessing
the damages and determining the compensation is one of the issues that the trial court is
independent of.
Sometimes, the plaintiff submits a claim for compensation for specific damages, but
during the consideration of the case, the assessment of these future damages increases. In
response, the plaintiff may try to add to the existing claim for compensation for these new
damages to the previously existing damages. But the Saudi judge may not respond to him and
ask him to file an independent lawsuit to claim compensation for those damages later.
Therefore, the considerations affecting the judge’s conviction while determining
compensation for damages may differ from one judge to another. Each judge has a discretionary
authority to form his conviction, based on the documents, evidence, and circumstances that were
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submitted regarding the subject of the dispute to determine the compensation necessary to
redress the damages suffered by the plaintiff. However, this conviction is not always based on its
release. In addition to the necessity of justifying the judicial ruling and the judge’s statement of
the elements on which he relied in determining the amount of compensation, there are some legal
and objective considerations that play a prominent role in his viewpoint and have a great impact
on the amount and size of the compensation awarded.
The judge must also decide on the limits of the parties’ requests, that is, not to exceed the
specified ceiling for compensation from any of the parties to the dispute. This is a limitation on
the judge’s discretionary authority in estimating compensation.
Compensation includes the creditor’s loss and profit, provided that these damages are a
natural result of non-fulfillment of the defendant’s obligation, his delay in fulfilling it or it is a
defective execution. But if the damages are a result of the creditor’s failure to implement his
obligations, then there is no compensation, as per the order of the Dammam Commercial Court,
which decided that the plaintiff was not entitled to the value of the liquidated damages clause and
the damages due him as a result of his claim because he himself did not fulfill his contractual
obligations stipulated in the contract. This ruling was upheld by the Court of Appeals.352
The Saudi judiciary, according to the original ruling, does not compensate for projected
future damages that are not achieved, but the matter ultimately is subject to the discretion of the
judge adjudicating the dispute. It works on estimating the compensation for the claimed damages
by determining the legal components of the damages. Then, the judge estimates what the injured
party has missed in terms of earnings and the elements included in this earnings, some of which
may be about future damages that might occur, and then determines the value of the
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compensation awarded. Estimating compensation for damages by specifying its constituent
elements is one of the legal issues that are subject to the supervision of the highest court in the
Kingdom. If the plaintiff does not prove the damages incurred by him, the court will not award
him compensation.
In this regard, the Dammam Commercial Court rejected a judgment for the plaintiff, who
had demanded compensation for the damages he sustained as a result of the defendant’s failure
to implement his obligations on time. Indicating that compensation for damages requires the
availability of the three pillars of liability: error, damages, and the causal relationship between
them. The plaintiff did not provide evidence that there were actual damages inflicted on him.353
Potential damages is assessed through future harm based on assumptions, predictions,
and expectations that are not inevitable and changing. Therefore, the Saudi judiciary does not
compensate for potential damages since the potential harm has not been realized. It is not
possible to determine a commensurate compensation. On the contrary, the contractual party can
expect the actual damages and the compensation amount under the same circumstances.
Some future damages might be realized immediately, though all or some of its effects
will be delayed until the future, such as the permanent disability of a person who is unable to
earn a living. The injury itself is real, but the financial loss that will result from it is in the future
and requires appropriate compensation.
While the possible damages are not immediately realized, the Saudi judiciary is strict in
the issue of compensation for future damages. Some jurists have inferred the permissibility of
such compensation by the Sharia rule “there are no damages nor return of damages” as
encompassing future damages whose causes are complex.
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The significance of this legal and jurisprudential rule is general. It includes all the
damages incurred due to the loss of benefits, compensation which stems from the damages
resulting from the delay in the payment of financial fees. There are two directions in the Saudi
judiciary regarding rulings on compensation:
(1) It allows compensation for the delay in disbursing government funds when the
damages are proven judicially. Compensation is not for late payment, which is not allowed
because it is a kind of usury that is forbidden by Sharia. It is about the damages caused to the
plaintiff as a result of this behavior by the governmental administration.
A number of rulings on this matter have been issued by the Board of Grievances,
including one to compensate the plaintiffs. As stated in some of these rulings,354 compensation
for the delay in paying the entitlement and stopping it usually requires tangible evidence of some
damages, as jurisprudence rules that “there is no injury nor return of injury.” So, it is necessary
to mandate the defendant to compensate the plaintiff for this expected harm and to derive this
from Sharia.
The delay in disbursing or suspending the financial obligations, without having a basis
for this in the contract or the law, constitutes a breach of the obligation. Both the Qur’an and the
Sunnah emphasize the fulfillment of contracts and obligations is a legal duty. Also, violating
contractual terms is prohibited by the text of the Qur’an and the Sunnah.
If this is proven, then in this situation it is necessary to recompense whoever violates the
terms of a contract with a punishment for what has been established in Sharia. For Sharia holds
that every forbidden matter for which there is no specific worldly punishment, a punitive
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punishment must be determined by a judge, guided by the circumstances of the case, and what is
customary in Islamic law. Thus, punishment can be either physical or financial.
Since the punishment parallels the action that compelled it, the preferred choice is a
financial penalty. This is because the plaintiff expected to be harmed financially due to the
aforementioned negligence on the defendant’s part.
If this is proven, then the defendant is usually obligated to pay a fine estimated as the size
of the expected damages for the breach of his contracted financial obligations, represented by its
delay in paying financial obligation to the plaintiff and then stopping it for a long period before
withdrawing the government project.
In this regard, the hearing panel charged with estimating this fine was briefed on the
circumstances of the case, as well as provided with all relevant papers and documents. After a
thorough investigation and diligence, it estimated the extent of the damages at 10 percent of the
total value of the period during which the claimant institution worked, as an appropriate
compensation for the delay in disbursing and suspending dues.355
(2) The second judicial approach adopts non-compensation for these expected damages
for the delay in disbursing government extracts under the premise that this penalty would
constitute usury, which is prohibited by Islamic law. A number of rulings have been issued by
the Board of Grievances in support of this approach.356
This a judicial principle from the Board of Grievances that also denied compensation for
the expected damages for compensation for the delay in disbursing government extracts because
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the principles that should be adhered to by the lower courts must be issued by the Supreme
Administrative Court. In addition, we find that some judgments were issued to compensate for
this damages during the issuance of judgments that refuse compensation. Therefore, this matter
of jurisprudence depends on the circumstances of each case and the judge’s discretionary power

2.5.7. Compensation for Damages of Missed Opportunity
The damages of missing an opportunity are defined as an action or non-action that may
cause the plaintiff to lose an opportunity to achieve a likely gain or to avoid an expected loss.
Thus, the plaintiff was hoping for a benefit to be gained or to avoid a loss that threatened him,
and he was counting on an opportunity that would allow him to achieve what he hoped for if
things went their natural course.357 The damages caused by missing this opportunity itself
overlaps with the potential damages caused by missing an opportunity. For example, the lost
profit means that the injured party missed an opportunity to gain profit due to a breach of
obligation.
The Sharia jurist’s opinions are varied in regard to whether the damages caused by
missing opportunity is entitled to compensation. Some jurists believe that the missed opportunity
does not merit compensation. And the reasoning is that the compensation for missed
opportunities is based on possibility and expectation, not on certainty.358 Furthermore, other
jurists believe that the missing an opportunity is entitled to compensation since this still
represents actual damages.
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The Saudi judiciary has a different stance in regard to how to use and understand the
missed opportunity term. Missed opportunity as a term is used in some Saudi court rulings due to
the plaintiff seeking compensation. However, the Saudi judiciary is in favor of the strict opinion,
where no compensation for a missed opportunity exists, since the damages have to be actual
damages and not possible damages such as possible gain or avoiding an expected loss claim.
However, a Saudi judge may rule in favor of the injured party, which seeks compensation
if he proves the actual profit loss or actual damages occurred via the missed opportunity.
Moreover, a Saudi judge’s discretion goes further than accepting the missed opportunity term or
the compensation for it by determining the compensation amount itself. For example, when a
lawyer breaches his professional responsibility and neglects the opportunity for his client to file
an appeal within the legal period specified, this causes his client to lose his likely chance to gain
from an appeal. Another example would be when a lawyer fails to attend court hearings despite
being properly informed of the hearing date, which caused his client a lost opportunity to win the
dispute.
In the previous examples, the Saudi judiciary would likely compensate for the harm of
missing an opportunity when it overlaps with the consequences of other damages.359 The
compensation depends on what type of missed opportunity the plaintiff is seeking compensation
for. This is what the Saudi Board of Grievances decided by saying that the court considers the
damages the plaintiff suffered and the actual gain or profit he missed, regardless of probable or
presumed cause. It is crucial to note that the compensation amount must match the damages.
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Based on the proven damages, not based on assuming hypothetical conditions that may or may
not occur.360
Thus, it is difficult to establish a legal merit on which a Saudi judge can rely to
compensate the aggrieved party for the damages caused by missing the opportunity, whether of a
likely profit or resulting in a loss that the plaintiff was possible to avoid. Therefore, a Saudi
judge has a discretionary authority to assess the extent of the possibility in ruling to compensate
the plaintiff for the claimed damages resulting from the missed opportunity. A Saudi judge may
do so according to the unique circumstances related to each case.
A Saudi judge will decide whether the case concerns future damages, potential damages,
aggravated harm, or direct or indirect damages. For example, if a person was charged with
delivering a race horse to the racetrack and failed the task. As a result, the opportunity of
winning the race was lost. The value of this opportunity is difficult to estimate unless it is related
to the damages arising from the lost opportunity. Therefore, it will cause the aggrieved party to
miss a clear actual gain.361
The Saudi Board of Grievances affirmed that compensation is for delaying the benefit or
losing it. However, the court must verify and consider all relevant documents, and the court has
to be certain that the damages have occurred as a result of the missed opportunity.
Thus, during the examination of the plaintiff’s claim for compensation, the court has the
authority to determine the compensation amount based on the case facts and other matters, such
as restricting his freedom, paralyzing his movement, and preventing him from carrying out his
and his family’s affairs, or depriving him of his legal role and rights. This is based on the
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jurisprudence rule, “the damages must be removed,” and its removal is only possible by ordering
the infringing party to pay compensation.362
In another legal case, the defendant, a real estate owner, prevented the plaintiff from
entering his enterprise by closing the place of business. The defendant’s action caused a financial
loss, including a loss of wages for his employees and a loss of the daily recognized profits for
himself. The plaintiff asked to be compensated for damages he suffered due to closing his place
of business. Since the Saudi court does not rule in favor of missing the compensation for
opportunity, there was no possibility of reparation for closing the business. However, the court
could rule regarding gain or loss in the plaintiff's favor.
And the Saudi judge has the discretion in compensation assessment which is why he is
independent within the limits of his discretionary power.363 Thus, the distinction between the lost
profit that the Saudi judiciary compensates for and a missed opportunity is clear. Lost profit is
considered an element of compensation. As estimated by a judge, it must include two elements:
the damages incurred by the plaintiff and his loss of missed profits, to the extent it can be
compensated for on the basis of missing the opportunity, which is a realization, unlike the
opportunity itself, which is possible.364
For a judge to rule for compensation for lost profit, there must be a documented breach of
obligation and that this breach causes damages to the other party. This was confirmed by the
Saudi Board of Grievances when it stated the plaintiff should be compensated for the damages
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that were caused by the breacher's doing. And the court must indicate in its ruling there is a
causation relationship between the breacher's doing and the damages.365
To compensate for a missed profit opportunity, it must be proved by the aggrieved party
that the opportunity of gaining the profit was definitively missed, meaning the aggrieved party
was deprived of the profit that he expected to achieve. The Saudi Board of Grievances confirmed
this by stating that the compensation was for the disruption of the benefits or its forfeiting, as
long as this was verified. The court carefully considered the case and ascertained the occurrence
of damages resulting from the missed opportunity. If the missed profit is based on mere
expectation and speculation, it is uncontrolled and constitutes possible deception, which Sharia
forbids. Therefore, since the damages amount is probable and not definite, the plaintiff cannot be
compensated for it.366
For the Saudi judiciary to rule in general for compensation, the compensation claim must
not be prohibited in Sharia, which means the Saudi court requires the legitimation of the benefit
to compensate for it. Examples of forbidden benefits are the loss of apartment rent used for
prostitution, liquor store profits, bank claims for interest payments, or late fee claims for late
payments. And this is why the Saudi Board of Grievances in one instance decided to reject a
plaintiff’s request obligating an administrative authority to pay interest resulting from the
authority’s seizure of the final guarantee submitted by her because bank interest is an instance of
usurious interest that Sharia prohibits.367

365

Judgment of the Court of Appeal No.: 759/S/8, 1430 AH, Case No.: 1/4439/L, 1429 AH, Set of Administrative
Rulings and Principles, vol. 1.
366
Appeal Judgment No. 33/S/8, 1430 AH, Case No.: 2/3747/L, 1428 AH, Set of Administrative provisions of 1430
AH, vol. 6, p.3008.
367
Judgment of the Board of Grievances issued on 1432 AH No.: 260/S/4, 1432AH, Case No.: 1/1975/L, 1429 AH,
Set of Administrative Rulings and Principles, 1432 AH, vol. 4, p.1004.

166

In all cases, the aggrieved party must prove that the opportunity to achieve a potential
profit or gain was real and significant. Therefore, it incurred tangible damages resulting from
another party. The aggrieved party may prove this by all means available, including testimony,
logical presumptions, and experts reports, i.e., he is not necessarily required to present specific
evidence or witnesses to prove the occurrence of the damages as a result of the loss of the benefit
for which compensation must be made. For example, when a claim was based on financial gain
conjecture, without true evidence. this is a potential profit that is not compensated by Sharia
since there are too many unknowns about the possible damages.368
The Sharia jurisprudence statements and the Saudi judicial rulings reveal that
compensation for lost profit or lost opportunity requires that the damages be real, not probable,
be proven, and that the benefit is legitimate.
For example, suppose the creditor stipulates a condition for the debtor that includes
paying him a specified sum of money in the event of late payment. In that case, this is an invalid
condition. The Saudi judge does not rule in the creditor's favor, regardless of the creditor’s
identity or the contractual obligation type, especially in the case of financing contracts. The
reason for not ruling in the creditor’s favor is that those practices lead to usury, prohibited by
Sharia. Thus, according to Sharia, it is not permissible to compensate with a late fee for repaying
the debt, regardless of the conditional obligation commitment period. However, this does not
preclude the creditor from claiming any other compensation for the debtor’s failure to pay.369
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The Saudi judiciary has emphasized the lack of compensation for unreal or uncertain
damages, since the calculation of lost profit is based on mere guesswork. This case falls into the
ambiguity that Sharia forbids, because its cannot be accurately determined. Thus, the Saudi court
ruled no compensation due to lack of causation, and the damages amount is ambiguous and
undeterminable.370
In the same context, the Saudi Board of Grievances’ judgment allowed compensation to
the plaintiff for the damages incurred due to his imprisonment, such as forfeiting his chances of
obtaining earnings, physical and health decline, and emotional distress. Thus, the Saudi court
ruled that the defendant pay the plaintiff a sum as compensation for the damages he suffered.371
As illustrated in previous cases, the Saudi judiciary has not settled on the issue of
compensation for lost profit. However, several rulings include compensation for losses when the
causation and loss relationship has been established, the damages are real, not probable, can be
proven, and the benefit is legitimate.372
It is necessary to mention that the plaintiff sometimes could not prove the exact
compensation amount due to a lack of experience availably or because the case documents file
were missing. In this incident, the Saudi judge may determine the compensation amount by
himself, since the compensation assessment amount difficulty shall not prevent the case’s
admissibility. In this regard, the Saudi Board of Grievances ruled to compensate the plaintiff for
closing his shop by using the judiciary discretion power to determine the proper compensation
amount. The judge asked the plaintiff to submit his monthly earnings reports, so they were
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utilized as a guideline for his rulings. In this ruling, the judge concluded that the plaintiff’s
missing investment opportunity was considered real and not possible damages. Therefore, the
court obligated the defendant to compensate the plaintiff for the damages he had suffered.373
By looking at the previous rulings, we find that the Saudi judiciary confirms the
compensation conditions to rule for the compensation for the missed opportunity. The lost profit
should be real and not probable. The missed opportunity should be recognized as a legitimate
benefit. The compensation awarded by the judge should be equivalent to the damages. This
concludes that the Saudi judiciary compensates for the damages driven by the missed
opportunity if the aggrieved party meets the compensation conditions. And the judge estimates
the gain or profit the aggrieved party missed to determine the totally lost to rule for the correct
compensation amount.
The Saudi judiciary rulings for the compensation for the missed opportunity are based on
Sharia primary sources, the Qur’an and Sunnah, and other secondary sources. For example, the
judiciary applies the Saudi Council of Senior Scholars’ fatwa as a jurisprudential rule in the
compensation case, which concluded the legitimacy of the liquidated damages clause.374
Contrary to previous rulings, where the judge ruled in the plaintiff’s favor, there are
several judicial rulings in which the judiciary refused compensation for the lost profit for
multiple reasons, including:
If the lost profit is based on mere guesswork and expectation, or if the loss occurred on a
prohibited benefit, or the lack of a causal relationship between the error attributed to the

373

The ruling of the Board of Grievances issued on 10/11/1436 No. (2/4760/S) for the year 1436 AH, in Case No.
14/216/L, 1435AH, Set of Administrative Provisions and Principles of 1436AH, vol. 6, p. 2940.
374
Senior Scholars Council Decision No.: 25, 1394AH, Book of Senior Scholars Council Research - Penal Condition
- Modern Comprehensive Library, p. 293. Al-Sharqawi, Abdel-Fattah, Compensation for Lost Profit in the Saudi
Administrative law and its Judicial Applications, College of Sharia and Islamic Studies, Qassim University, p. 168
and beyond.

169

defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff, the judge did not rule in the plaintiff’s favor.
Other reasons for denying a compensation claim include that the damages are probable and not
real, the profits are probable and not real;, the plaintiff’s inability to prove the harm incurred by
him as a result of missing the opportunity, or because the plaintiff himself contributed to the
occurrence of the damages.375

2.6. The role of the Saudi judge in choosing the jurisprudential rule
The role of the Saudi judge in choosing a jurisprudential rule applicable to the dispute,
including the cases of claiming the liquidated damages clause, is pivotal when the judge has
broad discretion in choosing an applicable rule to the disputed case from any jurisprudence
Islamic schools. Since the Saudi judge has broad judiciary discretion, he thus faces some
difficulties in knowing all the jurisprudence rulings from the Islamic schools.
But the question arises: from where does the Saudi judge draw upon the applicable
jurisprudencial rule? And is the judge or the plaintiff charged with proving the content of the
jurisprudential rule that is applicable to the dispute that includes a liquidated damages clause?
Finally, what are the means of proving the content of this rule? To answer these questions, it
should be noted again that the Saudi judge derives his rulings from the Qur’an, the Sunnah and
other sources of Sharia that were previously mentioned. However, due to the generality of the
texts compared to the multiplicity and specificity of the facts contained in the cases presented to
the judge, including the claims related to the liquidated damages clause, he must resort to the
books of the four schools of jurisprudence to search for appropriate jurisprudential rules to apply

375

Judgment of the Board of Grievances issued on 4/6/1429 AH, No. (279/T/6 (for the year 1429 AH), in Case No.
(1/1495/L) for the year 1426 AH, a set of administrative provisions and principles for the year 1429 AH, Volume
VI, Compensation, p. 3076).

170

to the dispute before him. He must not, however, apply a jurisprudential rule if there is a clear
Qur’anic text or prophetic hadith that applies to the subject of the dispute. But the judge has the
discretion to search for the appropriate jurisprudential rule to resolve the dispute in the absence
of such a text.
The parties can also assist the judge in suggesting an appropriate jurisprudential rule for
the matter at hand. The judge may respond to all or some of the parties’ suggested, or he may not
respond, though in that case the judge is required to explain why he excused these proposed
jurisprudential rules.
If the judge errs in applying the jurisprudence rules or in their interpretation, then his rule
is subject to be reviewed by the Supreme Court,376 and the Saudi judiciary relies on the Hanbali
school as a general principle. Therefore, when choosing applicable jurisprudential rules, the
judge usually resorts to the books, publications, and journals of this doctrine. But if he does not
find the suitable rule or finds something better in another school, then he applies his finding
because he is not obligated to apply only the rules of the Hanbali school of jurisprudence.
The judge, at the beginning of his consideration of the dispute, verifies the facts, then
moves to the stage of understanding the nature of the dispute, and then, in the absence of a text
from the Qur’an, the Sunnah, or precedent law issued by the legislative authority, the Council of
Ministers and the Shura Council, choose and apply the jurisprudential rule applicable to the
dispute.
The choosing of the jurisprudential rule is one of the most important judicial duties, for it
is where the judge uses his discretionary power in applying it to the facts of the dispute. This
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raises the question about the scope of the judge’s exercise of his discretionary power and the
extent to which this power is subject to the supervision of the Saudi Supreme Court.
1- The authority of the Saudi judge includes choosing the legal and jurisprudential rules
for resolving the dispute.
The dispute is resolved by the judge through his application of the appropriate legal rules,
so that he first begins by looking for a solution to the dispute in the Qur’an, the Sunnah of the
Prophet  ﷺ, and other sources of Sharia. If he does not find it, he will resort to the jurisprudential
rules and the sayings of the jurists in the legal schools, and in particular the Hanbali school. The
authority of the Saudi judge is graded according to the source of the applicable legal or
jurisprudential rule, as this authority exists on three levels:
•

The judge’s authority is restricted, often to the application of a clear legal rule that comes
from the Qur’an or the hadith. Given the presence of a clear definitive text, he has no
freedom of interpretation, and the Supreme Court reviews his application of the rule. If he
does not comply with these rules, his ruling will be overturned.

•

In cases in which the legal or jurisprudential rule that is applicable is not clear and is
subject to interpretation, he has more authority. Here, the judge interprets the most
relevant jurisprudential rule before applying it, and the Supreme Court reviews the
correctness of his ruling including the nature to rule on the penalty clause.

•

The judge’s authority is wide, leaving him the freedom to choose the applicable
jurisprudential rule in the absence of a clear text or a possible text that necessarily would
limit the judge’s discretionary authority in choosing the jurisprudential rules. 377

377

Al-Saadi, Muhammad, Interpretation of Texts in Law and Islamic Law, D M G, Wahran, p. 28, 1984.
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In order to limit the judge’s discretionary authority in choosing the jurisprudential rules
applicable to the dispute before him, the following could be adopted by the Saudi legal system:
A. Codifying the jurisprudence rules in a clear and orderly manner so that it is easier for a
judge to pass his judgment on the issue in dispute. This rule would put the solution before
the judge clearly and would not leave in front of him any room for assessment or
interpretation. When he violates this solution or interprets it in an unjustified manner, his
judgment should be overturned by the Supreme Court.378 For example, sometimes, a
jurisprudential or legal rule specifies cases of invalidity of the penalty clause, cases that
obligate the judge to affirm its amount without an increase or decrease, cases of
permissibility of amendment, or the method on which the compensation due to the
plaintiff is calculated. In such instances, the judge should refrain from his Ijtihad and
must abide by the adjustment stipulated in the jurisprudential rule or the legal text drawn
up by the Saudi legislator.
B. Developing a mechanism for how the judge exercises his discretionary authority in the
event that he deals with a vague jurisprudential rule that requires interpretation or finds a
solution to its contradiction with another rule in order to reach an appropriate solution to
the dispute. In such cases, the judge’s broad authority when dealing with these
jurisprudential rules should be limited because the Supreme Court will review the judge’s
commitment to follow the mechanism established by the legislator to interpret the
jurisprudential rule, not the extent of the judge’s commitment to apply its judgment to the
alleged facts.
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Among the duties of the judge is that of interpreting the jurisprudential rule and
assessing the facts of the case before him even if the opponents did not ask him to do so. The
Supreme Court’s should review the judge’s use of his discretionary authority in choosing the
appropriate jurisprudential rule to resolve the dispute. This involves a gradual monitoring
that varies according to the chosen Sharia or legal solution, and according to the degree to
which the judge exercises his authority. When there is a clear legal text or rule suitable for
application to the dispute, the Supreme Court should insist on the strict application of this
clear text or rule. Otherwise, due to the ambiguity surrounding the alleged facts, resolving the
dispute would require diligence on the judge’s part in choosing the appropriate
jurisprudential rule from his point of view, and the control of the Supreme Court over the
authority of the judge would be less strict. In all cases, the Supreme Court would seek and
exercise its oversight function to ensure that the judge has established the facts that are the
basis for his ruling on a legal and jurisprudential basis. The Supreme Court also wants to
ensure that the subject judge has given these proven facts the correct legal interpretation, and
that the subject judge has chosen the appropriate jurisprudential rule to apply those to those
facts.379
C. Asking the judge to give reasons for his choice of the jurisprudential rule, as this will
help his arbitral authority in choosing the legal solution to the dispute. The judge is
required to exercise his authority within the framework of the law, and therefore if he
departs from this framework, that would be considered a violation of the law subject to
the supervision by the Supreme Court. Through the Supreme Court’s oversight of the
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Zain Al-Din, Zarqun, I.D., p. 150 and beyond.

174

ruling, it could determine the limits of the trial judge’s exercise of his discretionary
power.
It should be noted that the type of review by the Supreme Court differs, so there could
be broad oversight if it comes to the application of a clear jurisprudential rule, and we find
limited oversight if it comes to ambiguous jurisprudential rule. In this case, the judge would
be asked to indicate in the reasons for his ruling, and why he refrained from using his
discretionary power or why he used it. The trial judge must also show that he did not deviate
in his use of power.380
The Saudi judiciary attaches great importance to the reasoning of judicial rulings
because effective reasoning is vital to the outcome of the judge’s ruling. The Supreme Court
takes note of the soundness of the reasons that the judge considered in making his ruling; if
they are thought to be unsound, the ruling might be subject to nullification.
The judge’s reasoning differs from his conditioning of the dispute submitted to him,
which gives the dispute a legal description that allows the execution of the appropriate legal
rule that is applied to the dispute. Adaptation precedes causation, as it gives the facts of the
dispute their legal description, and therefore it precedes causation including conditioning.
Adaptation is a mental act carried out by the judge for linking the facts of the dispute to the
provisions or jurisprudential rules that are compatible with them. The judge grounds the
material facts in the provisions of Sharia by applying the appropriate rules to the evidence of
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the facts of the case before him. The judge’s reasoning of the ruling reveals the adaptation he
has chosen by the judge, hence the close link between them.381
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Al-Qarni, Abdul Latif, Adaptation of Judicial Judgment, Economic Paper, May/15, 2010. Al-Sanhoury, Abdel
Razzaq, Al-Waseet in explaining the civil law, part 1, Dar Ihya Al-Turath Al-Arabi, Beirut, p. 36, 1964. Saad,
Ahmed Mahmoud, the concept of the discretionary power of the civil judge, 01, Dar Al-Nahda Al-Arabiya, Cairo, p.
247, 1988.

176

Chapter Three: Field Study

Introduction
A field study was conducted to learn more about the position of the Saudi judges in
dealing with cases that include the liquidated damages clause for which a questionnaire was used
for data collection. The language used to write the questions is in Arabic, as it is the formal
language in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the legal system.
Several important steps were taken to get the best from the questionnaire to increase the
quality and validity of the questionnaire and collect data. First, the Saudi judges’ sample was
selected from the two Saudi judiciary branches, the public and administrative judiciary in the
Kingdom. Second, open-ended questions were used to allow the participating judges to answer
questions related to the liquidated damages clause without any limitations. Third, the back
translation technique was used to ensure the quality and accuracy of translation from English to
Arabic. Conducting this questionnaire occurred after obtaining the Institutional Review Board
necessary approvals stipulated by Indiana University.
To recruit participants and increase the chances of high participation rates, I followed
several communication techniques. These techniques included sending emails, direct phonecalling, and utilizing professional networks.
The questionnaire was distributed to the participants electronically via Google Forms as
an alternative method. The Google Form private and secure link was shared with the respondents
via private emails and SMS. 382

382
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The questionnaire was distributed to judges from different regions of the Kingdom to
increase diversity and include the various prevailing jurisprudential opinions.
The researcher faced some difficulties while conducting the field study, most notably the
judges’ preoccupation with their work and their failure to respond promptly to the survey.
Therefore, it took some time to convince a sufficient number of judges to participate in the study.

3.1. Survey questions
The questionnaire contained ten questions aimed at investigating the judge’s opinion
regarding the liquidated damages clause aspects. The questions were designed to reflect the topic
of liquidated damages clause. The somewhat open-ended questions were selected to allow the
participants to give detailed answers, and there was space for them to express their opinion to
ensure that the answers helped readers understand the position of the Saudi judiciary on the
liquidated damages clause. The questions were:
1. In your opinion, do you support the inclusion of a liquidated damages clause in all
contracts?
2. In your opinion, will the inclusion of a liquidated damages clause in contracts contribute
to reducing disputes and speeding up litigation?
3. If there is a notarized contract that includes a liquidated damages clause, will the
execution judge rule on the compensation clause agreed upon in the contract, or will he
refer it to the subject judge to decide on it?
4. Do you think judges prefer to codify the views of Islamic jurisprudence or prefer to retain
broad discretion?
5. In your opinion, should the provisions of Islamic jurisprudence related to the liquidated
damages clause be codified?
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6. Is the contract indemnity provision automatically ruled out once the contract is breached,
or must one of the parties incur an actual loss?
7. Does the Saudi judge rule by what is written in the liquidated damages clause agreed
upon in the contract between the parties (without increase or decrease), or can he
reconsider the amount of compensation based on the amount of damages that occurred?
8. What is the impact of the fatwa on the ruling of the Saudi judge on the subject of the case
in question? And if the fatwa is issued by the Council of Senior Scholars in Saudi Arabia,
will the fatwa’s impact on the ruling’s pronouncement be greater?
9. Does Islamic jurisprudence affect how a Saudi judge rules in a case that includes a
contract that contains a liquidated damages clause? If so, how does this affect judgment?
10. In general, does the Saudi judiciary rule or not rule on the liquidated damages clause?

3.2. Results
3.2.1. Sample size
For the purposes of this study, the questionnaire was sent to several judiciaries in
different regions of the Kingdom and various degrees of Saudi courts. The questionnaire
invitation was to thirty Saudi judges, and fourteen judges did respond by completing the
questionnaire. Its circulation was limited to individuals who occupy the rank of the judge (C) or
higher in the Saudi judiciary to ensure that the answers obtained reflect the judge’s experience in
judicial work. The sample size was limited due to the type of participants and the nature of their
work.
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3.2.2. Statistical processing methods
The descriptive statistical methods were used to analyze the data collected from the study
sample based on frequency and percentages to identify the characteristics of the sample’s
answers and to determine its participants’ responses to the questions included in the
questionnaire.

3.2.3. Participants’ data
The characteristics of the study sample participants looked at years of experience as a
judge and the type of judiciary.
Years of experience

Frequency

Between 5 to 10 years of experience

50% of the participants

More than 10 years of experience

50% of the participants

Type of judiciary

Frequency

Administrative Judiciary

25% of the participants

General Judiciary

75% of the participants

3.2.4. Basic Information of the Survey
1. From your perspective, do you support the inclusion of liquidated damages clause in all
contracts?

Answer

Frequency
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Yes, but it is compensation to the extent of the actual or expected loss

1

without exaggeration.
Yes, I prefer it, because it may bring the judge a lot closer to the amount

1

of compensation.
There are some contracts in which the liquidated damages clause may not

4

be included, such as the loan contract.
No, but according to the contract.

1

No.

2

Yes, in order to preserve the rights of both parties.

1

No, because some contracts do not need that.

1

No, because it is specific to Ististna contracts and the like, unlike debt

1

contracts such as regarding a loan, where its inclusion is undoubtedly not
permissible because it is usury, and this is what is stipulated in the
Enforcement law in Article 95 and its regulations.
No. Rather, it can be included in cases where it can have a desired

1

benefit, such as urging achievement and mastery
Strongly agree

1
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2. From your standpoint, will the inclusion of a liquidated damages clause in contracts contribute
to reducing disputes and speeding up litigation?

Answer

Frequency

Often it will contribute to reducing disputes in the execution of contracts.

1

There is no relationship between this and the speed of litigation. Perhaps
the researcher means the lack of litigation.
Yes, the inclusion of the agreed-on liquidated damages clause in

3

contracts will contribute to reducing disputes and speeding up litigation
because then it will be considered an executive document.
Yes, it will contribute if it is utilized correctly.

1

No.

2

Maybe.

1

Yes.

4

Not necessarily, rather it may be a cause of conflict.

1

Yes, if is guided set with clear and unambiguous judicial controls.

1
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3. If there is a notarized contract that includes a liquidated damages clause, will the executive
judge rule on the compensation clause agreed upon in the contract, or will he refer the matter to
the subject judge to decide?

Answer

Frequency

It is referred to the subject judge to study the contract, its subject matter

5

and the validity of the entitlement, seeing as this is only done by the
subject judge.
It should l be referred to the executive court if it is agreed upon and

3

properly documented, and it is within the jurisdiction of the executive
court as an executive document. It should be referred to the subject judge
in case there is a dispute over the origin of the right.
If he does not find a legal or legal impediment to implementing it, he will

1

implement it
The principle rules directly, except in cases excluded by the law, which

1

will be referred to the subject judge.
It has not been presented yet, and this depends on the procedures, terms

1

of reference, etc.…
If the contract does not include a violation of the provisions of Sharia or a

1

problem in compensation and its estimation, it is dealt with before the
execution judge, but if it includes a problem, it is referred to the subject
court.
The jurisdiction of the executive judge does not appear in this case.
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1

If this condition is in an executive document, it is obligatory according to
the jurisdiction, but if it is not in an executive document, it is referred to
the subject judge for consideration.

184

1

4. Do you think judges prefer to codify the views of Islamic jurisprudence or prefer to retain
broad discretion?

Answer

Frequency

Both directions have pros and cons.

1

They prefer to be given wide discretion.

1

Most judges prefer to retain wide discretion in order to handle all the

4

cases they face, but legalization may limit this.
As far as I know, most people prefer codification.

1

They prefer codification for cases of dispute and not the areas of

1

agreement.
I see a preference for codification.

2

It is necessary to agree on the meaning of codification in order to answer.

1

In general, the judges with more experience prefer obtaining more

1

discretion power than the other less experienced judges.
Most likely with codification.

1

Discretion.

1
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5. From your standpoint, should the provisions of Islamic jurisprudence related to the liquidated
damages clause be codified?

Answer

Frequency

Maybe.

1

It is better to be from scholars who have experience and expertise.

1

The matter differs from one judge to another. Some judges may prefer to
search for solutions in the different schools of Islamic jurisprudence or the
various books of the same doctrine due to the diversity of opinions and the

3

difficulty of applying one particular opinion to all the cases.
Yes.

4

It is necessary to agree on the meaning of codification in order to answer.

1

Yes, it is preferable to regulate the provisions of the liquidated damages
clause for several reasons, including expediting the issuance of court

1

rulings and the ease of access to legal information for the legal profession.
Also, it is reassuring the foreign investment in the Kingdom.
There is no need for codification because the provisions related to the
liquidated damages clause are applied according to the fatwa of the Saudi

1

Council of Senior Scholars and the provisions of Islamic jurisprudence.
Yes, according to one of the legal rules and regulations so that there is no
discrepancy, even though codification will only limit the discrepancy in

1

rulings and not eliminate it.
I do not see that, but it is left to the discretion of the judge and the experts.

186

1
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6. Is the contract indemnity automatically ruled out once the contract is breached, or must one of
the parties incur an actual loss?

Answer

Frequency

The ruling is based on the contract terms and its clauses.

1

He must incur a real loss.

2

It is not sufficient merely to violate or delay the execution of the contract.
Rather, the damages must be realized in order to judge for the agreed
compensation clause amount. However, the matter may differ from one

2

case to another, so the damages are assumed to be achieved by simply
breaching the contract in some cases.
Yes, the judge will rule in favor of the injured unless he has given up his

1

right.
This is depending on the status and location of the case.

1

Yes, automatically, as soon as the breach of contract is proven.

1

There must be proven damages.

1

The provisions differ in compensation by mere breach or not, because some
of them cause harm by mere breach, while in other types of cases the harm
may not be realized by mere breach, but rather there is no realization of the

1

harm that necessitates compensation. Therefore, resorting to the judiciary
to obtain a judgment for compensation is financially costly, as this can only
be done under the care of a lawyer.
It is possible.

1
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It is necessary to verify the actual damages and not pay attention to the

1

moral damages.
The damages must be real and cannot be probable.

189

1

7. Does the Saudi judge rule by what is written in the liquidated damages clause agreed upon in
the contract between the parties (without increase or decrease), or can he reconsider the amount of
compensation based on the amount of damages that occurred?

Answer

Frequency

The principal is to execute what was agreed upon in the contract with all its

1

clauses.
Reconsider and check the agreement.

1

It may be judged by the amount of the compensation clause agreed upon in

2

the contract in the event of a breach, and once the occurrence of the
damages and the absence of a legitimate excuse is ascertained. This is
according to the Sharia principle: “There should be neither harming nor
reciprocal harm.”
The liquidated damages clause does not apply if a legitimate excuse for

1

breaching the contractual obligations occurred, and if the liquidated
damages clause was used as a penalty clause. The judge assesses the
fairness of this condition.
He can reconsider what makes the execution of the condition legally

1

acceptable.
No, the reconsideration is to achieve a balance in the interests of both

1

parties in the contract concluded between them.
It is possible to reconsider the compensation based on its amount and to
consider what will achieve justice for both parties.
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1

There are two directions.

1

If the conditions are fulfilled and the impediments are removed, the judge

1

bases his ruling on the amount of the agreed liquidated damages clause, and
he may also rule on part of it if the condition is exaggerated and is not
commensurate with the size of the violation, so that he decrees
compensation for the actual damages.
He may send it back to the experts for consideration.

1

He may rule according to what is stipulated in the contract if the contract

1

does not violate the law, and he may deduct from the amount stipulated in
the contract, according to the circumstances.
In all cases, the damages are considered and assessed according to the facts

1

of the case.
Rather, he reconsiders the amount of compensation; compensation is

1

reparation for damages, not for enrichment.
The principle is that the clause is binding for both parties, so long as the

1

clause is not violating Sharia rules, and the clause amount is not excessive.

8. What is the impact of the fatwa on the ruling of the Saudi judge on the subject of the case in
question? And if the fatwa is issued by the Council of Senior Scholars in Saudi Arabia, will the
fatwa’s impact on the ruling’s pronouncement be greater?

Answer

Frequency

No.

1

191

may affect.
The judge benefits from the fatwa and the fatwa approved is the fatwa of

1

the Council of Senior Scholars.
Yes.

2

The judge is affected by the fatwa, especially if it is issued by the Council

1

of Senior Scholars, but it is not binding.
Fatwa has a limited effect on a judge’s ruling due to many reasons.

1

The Saudi Council of Senior Scholars fatwa’s impact is relative unlike the

1

Supreme Court’s principles and decisions, which it are binding.
The fatwa of the scholar has consideration in the judgment of the judiciary,

1

as both the scholar and the judge apply Allah’s law.
Judges are affected by fatwas on the subject of the case, and the effect is
significant if they are issued by the Council of Senior Scholars, given that

4

judges know that these fatwas are not binding on them.
Undoubtedly, in the event of a legal dispute in a case, the judge has to
search for probable legal approaches, including fatwas issued by Sharia
boards, and violating them is not justified without documentation because
one has done so.
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1

9. Does Islamic jurisprudence affect how a Saudi judge rules in a case that includes a contract that
contains a liquidated damages clause? If so, how does this affect judgment?

Answer

Frequency

Yes, if the contract contains what is prohibited by Sharia or the law.

1

Yes, it has an effect.

1

Yes, Islamic jurisprudence has an impact on the Saudi judge’s
consideration of the liquidated damages clause by making sure that there is

4

no violation of the provisions of Islamic Sharia, such as the presence of
usury or risk, or a legitimate excuse that justifies non-execution or delay in
it, or exaggeration in the amount of the liquidated damages clause.
Yes, and Islamic jurisprudence permits the liquidated damages clause,
unless there is a valid reason for the breach of the obligation that compels it

1

to be considered legal. The valid reason constitutes a forfeiture of its
obligation until it is removed, or it was intended to be a financial threat,
and it is far from the requirements of the legal rules. In that case, it must be
referred back to justice and fairness, according to the missed benefit or
harm caused.
Yes, the effect is through limiting the condition with its legal limits.

1

Since the texts of Sharia in the Kingdom receive constitutional protection,

1

they cannot be violated. Sharia rules govern the liquidated damages clause.
Yes, it must not violate Islamic Sharia.

2
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Yes, in Ististna contracts and the like, according to the decision of the

1

Council of Senior Scholars.
Yes, it affects when it contradicts the legal principles and rules. The
judiciary is legitimate and derives its rulings from its evidence, and Islamic
jurisprudence does not contradict the principle of compensation in the form

1

of liquidated damages clause when the conditions are fulfilled and the
obstacles are removed.
It affects the ruling if the reasoning for it is based on Islamic jurisprudence.

1

10. In general, does the Saudi judiciary rule or not rule on the liquidated damages clause?

Answer

Frequency

Yes, mostly.

1

They rule.

4

Yes, the liquidated damages clause is ruled in some contracts according to

5

specific conditions.
The condition of the liquidated damages clause is not invoked unless its

1

conditions are met, including that it does not exceed the value of the actual
damages.
It is judged in some contracts but not others, and in the event of a ruling, it

1

is stipulated that it does not exceed 10 percent of the total contract value.
They rule when the conditions and reasons for it are fulfilled.

1

He rules unless there is a legal violation, such as usury or the clause is

1

excessive.
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3.3. Discussion
The survey questions were developed with the aim of identifying the judges’ attitudes
toward the liquidated damages clause. The first question focused on the polled judges’ opinions
about their support for including the clause for agreed-upon compensation in all contracts. This
is because Islamic jurisprudence permits the inclusion of a liquidated damages clause in some
contracts, as was previously indicated.
The second question addressed the extent to which, from the judge’s point of view, the
inclusion of the compensation clause in contracts contributes to reducing disputes and speeding
up litigation to identify the applicable practices in the courts and what judges believe in this
regard.
The third question discussed cases when a documented contract includes a liquidated
damages clause. What is the judge’s position? Will he rule to implement the liquidated damages
clause agreed upon or refer the matter to the subject judge to decide? This question aims to
identify the Saudi judge’s position toward the clause when it is a part of a notarized contract and
becomes an executive contract. Thus, the notarized contract obtains legal protection by relying
on the Saudi Execution Law, which subjects the executive judge to apply it to the disputed
matter without referring it to the subject judge.
The fourth and fifth questions are aimed at identifying the judge’s viewpoint about
codifying Islamic jurisprudence opinions and whether codification could limit the judge’s wide
discretionary authority relating to the liquidated damages clause in particular.
The sixth question explored judges’ opinions about the possibility of automatically ruling
in favor of the agreed-upon compensation once the contract was breached. Alternatively, does
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the matter require that the party benefiting from the compensation incur an actual loss in order
for the Saudi judge to award him the amount of the liquidated damages clause?
The seventh question investigated the judge’s opinion of the about the extent to which it
is possible to assess the amount of the liquidated damages clause and, if so, might the judge
adjust the amount of compensation based on the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff?
The eighth question involves an attempt to identify the extent of the fatwa’s impact on
the Saudi judge’s ruling on the subject of the case before him, which included a liquidated
damages clause; it also looks at whether this would have a greater impact if the fatwa were
issued by the Council of Senior Scholars in Saudi Arabia. My goal in asking this question was to
identify how much the fatwa affects judges’ rulings in Saudi Arabia.
This overlaps with the ninth question, which asks about the extent to which Islamic
jurisprudence rulings affect how the Saudi judge rules in a case that includes a contract with the
liquidated damages clause. Thus, the Saudi judge when he is using the fatwa in his rulings, takes
into consideration that the fatwa is based on various schools of Islamic jurisprudence.
The tenth question inquires about the general trend in the Saudi judiciary regarding
rulings on the liquidated damages clause.

3.4. Analysis
After reviewing the judges’ answers to the questions in the questionnaires, it became
evident that:
1. From the general Saudi judiciary, 75 percent of judges participated in the survey, and
from the administrative judiciary, and 25 percent participated.
It is noted that the largest proportion was from the general judiciary because it is
the judicial branch that considers disputes in commercial and civil contracts in the
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Kingdom, which include the liquidated damages clause. In contrast, the administrative
judiciary is concerned with administrative contracts that are concluded between
government agencies and the private sector. Its mandate was specified after the transfer
of jurisdiction over commercial cases from the administrative to the general judiciary in
2014.
2. There exists a discrepancy in the judges’ attitude toward answering the questions posed,
as the judge’s discretion appeared regarding the choice of appropriate solutions to the
questions posed, and this matter confirms that what was observed in the theoretical study
corresponds to what was reached in the field study.
3. The initial judge’s answers are often different from the final answers. Sometimes, the
judge adds limitations or exceptions to his answer rather than having a definitive answer.
The judges’ answers are noted as follows:
The majority of the answers to the first question about the extent to which the judges
support the inclusion of the agreed-upon compensation clause in all contracts were yes, even if
some of them started with the word “no,” as follows:
“Yes, but it is compensation to the extent of the actual or expected loss without
exaggeration.”
“Yes I prefer, it because it may bring the judge a fair assessment of the compensation
amount.”
“There are some contracts in which the liquidated damages clause may not be included,
such as the loan contract.”
“No, this shall be according to the contract. Yes, in order to preserve the rights of both
parties.”
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“No, because some contracts do not need that.”
“No, because it is specific to Ististna contracts and the like, unlike debt contracts such as
loan where its inclusion is undoubtedly not permissible because it is ssury, and this is what is
stipulated in the Executive Law in Article 95 and its regulations.”
“No, rather, it can be included in cases where it can have a desired benefit, such as urging
achievement and mastery. I strongly agree.”
From the judges’ answers to these questions, one can conclude that there is a tendency in
the Saudi judiciary to support the inclusion of the conditional compensation clause in contracts,
with the exception of contracts related to debt, such as the loan contract, because that is
considered usury, forbidden by Sharia. This response is consistent with the provisions of Islamic
jurisprudence that have been discussed above.
We find that most of the answers to the second question, about the extent to which the
liquidated damages clause contributes to reducing disputes and speeding up litigation was yes.
However, there are some answers that express that this is not necessarily the case, but rather it
may be the cause of the dispute.
The third question asked whether a judge would directly rule on the implementation of
the liquidated damages clause in a notarized contract, or whether he would refer the matter to the
subject judge for a ruling. Most respondents felt that the matter should be referred to the subject
judge to study the contract and the validity of the liquidated damages clause before ordering its
implementation. Some judges believe that the matter should be referred to the executive court
that was specified in the contract, which was properly certified as an executive document and
was part of the jurisdiction of the executive judiciary. Also, if there is no legal or statutory
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impediment to its execution, it shall be referred to the subject judge in the event there is a dispute
over the origin of the obligation.
Looking at the judges’ answers to the fourth question about whether they prefer to codify
the provisions of Islamic jurisprudence or maintain broad discretionary authority, the answers
were different. Some respondents said that each option has advantages and disadvantages, and
some maintained that codification is better, especially in issues where there are jurisprudential
differences. But most of the answers indicated that judges prefer to retain wide discretion in
order to address all the cases they face and that are concerned that codification may limit this.
When the question was limited to the extent to which it is necessary to codify the
provisions of Islamic jurisprudence related to the condition of the liquidated damages clause in
the fifth question, the answers were split. The majority said that codification is better, though
some stipulated that it should be done by jurists who have experience and expertise. Others
preferred regulating the provisions of the liquidated damages clause for several reasons,
including the speed of completion in issuing judicial rulings, as well as the ease of access to
knowledge of such rulings by the general public, which contributes to awareness. Also, it
reassures the businessmen by having more of a guarantee in their future business dealings and
opens new business opportunities for foreign investment. Also, its benefits those countries with a
business relationship with the Kingdom that already have laws recognizing the liquidated
damages clause and its applications.
The matter differs from one judge to another. Some judges prefer to search for solutions
in the different schools of Islamic jurisprudence or in different books concerning the same
doctrine, due to the multiplicity of facts and the inability to apply one school’s approach to all
the facts. Then there is the possibility of the Saudi judge ruling the agreed-upon compensation
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when one party has simple breached the contract and without stipulating the occurrence of
damages.
Concerning the sixth question, the judges’ answers again varied concerning what the
liquidated damages should be when there a breaching or delay in the execution of the contract.
The damages must have occurred for the judge to assess the value and whether it matches that of
the agreed-upon compensation clause. In some cases, judges assume that the damages are
achieved by simply breaching the contract. But the provisions differ in compensation by simply
breaching or not, because some defendants commit harm just by breaching the contract. In other
types of cases, the harm may not be achieved by the mere fact of committing the violation, but
rather the damages that justifies the compensation must first be realized.
One group of judges maintained that the amount of the liquidated damages clause is
automatically judged as soon as the breach of contract is proven and the condition is fulfilled,
with those who have an interest in it demanding its execution, and the condition does not include
a violation of Sharia. Other judges maintain that there must be harm and that it must be real and
material, not just moral, imaginary, or expected.
The seventh question asks whether the judge should invoke the liquidated damages clause
in the contract between the parties without an increase or decrease, or should econsider the
amount of the liquidated damages clause based on the amount of damages that actually occurred.
Some respondents said that he should rule according to a principle or implement what was
agreed upon in the contract between the parties with all its clauses. Others argued that the judge
should reexamine the clause and the agreement, and may judge the amount of the compensation
clause agreed upon in the contract when the breach occurs. This is to ensure that the damages
have occurred and that there is no legitimate excuse for the defendant’s obligation breach,

201

preventing the plaintiff from seeking compensation. The liquidation damages clause’s sum may
be reduced if it was excessive, given the damages incurred to the plaintiff, and according to the
jurisprudential rule “[t]here should be neither harming nor reciprocating harm.” If there is a
legitimate excuse for the breach of the obligation, then this excuse is forfeited by the necessity of
imposing the clause until it is removed. If the liquidation damages clause is intended to be a
financial threat, its sum is far from being just. Therefore, decreasing the liquidation damages
clause amount promotes justice and fairness, based on the missing benefit, or the degree of the
inflicted damages, to achieve a balance between the contractual parties’ interests.
Some judges added that if the conditions are fulfilled and the impediments are removed,
the judge bases his judgment on the amount of the agreed-upon compensation clause, and he may
also rule for only part of it if the condition is exaggerated and not proportional to the extent of
the damages done, considering the jurisprudential rule “[t]here should be neither harming nor
reciprocating harm.”383 Since the judge has the right to reduce the amount stated in the clause, he
is also entitled to grant the plaintiff more than what was agreed upon between the parties as
compensation for the actual damages. As one of the respondent’s judges said, “Compensation is
for reparation, not for enrichment.”
In answering the eighth question about the impact of fatwas on the rulings of Saudi
judges on the liquidated damages clause, the respondents considered how it would affect them
and other judges if the fatwa were issued by the Council of Senior Scholars in Saudi Arabia.
Would such a fatwa’s impact on the ruling’s pronouncement be greater? Most judges answered
that the fatwa would have has an impact on their ruling, especially if the fatwa were issued by
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the Council of Senior Scholars. Still, they would not necessarily consider such a fatwa as binding
if it went against the principles and decisions of Saudi’s Supreme Court.
Others maintained that the judge’s ruling is not binding by the fatwa. However, when the
judge solves a disputed case, he will use and search for all legal tools at his disposal to solve the
case, including fatwas. Thus, if he finds an applicable fatwa to the disputed case, the judge
cannot justify not applying it without providing reasoning and substantial evidence for not using
the fatwa.
The ninth question asked about the extent to which the provisions of Islamic
jurisprudence affect how the Saudi judge rules in a case that includes a contract with an agreedupon compensation clause. How do precedents and perspectives from Islamic jurisprudence
affect his judgment? All respondents felt that Islamic jurisprudence has an impact on the Saudi
judge’s consideration of the liquidated damages clause, though there were minor differences in
how they perceived its influence. They added that Islamic jurisprudence helps ensure that there is
no violation of Sharia, such as the presence of usury or ambiguity, or that there is a legitimate
reason that justifies the non-execution or delay of the contract terms before increasing the
amount specified in the liquidated damages clause. If the liquidated damages clause was intended
to be a financial threat, so that it is far from the requirements of the legal rules, it must be
considered in light of the interests of justice and fairness, and the obligation to prevent harm, as
stated in the fatwa of the Council of Senior Scholars in Saudi Arabia.
The tenth and final question concerns whether the Saudi judiciary should rule or not rule
on the liquidated damages clause. Most of the judges answered yes, it should, and stated that the
liquidated damages clause is hedged in some contracts by specific conditions, including that its

203

value does not exceed the amount of the actual damages, that it does not include any illegitimate
provisions, such as usury and risk, or that it be excessive or involve an excessive sum.

3.5. Conclusion
The answers obtained from the selected sample of judges confirmed that the Saudi judge
has broad discretionary power when considering the liquidated damages clause.
This is evidenced by the varying answers of the judges to the questions of the
questionnaire
- The field study enabled me to identify the positions of the Saudi judiciary with regard to
dealing with the applications of the penal clause in various contracts.
- The field study also helped me understand the intellectual processes that Saudi judges
use when applying the theoretical aspects of legal texts and jurisprudence rules to the facts and
practical issues related to the liquidated damages clause.
- The field study confirmed that the Saudi judge, in exercising his discretionary authority
when ruling on the liquidated damages clause, is affected by the provisions of Islamic
jurisprudence.
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Chapter Four: Practical Solutions
I have provided a review of the Saudi judge’s discretionary authority when dealing with
predefined liquidated damages under the provisions of Sharia, which is the Kingdom’s general
law. In addition, I have examined the opinions of a group of Saudi judges obtained through a
field study, and I have taken into account the Kingdom’s judge shortage in comparison to the
number of cases examined annually. This may cause delays in deciding some cases and
otherwise contribute to a slowdown in the Saudi judicial environment and its lack of
transparency, and thus cause the country to lose foreign investment, creating a need to develop
some solutions and propose practical solutions that can contribute to limiting the discretionary
power of the Saudi judge.
Given all of the aforementioned research and the field study, I have conceived of a
number of proposals that might help to curb the Saudi judge’s broad discretionary power when
examining liquidated damages cases.

4.1. Codification of Islamic jurisprudential rulings and obligation on the part of the Saudi judge
to apply them in cases of the liquidated damages clause
It is crucial to codify jurisprudential rulings adopted in Saudi Arabia to help judges
promptly reach accurate rulings and restrict their extensive jurisdiction power when considering
dispute cases involving liquidated damages clauses.
Jurisprudential rulings are those that are referenced in Sharia texts or that have been
deduced by jurists using commonly accepted methods of deductive reasoning384 from main or
secondary Sharia sources. The demand to codify Islamic jurisprudence provisions in a manner

384

Mahmasani, Subhi, Al-Awdae Al-Tashrieiat fi Al-Duwal Al-earabiat Madiaha wa Hadiruha, Dar Al-Eilm
lilmalayini, 4th Edition, Beirut, p.1 70, 1981.
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similar to that of Western laws (the Latin school) arose long ago, but there was a disagreement
among jurists about it over its legality, appropriateness of codification for the judge, or whether
it met the interests of society and people’s needs.

4.1.1. Definition
The process of codifying the provisions of Islamic jurisprudential precepts is still in its
infancy. As a result, jurists did not address its definition; nonetheless, several recent jurists have
provided such definitions as:
- Codification of the provisions of Islamic jurisprudence entails the formulation of legal
rulings in the form of articles arranged and numbered similarly to what is done in current laws,
including civil, criminal, commercial, international, and other laws, with the goal of providing a
particular and easy-to-use reference that judges can follow in their rulings.385
- Some scholars have defined codification as the compilation of transaction rulings, other
contracts, and theories in the form of easily accessible legal articles in many volumes of
jurisprudence.386
- Others defined it as the formulation of jurisprudential rulings transcribed in peremptory
terms, using sequential numbers and arranged in a logical order to avoid duplication and
inconsistency.387
I believe that the best definition is organizing and numbering Islamic jurisprudential
provisions in the form of legal articles (compulsory or supplementary) by competent authorities
with the goal of obligating judges and others in the judiciary to be guided by them.388

Al-Ahdal, Darwish, Madkhal Al-Ffiqh Al-islami, Al-Nahda Press - Sana’, p. 273, 1990.
Alzuhayli, wahibatun, juhud taqnin alfiqh al'iislamii , Al-Resala Foundation - Beirut, 1st edition, p. 26, 1987.
387
Almuhamid, shawish, masirat alfiqh al'iislamii almueasiru, Dar Ammar, pg. 437.
388
Albayuwmi, Ibrahim taqnin alsharieat bayn almujtamae waldawlat; Previous reference.
385
386
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4.1.2. Previous attempts to codify jurisprudence
Many attempts have been made to codify Islamic jurisprudence provisions in the form of
legal articles, such as is done with civil law through the formulation of legal articles arranged
and numbered in the manner of modern civil, criminal, commercial, and other laws.389
This is intended to be a simple reference that judges, attorneys,390 and everyone else may
use in their work, particularly with foreign investors and international enterprises.
Throughout history, several jurists, individually or collectively, have attempted to record
the decisions of Islamic jurisprudence in the form of legal articles particularly within the
framework of the Hanafi school, including.391 Their works include Murshid Al-Hiran Ilaa
Maerifat Ahwal AlInsan by Muhammad Qadri Pasha Abu Al-Layth Al-Samarqandi’s392 and
Madat Wakhizanat Alfiqh, and the Hindi Fatwas by a group of jurists as per a directive issued by
the Mughal Sultan Bahadur Alem Ker.393 There is also a summary of legal rulings based on the
Maliki school by Muhammad bin Amer and many other interpretations of the provisions of
Sharia jurisprudence that lack the element of obligating the judge to follow, which is the
distinguishing characteristic of codification. In other words, this involves an official body with
the power to mandate what is codified, such as the state’s legislative authority. Sharia jurists do
not disagree about collecting jurisprudence rules in volumes or codifying the Sharia provisions in
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Alzuhayli, wahibatun, juhud taqnin alfiqh al'iislamii; I.D.
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article forms. However, the jurists’ disagreement arises over the extent to which the judge may
be obligated to rule based on the codified articles.394
The first formal attempt to codify the rulings of Islamic jurisprudence began during the
era of the Ottoman Empire, in 1876, when a committee of Sharia jurists was created to compile
the jurisprudential rules in one place, under the name Journal of Judicial Judgments,395 which
contained a set of jurisprudence rules derived from Hanafi school jurisprudence. It included
rulings on commercial transactions, lawsuits, personal status, and evidence, and it was
formulated in the form of legal articles with serial numbers on the pattern of modern law. It
contained during its lifetime 1,851 articles and its overall goal was to provide an easy reference
for judges and lawyers. Another objective was to cope with the economic and social
developments that the Ottoman Empire experienced in its relations with other countries and
peoples, which prompted this journal-based codification in order to prompt better legal
environment.
This journal played a substantial role in the development of the Ottoman Empire’s
judicial system, but as some Hanafi jurists began to insist more on limiting rulings to those
mentioned only in the Hanafi school rather than other schools, the state was forced to apply laws
derived from other European countries.396
In subsequent years, the Journal of Sharia Judgments was issued, in accordance with the
Hanbali school, by Judge Ahmed bin Abdullah Al-Qari,397 former Chief of the General Court in
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Mecca. This journal contained only the rulings of the Hanbali school through his own books and
contained 2,382 articles in a format similar to that of the Journal of Judicial Judgments.398
The editor of this Journal is regarded as one of the prominent figures of jurisprudence in
the history of the modern Saudi state. With this work, he made a significant contribution to
codifying jurisprudence and formulating rules of the Hanbali school in the form of legal articles,
including discussing many jurisprudential issues and rules. For contemporary jurists, judges, and
legalists in the Kingdom, this publication serves as a key reference,399 yet it is not binding for the
Saudi judiciary.
This Journal was the first work to codify Hanbali jurisprudence, despite the fact that its
author was a follower of the Hanafi School, and his jurisprudential composition was not
according to the Hanbali school. Nevertheless, he benefited from the style adopted in the Journal
of Legal Provisions. Also, it shares some similarities with the Journal of Sharia Rulings. The
Journal of Sharia Rulings remained in the possession of its author and was not published until
his death due to the opposition to codification in the Kingdom. After the author’s death, two
jurists worked on editing and updating this Journal, until it was published as a book in 1981.400

4.1.3. The permissibility of codifying the provisions of Islamic jurisprudence
Ancient Islamic Sharia jurists addressed the issue of codification,401 which in fact
represents the judge’s obligation to issue certain rulings that do not supercede other Sharia
provisions that are not written, even if the judge fulfills the conditions of independent reasoning.
There has been much controversy among Islamic Sharia jurists since ancient times about the
398
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extent to which it is permissible to codify the provisions of Islamic jurisprudence and to oblige
the judge to rule on them. Two trends have emerged.402
A. The first trend believes in the permissibility of codification
The proponents of this perspective believe that it is permissible to compel a ruling with a
particular jurisprudential school, and thus the ruler can ask the judge to adopt a particular
school.403 This is the view Hanafi, Maliki, 404 and some members of the Shafi’i schools take.405
This trend sees that codifying Islamic jurisprudence has several advantages and that it is a
necessary step for the Kingdom’s economic and social development.406 However, this is to be
achieved within an Islamic framework based on the following foundations:
•

Observing the established texts in the Qur’an and the peremptory and presumptive
Sunnah.

•

Utilizing the ancient jurists’ jurisprudence to make decisions on new topics that they did
not address.

•

Taking into account what serves the interests of the individual and society in the modern
era based on an Islamic perspective, where no conflict exists between what may be seen
as a public interest and the principles and general spirit of Sharia.
The proponents of codification believe that if these principles are observed, the

codification of Sharia will yield several benefits for society, including:
•

Realizing the principle of equality before the law.
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•

Restricting judges’ broad discretion and contributing to the uniformity of court verdicts
for comparable situations, rather than leaving it to the judges’ whims and individual
opinions.407

•

Rigorously evaluating some unclear texts by judges, monitored by the highest court, in
light of their roots in the books of the jurisprudence schools.

•

Achieving the goal of knowledge of legislation and knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence
rulings that can be adapted according to people’s cases and disputes, which will help
standardize the type of judicial rulings that can be issued.

•

Limiting applicable texts on which judges base their rulings rather than searching through
various jurisprudence books to assess the incident presented to the judge, especially in
this era when most judges lack the capacity of diligence in eliciting Sharia rulings from
Islamic jurisprudence.408

•

Resolving some issues in practice, as the application of Sharia provisions is excluded by
some international arbitrators when one party chooses them as an applicable law. This
might be due to the lack of clarity of its rules, or the arbitrators’ inability to know the
ruling on the issue owing due to the different provisions in the Islamic schools’
jurisprudence.409

•

In an Islamic state, the application of the provisions of Sharia is compulsory. If the noncodification of its provisions becomes a justification for its non- implementation, then
codification itself becomes an obligatory matter.410
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•

One benefit from obligating judges to rule according to one particular doctrine is that if
the ruler determines that this is in the public interest, he may compel the judge to act
upon it,411 as Islamic Sharia always supports the public interest.

•

If the judge is empowered to decide using a particular school of thought, he cannot go
beyond it, even if it contradicts his view,412 since the judge is deputizing the state ruler in
the judiciary. Thus, he is obligated to implement the laws issued by the state’s ruler
unless they are contrary to the provisions of Sharia.413

•

The judge is obligated to obey the ruler unless he commands disobedience according to
the text of the Qur’an. The Almighty said: “O ye who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the
Messenger, and those charged with authority among you.”414 The Prophet  ﷺsaid, “It is
obligatory upon a Muslim to listen [to the ruler] and obey whether he likes it or not,
except when he is ordered to do a sinful thing; in such case, there is no obligation to
listen or to obey.”415 Consequently, the ruler may enact and issue laws, as well as bind
judges to rule on them.416

•

It is almost unanimously acknowledged that a judge who fulfills the conditions of
independent reasoning is not compelled to rule in accordance with a particular doctrine.
However, suppose the judge has not reached the level of Ijtihad, meaning the ability to be
diligent in eliciting Sharia rulings from Islamic jurisprudence. In that case, he is obligated
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according to the rulings of Sharia to follow the rulings mentioned in one of the Islamic
schools of jurisprudence.417
•

There is a clear need for stipulating the legal rulings that should be applied to new
developments through codification, 418 because leaving rulings to a judge’s discretion
serves no interest due to the heavy workload of judges and their lack of time to research
and investigate every emerging issue. The liquidated damages clause is an example of
this.419

•

Codification will be in the disputing parties’ favor because it combines the Sharia rules
with ease of application.

•

Codification will serve as a summary of the evidence and rulings selected in an
appropriate manner that can be applied from Islamic jurisprudence, thus facilitating for
judges and their assistant lawyers and others to know what rulings from disputed facts
they should make and thus saving them time and effort.

•

Defining public rights and duties beforehand, so that everyone will be aware of what he
has and what he owes, leaves no room for other possibilities given the wide discretion of
the judges.

•

Unifying judicial rulings and making it difficult to find any sort of conflicting rulings,
which will promote a sense of reassurance among the public, whose rights and interests
will be well maintained.
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•

Supporting the idea of codification in general, including the codification of most
commercial issues in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the form of regulations and bylaws that do not violate the provisions of Sharia. Thus, work in these legal areas will
become more stable. This may not happen if the important legal teachings and rulings of
the past are left scattered in the books of Islamic jurisprudence. Furthermore, there was a
project to codify the provisions of Sharia issued by the Ministers of Justice of the Gulf
Cooperation Council countries under the name Muscat Document of the Unified Law for
the Personal Status of the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries in 2001. It is a guiding law
yet not binding on the GCC countries, and it was issued in conformity with the principles
of Sharia. Moreover, a large number of guiding laws have been issued by the GCC in
accordance with this document; some of them have become mandatory in all the six Gulf
countries.420
B- The second trend believes in the inadmissibility of codification
According to this trend, there exist flaws in codifying Islamic jurisprudence, and

therefore it is not permissible to obligate the judge to rule under a specific doctrine. This is what
the Malikis421 believe in and the Shafi’i 422 and the Hanbali schools 423 do as well. They make the
following points in support of their point of views:
•

Allah’s saying states: “So judge between the people in truth,”424 and the truth here does
not necessarily lie in a specific jurisprudence school, as the truth may appear to the judge
in another school, and if the truth appears to him, he must act upon it.
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•

There is a Consensus among jurists not to link people to one opinion or one school of
jurisprudence.425

•

It is not permissible for a person in charge of any of the affairs of Muslims to prevent
them from using their independent reasoning. For this reason, when Caliph Harun AlRashid consulted Imam Malik, the founder of the Maliki school, to compel all Muslims
of that time to follow what was recorded in his book Al-Muwatta, Imam Malik’s response
was to refuse such notion, saying he did not want to allow obligating Muslims to follow
his jurisprudential opinion.426

•

It was mentioned in the hadith that judges are of three types, one of which will go to
paradise and two to hell. The one who will go to paradise is a man who knows what is
right and gives judgment accordingly, but a man who knows what is right and acts
tyrannically in his judgment will go to hell, and a man who gives judgment for people out
of ignorance also will go to hell.427
The reasoning behind this hadith is that the ruling that prevents sin is what the judge

considers to be the truth. The preponderant, codified opinion may not necessarily be that of what
is right and just in the eyes of the judge. If the judge ruled other than what he knew to be right,
this is considered to be a sin, and therefore one cannot obligate him in accordance with what is
codified.

4.1.4. The position of codifying the provisions of Islamic jurisprudence in the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia
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King Abdul-Aziz Al Saud, the founder of the Kingdom, was eager to create a
jurisprudential code that would govern the branches of jurisprudence and the rulings of the
judiciary, making it easier for judges and the litigants, and the general public to refer to and
benefit from clearly organized legal statutes. With such codification, people could easily manage
judicial personnel affairs and learn about jurisprudential rulings.
This was to be achieved via issuing a journal for legal rulings by a committee of senior
Islamic jurisprudents from Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, representing all four schools of
jurisprudence, and who would consider the interests of Muslims and draw rulings from the
Qur’an and Sunnah. Through this initiative, the king hoped to oblige judges to adopt selected
rulings from the different schools of jurisprudence, rulings that were to be written down and
circulated among judges. In the same context, the editorial of the State Gazette read: 428 His
Majesty the King is considering developing a code of Sharia rulings entrusted to a committee of
high-caliber Muslim scholars and culled from the books of the four respected schools of thought.
This journal will be very much like the Journal of Al-Ahkam that the Ottoman government
issued in 1876, yet it is different in some respects, namely the lack of adherence to one doctrine
over than another. Instead, it adopts what serves the interests of Muslims as per the best doctrine
in question coupled with an argument and evidence from the Qur’an and Sunnah. In the same
vein, he instructed the Judicial Monitoring Board to proceed with its work as follows:
Should the four schools of thought agree on one of the rulings, then it becomes binding to
all courts and judges. The four schools often agree in the basic rulings and in many subsidiary
rulings. As for the disputed issues, they shall be noted down as of today, and every week the
Judicial Monitoring Board convenes with a panel of expert scholars to consider the controversial
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issues found by the Board with regard to the ruling as seen by each school of thought. They shall
look into the strongest argument and evidence from the Quran and the Sunnah of His Messenger
 ﷺand issue a decision to approve and adopt it. In this manner, the Board collects most of the
disputed issues from which conflicting views of different schools arise, so as to issue a decision
about them. This decision shall be binding to all the Sharia courts and judges and shall serve as a
key foundation for the unification and composition of rulings.
However, this royal call to codify the rulings of Islamic jurisprudence was not well
received by a sufficient number of jurists; some objected to codifying the rulings of
jurisprudence. Accordingly, the king had to instruct the judiciary to specify the jurisprudential
references approved in the Hanbali school, which judges should adopt, so that both litigants
could be aware of the jurisprudence rulings that can be applied to the issues presented, as well as
the specific approved references that can be consulted and adopted by the Saudi judiciary.429 The
decision also included that the fatwas from Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal should be applied in the
Saudi courts because it is most convenient to review his books and the numerous citations they
include when addressing issues. The courts thus are to apply Hanbali school concepts, and if the
judges encounter hardship, difficulty, or violation to the public interest in applying it to some
issues, they have the right to consider and research a ruling for it in other schools of
jurisprudence as needed.
Adopting what was stipulated in the Hanbali school of thought was not initiated by the
ruler but was advised by a scholarly body of the judiciary. The judges affiliated with the Judicial
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Council have committed themselves to it so far; it is rare that a judge deviates from the specific
doctrine of the Hanbali school in their rulings. If this ever happens, their ruling is overturned.430
This decision does not include an obligation to codify because the jurists rejected it at
that time, but it does include an obligation for judges to work according to a specific school of
Islamic jurisprudence, the Hanbali school, and to not contradict its doctrine except when there is
hardship and a violation of the public interest.
The justification provided for choosing the Hanbali school was that reviewing Hanbali
jurisprudence books is more accessible. Moreover, it is simpler to formulate its provisions in the
form of legal articles that make reviewing judgments easier than referring judges to law books.431
The use of independent reasoning and the varied rulings by Saudi judges in similar cases
has led to the continuation of calls for codifying Sharia rulings in the Kingdom to mitigate these
discrepant between rulings, facilitating the anticipation of the type of rulings that may be issued
and removing doubts about their nature.
The Saudi king has noticed the issuance of rulings by some judges that some people may
deem contradictory, given that the cases seem similar, even though, in fact, they may not be so.
This made certain people believe that judges follow their whims or fail to apply the Sharia
provisions. Thus, the Saudi king thought that it might be due to the lack of a codification
reference that judges can use while issuing rulings. Also, it can benefit the Sharia and law
students during their studies. Moreover, it may push foreign investors to call for different
applicable laws instead of using Saudi laws, because investors may have no recourse in the Saudi
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courts due to the lack of codification, especially when the dispute relates to compensation for the
liquidated damages clause.
For the above reasons, the king presented the issue of codification to the Council of
Senior Scholars to request the issuance of a fatwa on codifying the provisions of Islamic
jurisprudence and obligating judges to rule on it. It is noteworthy that the idea of having a
codification reference that judges can use is not new since the late King Faisal requested the
Council of Senior Scholars in Saudi Arabia to consider the issue of the permissibility of
transcribing the suitable opinions of the jurists to compel judges to rule accordingly.432
The Council of Senior Scholars examined the codification suggestions and decided by a
majority that it is not permissible to write rulings that obligate judges to rule according to
codification.433 The council justified its decision stating that codification is not the best reform to
solve the problems since it will not end the contradictions between various judges’ rulings. Also,
the Council illustrated that codification will lead to unfortunate consequences due to the
following:
•

Obligating the judges to rule according to what was chosen from what is considered
correct opinion according to the one who chose it might require the judge to rule
differently from what he believes, and on some issues, this is not permissible. It
contradicts what was done during the era of the Prophet and his caliphs, and, after them,
the predecessors. When this idea was previously presented by Abu Jaafar Al-Mansur to
Imam Malik during the caliphate of Banu Al-Abbas, the iman rejected it and explained it
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was not suitable. Hence, it is an idea rejected by the predecessors, and there is no good in
anything that was considered in the era of the predecessors as newly invented.
•

Obligating the judges to follow a specific code will restrict their judiciary power to find
the best ruling on the disputed case. Moreover, codification will prevent the judges from
using the Quran, the Sunnah, and the Islamic jurisprudential schools, which hinders the
benefit of the knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence. This also clearly contradicts primary
Sharia sources, which are obligated to refer back to the Qur’an and the Sunnah regarding
rulings on which they differ. Allah said: “[I]f ye have a dispute concerning any matter,
refer it to Allah and the Messenger if ye are in truth believers in Allah and the Last
Day.”434

•

Obligating judges to follow what is codified leads to the same results reached by those
who instituted codification in the developing Islamic countries. They tried codification,
obligating judges to rule in accordance with it. However, it did not bring them any
goodness, and it did not remove the differences in rulings. Rather, it led them to rule by
man-made laws, except for personal-status matters, and some penalties. To stop the
pretext of corruption, to preserve the judgment of Allah’s law, and to stay in line with the
spirit of an Islamic nation we must think of another path of reform, one that will be free
of grave consequences.

•

Finding an inclusive book that comprises what is considered to be the most accurate
opinion of those decisions that are numbered and serialized will not necessarily resolve
the dispute, even if there is consistency in the rulings of all the cases. This is because
judges differ in their perceptions and understanding of scholarly materials, the extent to
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which they apply them to the case they consider, and the particular circumstances of the
cases, including people’s differences about the meaning of some legal texts from the
Qur’an and Sunnah, despite their clarity and the knowledge their source came from he
who is “All-Knowing.”435
•

The civil courts in countries ruled by man-made laws have written down their laws in the
form of unified and serialized articles. However, their judges’ rulings differ, and in some
rulings, there were contradictions and errors. These rulings’ mistakes are often appealed
and rescinded in the courts of appeal. Thus, obligating the use of codification did not
prevent errors and contradictions in the judicial rulings. Therefore, accusing judges and
calling for their judgments to be overturned will continue as long as judges differ in
opinions, ideas, understandings, capacity, and ability to apply judgments to disputed
cases.

•

It is inappropriate to avoid the ill effects that result from obligating judges to rule in
accordance with what is codified: to give them the right to dismiss what is contrary to
their beliefs from what has been codified. This is due to dependence, caseloads, evading
responsibility, obstructing transactions, and accumulating them, which will open the door
to fraudulent behavior to get rid of some cases. Moreover, in cases where the judge
disagrees with what has been codified, he will simply dismiss it, seeing as how the
preponderance of evidence is a relative matter, and each saying has its application.

•

Real-life application confirms that the litigants’ knowledge of what the judge refers to in
detail is not necessary nor is it a condition for accepting the judge’s ruling or its
enforcement, not from the point of view of Sharia or that of Saudi law. The Prophet ﷺ

435

One of God’s attributes and names in Islam.

221

and his companions used to judge between people in disputes, and their jurisprudence
was not recorded. Many of the parties had not memorized the entire Qur’an nor much of
the Sunnah. Rather, they generally knew that the judge would rule on cases brought to
him from what he comprehended from these primary Islamic texts, just as the cases in the
countries that rule with man-made laws and where the litigants have little knowledge of
the majority of the laws to which judges refer; therefore, they hire lawyers to plead on
their behalf. Hence, it was not necessary to write down the rulings according to the
codification proposed so that the litigants follow them. Yet even when the legal rulings
are codified and whoever wants them has access to them, it does not guarantee that the
judge will agree with him in understanding and applying it to his case. That is the
situation concerning both those who refer to Sharia in their trial and those who refer to
man-made law. For even if the rulings are written down, all the details of the cases might
not be mentioned, and each judge would strive to apply differently the ruling to the case
brought before him.
Based on the above, it is clear that another way must be sought to remedy the situation.
The Council of Senior Scholars believes that the solution to the problem is as follows:
•

Qualifying and training the judges for judicial work.

•

Better recruitment standards, such as testing their knowledge, reasoning, honesty, and
trustworthiness, which supports raising the level of quality of the judicial rulings.

•

Forming a committee of scholars to discuss critical judicial matters that are causing
differences among the judges, which reflect on their judicial rulings. The committee
should strive to clarify with evidence what its members view as the correct ruling. The
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committee work is not to obligate the judges with what the research has concluded but
rather to assist them in carrying out their work.
•

Differences in rulings existed during the era of the Four Caliphs and the Righteous
Predecessors, even by a single judge in two similar cases, where what became clear to
him in the second did not appear so to him in the first. Despite this, he did not rescind his
previous ruling. However, this is not enough reason to consider such codification nor
obligating the judges to rule in accordance with one saying. Although earlier Muslim
religious leaders and thinkers were more intent on presenting the practice and reputation
of Islam, this difference should not be a cause of suspicion and accusation of the judge,
seeing as how the basic trait to be present in those who are chosen to judge is being an
honest and responsible scholar.

•

Therefore, many legal scholars and teachers believe that the best way forward is other
than codification, for its outcome is not guaranteed, and it leads to the separation of
people from the sources of their Sharia and the wealth of their forebears in jurisprudence.

•

It is evident from this fatwa that codifying the provisions of Islamic Sharia is one an issue
that has been in dispute since the beginning of the Islamic era until the present time.436
However, this dispute did not prevent the existence of several individual or collective
codification attempts. Yet the interest of Saudi society at the present time, and the
multiplicity of its relations, dealings, and partnerships with other countries, require that
there be a codification of the provisions of Islamic jurisprudence in the form of written,
clear, and stable laws that are not subject to the absolute discretion of the judge. This is
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what prompted King Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz in 2014 AD437 to revive the idea of
codification, based on the four schools, after it remained for decades with the Council of
Senior Scholars, and it is the same idea that was advocated by the previous king.
King Abdullah suggested a scientific jurisprudence body, and after obtaining the approval
of the Council of Senior Scholars in the Kingdom on the idea of preparing a “judicial code,”438 a
royal decree439 was issued to form a Sharia committee from the Council of Senior Scholars in the
Kingdom, which was to prepare a draft “Code of Judicial Provisions.” The code was to include
legal issues that are commonly faced by the judiciary and present them according to Islamic
jurisprudence and classified in the form of articles. The committee would choose the strongest
evidence from the four schools of jurisprudence, and the royal decree obligated it to fully adhere
to the provisions of Sharia and follow the scientific method in weighing between the options of
the jurists. Further, no article was to be mentioned in this code except if its approach was
supported by the texts of the Sharia or the statements of the scholars. The committee had to
submit its work to the king within 180 days. However, the committee faced some difficulties in
completing its work during this period, and its work continued until the date of preparing this
research.
Recently, the work of this committee has been assisted by some jurists in codifying the
provisions of Sharia. Some preliminary drafts of its work have begun to come out, but
completion of all that is required of it and the subsequent procedures necessary to issue such a
jurisprudential code will take additional time. It is expected that the outcome of this project will
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be in the form of several codes, one devoted to civil and commercial transactions, a second to
evidence, a third to criminal laws and penalties, and a fourth to personal-status issues.
These jurisprudential codes will transform the texts of Sharia to rigid legal texts, as some
claim.440 Rather, they will work to find the appropriate mechanism for executing its provisions
by placing them in legal articles that are easy for judges to apply to the disputes before them,
while limiting the judges’ extensive discretionary powers that sometimes lead to incorrect
judgments. This is especially the case since a large percentage of judges do not have the
qualifications for independent reasoning and thus derive rulings from primary or secondary
sources of Sharia. Such judges in particular would benefit from a codification of Sharia law to
reach the appropriate rulings. Therefore, codifying the rulings of Islamic jurisprudence on the
basis of the strongest evidence from all Islamic schools of jurisprudence is a necessity in
assisting judges in the performance of their work and limiting his sometimes poorly exercised
independent reasoning in often controversial matters, such as the liquidated damages clause.
Judges in the Kingdom are bound to abide by the laws that are issued by royal decrees,
after approval by the Council of Ministers and the Shura Council, which are called regulations
instead of legislation and laws. Their rulings should not violate Sharia and they regulate many
topics such as commercial law, labor law, corporate law, and intellectual property law.
Therefore, codifying the provisions of Islamic jurisprudence in the form of legal articles in
various branches of law and issuing it in the form of laws will make judges abide by Sharia law
and apply it to the issues presented to them.
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4.1.5. Codification limits the judge’s discretion when considering the liquidated damages
clause
Obligating a Saudi judge to apply codified jurisprudential texts, especially in contract
cases and disputes about the liquidated damages clause, limits his discretionary power because
he will not be able to deviate from the text and apply any jurisprudence that he sees fit. If he
does, he is required to provide the reasoning behind his ruling.
The Higher Court will not support what he rules in opposition of the codified text, unless
it is proven to the court’s satisfaction that the judge’s opinion is consistent with a definitive text
in the Qur’an and Sunnah, and not consistent only with the non-definitive text. This is based on
the notion that the codification of Islamic jurisprudence has removed the confusion regarding the
possibility of a presumptive text and the appropriateness of its application to the presented
incident.
Codification makes it easier for jurists to explain articles and compare rulings with
previous ones dealing with the same or an analogous situation, and thus helps judges, lawyers,
and students to understand the rulings. It also makes it easier for the courts to apply the
provisions of Sharia now contained in codified articles and reduces the possibility of difference
in judicial rulings. Finally, it can guide the judge to the legal rule applicable to the dispute with
ease, instead of his having to search among the many opinions found in books on Islamic
jurisprudence, which require great effort.
A judge cannot argue that the codification prevents him from making decisions to justify
his wide discretionary authority, because the articles of codification have been prepared by
highly qualified jurists and scholars, which makes their work more aligned with Sharia rules and
the public interest. Moreover, codification does not mean he has to abandon independent
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reasoning, as he still needs to consider one or more articles of the codification in light of the
changing conditions, interests, and needs of society.
Through this scientific mechanism that has been adopted, the most correct opinion is
chosen for controversial issues, based on weighing rules adopted by the jurists of the science of
jurisprudence. The codification also provides an opportunity for jurists to influence the judges’
applications of the codified texts on the presented cases and disputes, including those related to
the liquidated damages clause, instead of referring to the plethora of sources in various books
and references of Islamic jurisprudence. This will prompt judges to properly limit their
discretionary authority, while encouraging proper reasoning in formulating their rulings in a way
that contributes to achieving justice between the disputants and increase confidence in the Saudi
legal system. Doing so is especially important for foreign investors who fear the wide
discretionary power of the Saudi judge in the absence of clearly written legal texts.

4.2. Notation and publishing of final court rulings
Judicial codes are not a recent idea in Islamic jurisprudence. We can find in some Islamic
jurisprudence schools, such as the Maliki school, a codification, of what was called “what was
followed” that included records of the judicial ruling abstracted from the incident and its
circumstances, while sometimes it noted the facts of the case and the ruling.
The follower of Islamic jurisprudence will find many incidents in which the rulings were
written, starting from the era of the Prophet ﷺ. The companions transmitted many facts in which
the Prophet ruled according to certain reasons he had articulated.
The codification of precedents and judicial rulings differs from what is called
“codification of jurisprudential rulings.” In the latter, jurisprudential texts are selected and
codified, and the judiciary is obliged to enact, which is similar to the “Latin” legal school. In
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contrast, the notation of precedents and judicial rulings is achieved by collecting judicial rulings
that meet the required conditions and publishing them to those interested in the legal affairs. If
these precedents constitute a judicial principle, it is issued by the Supreme Court in accordance
with the provisions of the Judicial Law, and judges, in many cases, are obligated to abide by the
general principles issued by the Kingdom’s Supreme Court.

4.2.1. Contents of the notated rulings
Notation of judicial rulings means writing about the facts behind the case, the ruling, and
the reasons for it. The ruling may include the evidence from the texts of the Qur'an, Sunnah,
Consensus, Analogy, other secondary Sharia sources, or the sayings of jurists from the Islamic
jurisprudence schools. The rulings are classified according to their type such as legal, labor,
personal, commercial, or criminal. Judicial rulings are not written in the form of numbered and
serialized articles, as is the case in codification. Final judicial rulings that have been issued by
courts and quasi-judicial committees at their various levels are collected, arranged, classified,
and published for those interested in them.
In the Saudi judicial community of the Kingdom, the term “notation of judicial rulings”
generally is used to mean references to writing the rulings of Islamic jurisprudence, but there is a
difference between the term “notation” and the term “codification.” The two terms have in
common attempts to collect, arrange, detail, and classify legal rulings. However, notation also
may include jurisprudential sayings and their evidence in a single issue, without obligating the
judge to rule guided by one. It may also include the collection of court rulings only. Notation
does not require listing its topics in the form of numbered legal articles. On the other hand,
codification is the formulation of the sayings of jurists in the form of numbered, arranged, and
classified legal articles that oblige judges to follow their guidance and apply it to disputes as is
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the case in the laws of other countries.441 The notation of judicial rulings issued by the courts
falls under the term notation and not the term codification.
Despite the interest in the notation and publication of judicial rulings in the Kingdom,
this matter was not raised regularly for some time. The Judiciary Law and the Law of the Board
of Grievances included a stipulation that judicial rulings must be written and published as per
article Twenty-one of the Law of the Board of Grievances, Administrative Judiciary, issued by
royal decree No. M/78 dated 9/19/1428 AH, which established an office for technical affairs in
the board consisting of a president and several judges, experts, and researchers. It is concerned
with issuing jurisprudence opinion, providing research and studies, and other matters requested
by the Chief of the Court. At the end of each year, the Office organizes judgments issued by the
circuits of the Court, after which it prints and publishes them and submits a copy of it to the king.
The Board of Grievances long notated and published a set of judicial principles approved
by the audit bodies in the Board of Grievances, the Appeals Judiciary, which showed adherence
to applying the principles of Sharia and the regulations that are compatible with it to achieve its
purposes and objectives. To that effect, several groups concerned with principles and judicial
rulings in administrative, commercial, and criminal cases were issued.442 The Ministry of
Commerce, in cooperation with the Chambers of Commerce in the Kingdom, published
selections from the decisions of the Appeals Committee for the Settlement of Commercial Paper
Disputes, which considers cases of checks, bills of exchange, and promissory notes. These
notations and published documents interested a large number of people. But the issuance of these
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notations stopped for a while,443 until it began to reappear recently, where the notations and
published rulings received much attention from the administrative judiciary for their contribution
to serving the judiciary by limiting the duration of cases and the discretionary power of judges.
Notations contribute to clarifying what the ruling has resolved in the cases, in addition to
shortening the time and reducing the effort on the case examiner, and contributing to spreading
legal knowledge, achieving transparency, and deepening knowledge of the applied aspects of law
among judicial, academic, and other interested individuals related to legal aspects, especially
among the employees of the judicial, legal, academic, and other bodies.
Copies of these judicial groups and principles have also been published on paper and
electronically, with the aim of contributing to the enhancement of awareness of judicial and legal
aspects and knowledge about the way judges adjudicate cases, and generating the persuasiveness
and consistency of judicial rulings.
In the field of public (non-administrative) judiciary, the third paragraph of Article 71 of
the Judicial Law issued by Royal Decree No. M/78 dated 9/19/1428 stipulates that a research
center shall be established in the Ministry of Justice and composed of a sufficient number of
specialized members, each of whom must have a university degree.
This center is tasked with publishing selected judicial rulings with the approval of the
Supreme Judicial Council444 after a decision issued by the Saudi Council of Ministers which
obligates the Ministry of Justice to publish these court-issued rulings after classifying them and
deleting names from them for the sake of confidentiality.445
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This was also followed by the issuance of a decision by the Minister of Justice446 to form
a committee of judges with experience and broad interest to carry out the tasks required by the
various stages of notation and publication, from reviewing judgments, classifying them and
preparing them for publication.447
In implementation of this trend in notation, the Research Center at the Ministry of Justice
issued a guide to judicial rulings in 2017, which includes judicial principles derived from rulings
and decisions issued by jurists issued principles and decisions in the stages of development of the
Saudi judicial system. These principles are entirely derived from decisions and judgments of
cases reviewed by the highest judicial authorities in the Kingdom, the Supreme Judicial
Authority, the General Authority of the Supreme Judicial Council, the permanent body of the
Supreme Judicial Council, and then the Supreme Court with its general assembly and its various
judicial departments.
This code included a set of principles and decisions issued by these authorities between
1971 and 2016 that are characterized by comprehensiveness, accuracy of arrangement, ease, and
preciseness of attribution and documentation of sources.
Among the key issues that those who are responsible, at the highest judicial authority,
seek to ensure are attention to the highest quality of rulings that are published, how they are
classified, ensuring the continuity of their publication and issuance, and the degree of judges’
commitment to them in their rulings. The Ministry of Justice has worked on administrative and
scientific readiness, through the formation of a permanent scientific committee consisting of
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three judges to set guidelines and rules on the nature and quality of the provisions to be codified,
and to ensure the suitability of the provisions presented for notation and publication.448
A large number of final and final judicial decisions issued by the courts of the general
judiciary have been selected, classified, and published through paper and electronic media.449
For its part, the administrative judiciary worked to activate the text of Article 21 of the
Law of the Board of Grievances by classifying, printing, and publishing judicial rulings,
indicating that the assignment of this task had been made by the Technical Affairs Office, which
is composed of several judges and experts supported by researchers and technical professionals.
As a result, the Board of Grievances, through its courts, issued sixteen volumes
concerned with its principles and rulings issued by the Board of Grievances’ Courts until 2018.
The Office of Technical Affairs continues to publish groups of judgments and principles. The
volumes dealt with principles and rulings related to administrative, commercial, and criminal
cases until the transfer of the jurisdictions to the general judiciary. Those volumes were
published in paper and electronic form.450
Thus, an opportunity to see judicial rulings and contribute to restricting the discretionary
power of judges through the difficulty of ruling otherwise, unless acceptable justifications and
reasons are provided.451 It is expected that this effort will continue to codify and publish rulings
of Saudi courts in the general judiciary, that of the Board of Grievances, and quasi-judicial
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committees, in light of the Saudi government’s interest in developing the judiciary and the Saudi
legislative environment to attract foreign investment to the Kingdom.

4.2.2. The benefits of publishing judicial rulings
Notation and publishing of judicial rulings contributes to serving those interested in the
judicial field, and with human rights issues in particular, by showing what has been ruled by
judges in the past, thus allowing litigants and others interested in judicial affairs to know the
likely direction that cases before the court will follow. Even though some facts differ from each
other, the legal grounds set forth in the published final rulings can be relied upon in predicting
the judge’s perspective on facts and cases before him. Likewise, a judge will find it difficult to
go beyond what is included in cases similar to those before him. These guidelines thus become a
limitation on his discretion unless he can persuasively justify his deviation from the resolution of
past cases. If so, the case will be monitored by the Supreme Court, which will overturn his ruling
if it is not convinced of his justifications for deviating from the provisions published in the
similar incident.
Published rulings that contain evidence and reasoning are beneficial for the judges
themselves as they contribute to saving time and effort, and limit the judges’ discretionary
power, particularly in terms of rulings that might be reversed by the Supreme Court. Such
codification also makes for a certain degree of predictability when it comes to rulings for similar
cases, which will benefit all those interested in legal issues, including judges, lawyers, business
owners, and foreign investors.
A number of benefits can be summarized for the notation of judicial rulings in the
Kingdom, including:
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•

Notation contributes to clarifying what has been ruled in the past, which helps promotes
foreign investment because investors are more aware of what the judiciary is in general,
including the commercial judiciary, which, together, are seen as proper legal processes
and standards.

•

Notation contributes to shortening the time and reducing the effort of the case examiner,
and helps spread doctrinal awareness among the judicial community; it achieves the
principle of transparency, and incorporates academic research in applied aspects.

•

Judicial notations enrich jurisprudence and marry theory and practice on the ground.

•

Publishing judicial codes contributes to deepening the expertise and knowledge of judges
in a way that guides their rulings and limits their use of discretionary power that is not
based on strong legal foundations.

•

Notation contributes to examining the codified provisions, studying them, and comparing
them with other legal systems, which results in the development and strengthening of
provisions and the creation of ideal models for judgments in many issues from which
judges in general and new judges in particular benefit.

•

Writing and publishing judicial rulings creates a kind of self-discipline over the judge’s
work, so the judge is eager to review his rulings and to possibly revise them so as not to
violate previously published rulings. This is in part because he knows that his own ruling
will be published and read, so he works on cases more deliberately and carefully.

•

Writing and publishing judicial rulings enhances internal control in the judiciary that is
carried out through different levels of litigation such as the appeal and the Supreme
Court, and therefore the published rulings, precedents, and judicial principles will limit a
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lower judge’s discretionary authority. This in turn will ensure that he is guided by judicial
precedents when considering the cases before him.
•

Judicial notations help lawyers in the performance of their work by providing legal
guidance to their clients more accurately and clearly.

•

Published notations and past judicial rulings help judges to settle disputes more easily
and accurately and to clarify the demands of and advocacy for the litigants throughout
their cases.

•

Writing and publishing judicial rulings serve Islamic jurisprudence by clarifying the
correct applications of Sharia and standardizing jurisprudence in similar circumstances.
Further, it simplifies and presents its findings to the public, which contributes to
educating the public on opinions and legal principles on which judges based their
judgments.

•

This approach thus bolsters confidence in the Saudi judiciary and identifies ways to apply
the texts of Sharia, and to explain this to those interested from inside and outside the
Kingdom.

•

It contributes to the dissemination of awareness and a culture of human rights among
members of society, which leads to the reduction of resorting to the courts, because
knowing the judicial position on any issue before resorting to the courts will lead to the
reluctance of some to file lawsuits that they are not guaranteed to win.
Despite the many benefits that result from writing and publishing judicial rulings, as it

provides more transparency to those interested in the Saudi judicial affairs, but because the
circumstances of the parties to the cases differ, a judge is still not compelled to rule with this
judicial precedent in a similar case a
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4.2.3. The concept of judicial precedents
Judicial precedents are defined as rulings in a case issued by a competent court that are
taken as examples or references for a similar case that arises later. These rulings have been
affirmed by a higher court, such as a court of appeal or the Supreme Court, so that those rulings
become guidelines for the judge in lower courts when they consider issues identical or similar to
those in which the rulings were issued.452 They are the judicial rulings issued on specific cases
for which an affirmed verdict has not been previously issued.453 It is clear from this last
definition that a judicial precedent is a judicial ruling on a specific disputed case. This judicial
ruling issued in this particular incident has no precedent, as it is the first ruling issued for this
matter.
A precedent in Anglo-Saxon legal systems is a prior legal case that establishes a principle
or a rule that a court has the right to use and apply when there is a case before it with similar
circumstances and facts.454 The precedent is stated in the judicial ruling.

4.2.3.1. Distinguishing judicial precedent from other terms
Judicial precedent differs from some other related terms such as the terms “customary
practices” and “judicial principles.”
A.

Judicial precedents and customary practice
Customary practice refers to judicial rulings which rely on what is contrary to the most

correct or well-known in the jurisprudential school. The reason for the judge’s choice of
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customary practice is because benefits to the public-interest view or Blocking Pretext or applying
a Custom.
This term became popular in the Maliki school of jurisprudence, which collected
customary practices in some volumes.455
In the Saudi judiciary, this term refers to a jurisprudential statement that contradicts the
approved Hanbali school of jurisprudence, which judges are obligated to rule by, and the work of
the competent court was to check if the judgment followed this opinion for a significant
reason.456 It is “the adoption of a weak or abnormal statement in the jurisprudence school instead
of the most correct or well-known in the doctrine, for a benefit, necessity, custom, or
otherwise.”457
Therefore, an unpopular jurisprudential opinion might be applied to the disputed case,
despite the presence of another well-known opinion due to the significant public interest
outcome.458
Contrary to what is required of the judge is to apply the most supported and powerful
jurisprudential opinions to the dispute cases, the judge might rule on the basis of a weak saying
that is corrected if that is necessary, and this is a matter that is permissible according to some
jurists in all Islamic schools of jurisprudence.459 Customary practice is considered a way of
giving preference to statements in the jurisprudence schools, as stated by the Hanafi school, and
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the Maliki school, which designated it with the term “customary practice.”460 The Maliki jurists
stipulated the following conditions for considering the customary practice:461
1- Proving the action by a decree or a fatwa.
2- Including a legitimate source of Sharia principles and rules.
3- Issuing a ruling or fatwa that is supported by scholars whose independent reasoning is
respected.
Many of the Maliki jurists tend to overturn a ruling if it contradicts the customary
practice.462 Also, some applications of the customary practice in Saudi courts contradict the
approved Hanbali school that is usually applied by the Saudi judiciary.463
Thus, “customary practice” is closely related to judicial precedents, particularly given
that judicial precedents are part of customary practices in courts, where the judgments that are
customary in the courts are part of what is considered “customary practice.”
However, there is a fundamental difference between the two terms. Customary practice is
more general and comprehensive than judicial precedents, as it includes judgments and other
details such as the method of keeping records and determining the procedures to be followed
when litigating. Judicial precedents are limited to the rulings applied by the judiciary to cases or
disputed issues that are presented to it frequently.464
Consequently, while judicial precedent and customary practices both involve a ruling
regarding a specific fact, they differ in the following:465
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1. While judicial precedent occurs when a ruling is decided in a disputed matter that has not
previously been decided with a definitive verdict, the judiciary customary practice is the
application of a jurisprudential opinion, unlike the opinion of the majority in the school
of jurisprudence.
2. A judicial precedent is specific to the dispute that the courts decide, while for customary
practice, it acts like a fatwa regarding the obligation scope to the judge to follow or not.
3. Customary practice must be respected and acted upon unless an exception is applied. As
for the precedent, it is to be applied if it takes the form of a judicial principle and final
judgment of the courts of appeal, and it is generally preferred to customary actions.
B. Judicial precedents and judicial principles
Judicial principles mean those all-encompassing guidelines and the overall rules that the
Supreme Court decides in the field of litigation. It is a complete and binding judicial decision
that is issued by a competent authority within the limits of its jurisdiction and that applies to
varied circumstances.
The Supreme Court is authorized to issue judicial principles by law.466 In its general
assembly, it defined the judicial principle as the general objective and procedural judicial rule
decided by that Court, which is taken into account when considering cases and issuing judgments
and decisions. Its more general definition includes what can be derived from judgments and
decisions that can be generalized and applied to other facts, without these rules being necessarily
issued by the Supreme Court.467
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The judicial principle is what the Supreme Court initially decided upon in accordance
with what was stated in Article 13 of the Judicial Law issued in 1428 AH, or what is derived
from the work of the courts and their functioning on a specific basis when deciding on a dispute,
affirmed by the higher courts. This is similar to customary practices in some schools of
jurisprudence in terms of reliance on it and not violating it by the lower courts.468
A judicial ruling may be one of the sources of the formation of the judicial principle,
when there is a judicial ruling and it is cited after its publication and reflecting urges' knowledge
of it. Confirmed in this way, it becomes a judicial precedent, and then it can be a judicial
principle that must be followed when the Supreme Court decides that it is such.
Judicial precedents are not limited to substantive articles that focus on the operative part
of judicial ruling, but also include the procedural processes in the presence of a procedural void
that helps lead to a judicial ruling. Whenever a legislative text is found, the Saudi judge is bound
by its presence. In its absence, the judge is required to use independent reasoning, and sometimes
judicial precedents and principles are formed as a result.
Judicial principles are a more accurate description and more compelling than judicial
precedent in a dispute between jurists. Some jurists believe that a precedent represents a
principle, while others believe that a principle must be included in the text of a ruling or decision
issued by the Supreme Court.
Judicial principles differ from judicial precedents in that the binding precedent deals with
a special event, and the subsequent judicial rulings issued in similar facts or issues must be
guided by its content unless there is a contrary reason which is deemed sufficient to override the
precedent. In contrast, the judicial principle represents a general rule that includes several facts
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related to this rule which eventually will be an integral part of a law. The principle can only the
abrogated by following the process that the law stipulates.
Therefore, the principle limits the judge’s discretionary power. Some jurists believe that
the judicial principle is included in the term “binding precedent”; where both are issued by the
judiciary and are related to the determination of the facts, a judicial precedent does not require
judicial repetition.469
Here, the difference between judicial precedents and judicial principles is that precedents
are partial judgments that are enunciated in actual cases, while judicial principles are
comprehensive to the entire judicial process: they are the rules and processes of judicial
decisions and apply to all subsequent judicial decisions.470
C. The legal basis for judicial principles in Saudi legislation
The issuance of judicial principles by the Supreme Court in the Kingdom is based on
Article 13, Paragraph (A) of the Saudi Judicial Law, which states that the Court undertakes,
within the scope of its work, the determination of general principles in matters related to the
judiciary. Article 14 of the Judicial Law stipulates what happens if one of the circuits of the
Supreme Court decides, in connection with a case it is hearing, to abandon a principle that it had
previously adopted, or another circuit court has taken in previous cases, or if one of the circuits
of the Court of Appeal decides to abandon a principle that it had previously adopted, the matter
is then referred to the President of the Supreme Court to refer it to the General Assembly of the
Supreme Court for adjudication.
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In 2012, the General Assembly of the Supreme Court began deciding about general
judicial principles. Thus, the judicial principles approved by the Supreme Court are binding on
all judges, and the judge has no discretionary authority to deviate from them in his rulings.471
Article 13 of the General Judicial Law stipulates that the Supreme Court should have a
general body headed by the president of the court and the membership of all its judges, which
undertakes a number of tasks, including a report of general principles in matters relating to the
judiciary. The meeting of the general assembly is not valid unless attended by at least two-thirds
of its members, including the president or his representative, and its decisions are made by a
majority of members present. If the vote is even, the side with which the president voted
prevails, and its decisions are considered final.

4.2.3.2. The influence of the judicial precedents
A. The influence of the judicial precedents upon the Saudi judge
A judicial ruling is limited in its effect on the parties and their successors. But when this
ruling is confirmed by the higher court and becomes final, it applies to similar cases. Thus, it can
be relied on as a judicial precedent in similar cases that have not been decided.472
Rulings of the (righteous) (judges), as they were narrated by the following Ibn Masoud
saying473 set precedents in Islamic jurisprudence: “Whoever among you is presented with a
decree after today; if a matter comes that is not in the Book of Allah, then let him judge
according to what his Prophet ﷺ, decreed. If a matter comes that is not in the Book of Allah, nor
in what his Prophet  ﷺdecreed, let him judge according to what the righteous have decreed, and
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if a matter comes that is not in the Book of Allah, nor in what his Prophet  ﷺdecreed, nor did the
righteous judge it, so let him strive to arrive at his opinion.”474 This indicates the permissibility
of following the predecessors’ opinions after scrutinizing all the evidence, verification, and
reasoning.475
Suppose the judicial precedent becomes a judicial principle issued by the Supreme Court.
In that case, a judge cannot rule opposing the judicial principle unless he provides significant
causation for his decision. And in this case, the judge’s rule is subject to judicial review. This
judiciary practicality is attributed to some scholars of Maliki doctrine.476
The question arises about the extent of the judge’s commitment to judicial precedents.
Saudi judges do generally adhere to what is customary in Islamic jurisprudence with two caveats:
1. The judgment was issued by higher court, or the previous judgement was based on texts
from the Qur’an, the Sunnah, Consensus or Analogy, in which there is no dispute among
the jurists. In such cases, the successor judge is bound by what the court or the previous
judge ruled. But the obligation here derives from the text, not from the judicial precedent
itself.
2. If the judgment rendered by the previous judge is in a matter in which there is no text
from the Book, the Sunnah, consensus, or analogy. In this case, the matter is not without
two subcases.477
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The first subcase is that this issue is the subject of a dispute between jurists, and the
judgment of the previous judge is likely to lend weight to one of those opinions, though here the
previous judicial judgment is not binding on the two judges.
The second subcase is that this is an emerging issue and cannot be measured on those
issues that have already been examined in Islamic jurisprudence. So, the judge renders a verdict
purely out of independent reasoning. Also, the judicial ruling is not binding to other cases. And
the explanation for the judge’s behavior is that the judge has reasoning that is independent. Thus,
it is not an adequate opinion for other cases since it is based on conjecture and not a deduction.
Therefore, the judge who used the independent reasoning adheres to it as long as his opinion of it
does not change. This means the judge is not permitted to change his independent reasoning and
imitate another judge’s reasoning.”478
It was narrated on the behalf of Caliph Omar, that he said: “Do not prevent youself from
fulfilling his cause today, so you reviewed your mind, and you were guided in your senses, to
return to the truth, for the truth is old, and reviewing the truth is better than persisting in
falsehood.”479
Therefore, the judicial ruling is partial in effect, that is, it is “concerned with the incident
in which it was issued and the parties to the dispute only.” This means that a judicial ruling
issued in an incident is specific and limited, and does not extend to similar issues.
The rules of independent reasoning in Sharia require that the judge’s work is carried out
in light of the texts of the Quran and the Sunnah, as the role of the judge when considering a case
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or issue lies in applying the various sources of Islamic law in accordance with the established
evidence.
Judicial precedent ensures the stability of judicial rulings, and each ruling should
continue a general trend that all judges are committed to follow and rule in accordance with
whenever a dispute is presented to them.
Some have argued that there is no legal precedent in Islamic law that would make it so
strong that the subsequent judge cannot rule differently than another judge in a similar situation.
However, the trend in the Saudi judiciary is that judicial precedent has an impact on a judge’s
subsequent ruling so that it is difficult for him to deviate from the precedent unless he justifies
his deviation with convincing justifications is sustained by the highest court.
B. Types of precedents in the Saudi judiciary
Judicial precedents are divided into binding judicial precedents and indicative judicial
precedents.
1. Binding precedents
These are the judicial precedents issued by the Supreme Court based on judicial
principles, and they must be applied and adhered to by lower-court judges in all similar cases,
facts, and issues presented to them. That is the case unless there is a strong reason for not taking
them, in which case, the judge must indicate the reason for not taking precedent into account or
his judgment might be subject to cassation. For the precedent to be binding, the issues resolved
in the binding judicial precedent must be identical, or nearly so, with the issues to be resolved in
the current case before the judge.
The Supreme Court in the Kingdom may reconsider the judicial principle that was
previously approved as a binding judicial precedent and change the direction in its subject for
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justified reasons or circumstances necessitated by the public interest, especially if it receives a
request from the king to study it. It is also permissible for a judge to establish a new judicial
principle without having a case before him. All judicial principles must be adhered to, and the
judge is not allowed to rule in a way that contradicts the precedent.
The judicial principles issued by the Supreme Court in the Kingdom are similar to the
judicial precedents issued by the Supreme Court in the United States except that the Saudi
judicial is a non-federal one. Rather, there are two Supreme Courts, one for the general and one
for the administrative judiciary that specializes in cases in which the state is a party. All courts
affiliated with each Supreme Court adhere to the precedents of its Supreme Court. In contrast,
judicial law follows a certain hierarchy of courts, headed at the federal level by the Supreme
Court, followed by the lower federal courts. At the state level, there is a similar judicial law. The
judges of the lower courts are obliged to apply the precedents of the higher court until it later
modifies its precedents, which is similar to the judicial situation in the Kingdom.
Some consider the rulings published in the volumes are binding as a judicial precedent,
because they have acquired definitive ruling status since they have fulfilled all the litigation
processes. However, some jurists have distinguished more precisely in the published judicial
precedent between precedents that end with the non-appeal of the initial judgment or the failure
to object to the cassation of the appealed decision. Therefore, the jurists believe these judicial
rulings are not considered judicial precedents since the judge can take comfort in them because
their verdict came out of the disputed parties’ conviction, not obligated by the higher court.480
The obligation that judicial precedents confer on a judge also is found in Islamic
jurisprudence, as effects of such precedents, including judges’ reliance on them, in rulings in
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similar cases, according to the rulings of the righteous predecessors481 was widely reported. This
is a matter that one judges should assess by what righteous predecessors stated in their principles
and precedents, and the validity of the judge’s jurisprudence in what is not a ruling, to establish
new principles and precedents.
It is clear that the judicial precedent has a place in Saudi jurisprudence, and the Saudi
legislator has intervened to support such precedents. The old Saudi Judicial Law, issued in 1975,
states: “If one of the court’s circuits decides in a case it is considering, to reverse the
jurisprudence that it or another circuit had previously adopted in previous rulings, it shall refer
the case to the General Assembly of the Court of Cassation, and the General Assembly shall
issue its decision by a majority not less than two-thirds of its members to authorize revocation
[of the decision]. If the decision is not issued in an aforementioned manner, the case is referred
to the Supreme Judicial Council to issue its decision in accordance with Article 84, paragraph 1
of Article 8.”482 This article was replaced in the new Saudi Judicial Law issued in 2007, Article
14, which states: “If one of the circuits of the Supreme Court decides, concerning a case it is
hearing, to abandon a principle that it has previously adopted, or if another circuit in the same
court has adopted it in previous cases, or if one of the circuits of the Court of Appeal decides to
abandon a principle previously adopted by one of the circuits of the Supreme Court in previous
cases, the matter is referred to the president of the Supreme Court to refer it to the General
Authority of the Supreme Court for adjudication.”
The new Saudi Judicial Law emphasized judges’ tendency to adopt judicial principles
and judicial precedents issued by the Supreme Court and make them mandatory, so these
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principles and precedents are not modified except by a decision of one of the Supreme Court
circuits, whether the reversal of such a principle is from the Supreme Court itself or one of the
appeals circuits.
Judicial principles represent stable judicial diligence in dealing with cases in the absence
or ambiguity of one or more regulatory texts, either substantive or procedural, based on the
provisions of Sharia and its detailed evidence in such cases. The importance of principles and
judicial precedents increases as the scope of jurisprudence and the discretionary power of the
Saudi judge expands, especially with regard to provisions for liquidated damages in the
Kingdom. This makes judicial principles a decisive factor in determining how the judge decides
to settle the disputes before him. The Saudi legislator emphasized the importance of the stability
of judicial principles when he elucidated the procedures for reversing them, which provides an
implicit indication of the permissibility of invoking them if the incident presented applies to the
rule established by the stable judicial principle. Judicial principles are characterized by their
ability to develop and change continuously and smoothly, according to the latest societal
developments, due to their real nature in that their approval aims to settle disputes before the
judiciary.483
Judicial principles constitute general guidelines for detailed issues in doctrinal and
procedural issues that are currently issued by the General Authority of the Saudi Supreme Court,
according to the scope of its jurisdiction indicated in Article 11 of the Judicial Law, as well as
Article 13. The latter states that among the tasks of the General Assembly of the Supreme Court,
reporting general principles in the Judicial issue, and from the judicial principles that may be
issued by the higher courts, are choosing a specific jurisprudential opinion; approving a judicial
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Analogy creating a new principle that does not exist in Islamic jurisprudence; weighing the
conflict between two texts; interpreting an ambiguous text or choosing one of the possible
interpretations for the text; determining a general text, general statement, or restriction of a
general term; and specifying the scope of application of a legal opinion or a legal text.484
Examples of judicial principles that were issued in the Kingdom by higher courts and
became binding on lower courts are:
•

The fine due to the penalty clause, if its justification is proven, is not forfeited except by
waiving it.485

•

The agreement to arbitrate does not forfeit the fine fixed by the penal clause unless its
forfeiture is stipulated in the agreement of arbitration.486

•

The conditions is valid unless it violates a legal text or rule.487

•

Conditions between the two parties, if they do not contradict Sharia, are respected, and no
one has the right to invalidate them or allocate them except the parties.488

•

If there is a condition between the two parties that does not contradict Sharia, then it is
respected and no one can invalidate or limit it, except the parties.489

•

The penalty clause is valid if it is within the reasonable limits of custom.490
These judicial principles are based on detailed jurisprudence opinions, including

contracts and compensation. And for the precedent to be considered binding, the disputed case in
the courtroom must mimic the judicial precedent and share the same facts.491
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The preponderance of the preceding is only in the text of the judgment, which is directly
focused on the facts on which the judgment is about, and as for the accidental judgments
contained in the context of the decision, they are only additional.
In short, the Saudi judiciary accepts precedents, both in the courts of the general judiciary
and the judiciary of the Board of Grievances, and there are recent rulings in the judiciary of the
latter where the judges invoked judicial precedents and recorded them as the primary reasons for
their rulings.492
2. Indicative or exemplary precedents
Indicative precedents occur when non-binding judgments are issued in cases decided by
lower courts or when judgments issued in them were finalized without appeal due to the lapse of
the legal period, or ended in conciliation, or ended by not appealing the first-instance judgment.
Also, they occur when there is no objection to the appealed judgment or issued by parallel courts
such as the administrative courts for the general judiciary or the courts of the general judiciary
for the judiciary of the Board of Grievances.
These precedents are used by a judge, although he is not obligated by them, because their
judgment came out of conviction, and the judge did not utilize it as a binding procedure. At the
same time, the binding judicial precedents represent judgments that acquired their definitive
status.493
3. The authority of judicial precedents in comparative legal schools
Legal schools vary in their adoption of judicial precedents/ Followers of the Anglo-Saxon
school adheres to judicial precedents, and American, British, Australian, and Indian laws reflect
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this, while the Latin school for the most part does not adhere to judicial precedents, and so
French, Belgian, Italian, and Egyptian law do not reflect a concern for judicial precedents.494
The task of the judge in the Latin legal school is limited to applying the law in the cases
presented to him; he simply searches for the appropriate legal text and applies it to the issue in
dispute. If he does not find an appropriate text in the law, he strives to find a solution. The effect
of his judgment is limited to the case at hand and does not extend to any other case, even one
similar to it, and his judgment does not bind any other court, even if it is inferior to the court
from which the judgment was issued.
French law stipulated this principle where it prohibited judges from setting a general
principle to be applied in similar cases. This tendency was justified by the necessity of
preserving the principle of separation of powers so that the judiciary is not allowed to interfere in
the jurisdiction of the legislative authority. However, the Latin school does not completely
neglect judicial precedents, which it considers an explanatory source for the rules of law so that a
judge must be familiar with previous rulings and is guided by them when he does not find an
applicable legal base in considering the cases before him.
The judiciary in the Anglo-Saxon school, such as English law, and those who follow it is
the source of the judicial precedent; this judgment is binding within certain limits for all courts of
the same rank as the court that issued it, as well as for all courts of lower rank.
Judgments issued by the Court of Appeal, for example, are considered legal precedents
that are binding on all English courts of appeal, including the Court of Appeal that issued it and
also the courts of a lower degree thereof. But this judgment does not bind the higher court such
as the House of Lords, the supreme judicial body in United Kingdom, and therefore the judge is

494

See: Al-Khanin, Abdullah bin Muhammad bin Saad, Tasif Al-Qadis, I.D., p. 441 and beyond.

251

bound when he decides any dispute before him to search for precedents issued for such cases;
thus, the judge can derive legal rules to be applied in the case before him.495
Judicial precedents are considered in all legal schools throughout in the world, Latin,
Anglo-Saxon, Islamic, but these schools differ on the extent of authoritativeness or obligation
these precedents have. Some judges consider them for reference and guidance but view them as
non-obligatory, such as the Latin school. Others consider them binding and an official source for
judges’ rulings, such as the Anglo-Saxon school. The Islamic school and its applications in Saudi
Arabia can be considered moderate in taking and obligating judicial precedents
When these precedents comprise a judicial principle or are issued by the Supreme Court,
they are considered binding on the judges, who have to follow them, unless the Supreme Court
amends its jurisprudence in this regard, in which case it is sufficient for judges to consult them.
If the rulings of the Saudi Courts of Appeal began to constitute a series of restrictions on judges
in courts of the lowest degree, it is difficult, in this case as well, for them to ignore its content
when issuing judgments in similar cases, for fear of having their rulings reversed unless they
justify the reasons for not following these judicial precedents with acceptable justifications.
However, jurisprudence and legislation have both developed, so that the Anglo-Saxon
school has begun to use some written legislation in addition to judicial precedents, and the Latin
school has begun to rely to some extent on judicial precedents.496
Thus, judicial precedents in the Anglo-Saxon legal school constitute a kind of legal
argument that must be acted upon, and all lower courts are obliged to follow their judgments in
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similar cases. In the Latin legal school, judicial precedents do not have the same authority. The
judicial precedents and principles and the customary practices in the Saudi application of the
provisions of Sharia constitute a middle position between the Anglo-Saxon and Latin legal
schools, where judicial principles are followed and adhered to, along with other judicial
precedents issued by the courts of appeal, and it is difficult for the judge to neglect its content.
Therefore, from a practical point of view, the lower courts respect the judicial precedents
of the higher courts and do not want to contradict them, for two reasons:
1. The role of the higher courts is to monitor the courts’ application of legal rules, so the
courts are keen on seeing that their rulings conform to what has been established from
previous court districts in order to avoid reversal of their rulings.
The judges of the higher courts are usually those with a higher level of education and
more experience in rulings and applying them to the facts; thus, it is most likely their rulings are
correct.497

4.2.3.3. The importance and benefits of judicial precedents
The importance of judicial precedents is that it enables judges to benefit from the rulings
of their predecessors, to be educated by them, to base their rulings on them,498 to use them in the
performance of their duties. The function of judicial precedents is as follows:
A. Judges base their rulings upon judicial precedents
When the judge issues a ruling for a new matter about which no one else has issued a
ruling before, his new ruling will become a judicial precedent, thus, future cases dealing with the
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same matter will rely on this judicial precedent, as long as it is reasonable.499 The jurisprudence
is based on this precedent, which has priority over independent reasoning according to personal
opinion.
B. Gain procedural guidance through judicial precedents
There are certain procedures that the judge follows while resolving the disputes before
him, according to which decisions are made in procedural law. In some cases, procedural issues
have not been addressed by the jurists or the law, in which case the judge strives to establish
some procedures during his consideration and conduct of the case. These procedural precedents
will act as guides in subsequent similar cases and judicial procedures, given that the original
judge used a procedure that proved effective.500 Judicial precedents have many benefits,
including:
•

Facilitating the judge’s work: the procedural precedents help him process emerging
issues, making it easier for him to settle the dispute before him because he finds that the
judges who preceded him had found an effective way to solve the case, which saves the
judge time and effort.

•

Enriching judicial jurisprudence: judicial precedents show the way for jurists and judges
with regard to the handling of issues for which there is no direct legal text. Precedents
provide mutual jurisprudential and judicial enrichment. The judge and others interested in
judicial affairs (e.g., law students and law professors) benefit from the jurists’ analysis of
these rulings, just as all those interested in the judicial affairs, such as students of Sharia
and law colleges, lawyers, and parties to cases, benefit from it.
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•

Judicial precedents contribute to unifying the standardization of rulings in similar cases
and limiting the wide discretionary power of judges.

•

They contribute to the stability of the work of the courts and their regularity in following
a certain rule in some cases.

•

Applying the same precedent in similar cases will achieve equality between the parties in
all comparable cases before the courts, so the rulings on similar cases will be the same.

•

Commitment to following judicial precedents contributes to knowing how to resolve
future disputes in advance and helps litigants and their lawyers know the probable
direction of the case from the outset.

•

The use of stable rules and processes for adjudicating cases saves time and effort for
those concerned with judicial affairs.

•

Benefiting from the experiences and expertise of former judges who have reached a high
level in jurisprudential knowledge inspires confidence among the parties to the case and
the general public. It leads to respect of judges in lower courts from the more experienced
judges in higher courts, so that their rulings are less subject to cassation.

4.2.3.4. The role of notation of judgments and judicial precedents in limiting the
discretionary power of the Saudi judge
Recording and publishing judicial precedents and rulings contribute to limiting the
discretionary authority of Saudi judges in the Kingdom, as these judicial precedents and
principles represent parameters for judges when ruling in similar cases. Whether the judge
searches for these precedents himself, or the litigants or their lawyers do, they necessarily
influence the judge’s conviction and rulings and therefore significantly influence him. The judge
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cannot issue a ruling in an incident in violation of the judicial principles previously issued by the
Supreme Court, because such a ruling would be overturned by the higher court.
The highest judicial bodies in the Saudi Arabia, which have now been replaced by the
Supreme Court, have over the years enunciated many principles regarding the penalty and the
liquidated damages clauses, including that the contractual conditions are valid unless they violate
a legal text or rule.501 This applies to conditions between the two parties; if they do not contradict
Sharia, then they are respected, and no one has the right to invalidate or specify them except for
the parties who concluded them.502 Thus, if there is a liquidated damages clause between the two
parties that does not contradict the law, it is respected, and no one can refuse or specify it except
for the one who concluded it.503 The principles represent limitations on the judge’s discretionary
authority, so a judge must affirm that his handling of cases, including a liquidated damages
clause, is consistent with these judicial precedents.

4.3. Issuing scientific jurisprudence and court journals to enrich jurisprudence and enhance
transparency
Developing judges’ knowledge of jurisprudence issues involves being informed about
research and comparative rulings in various legal schools through what is published in journals
that deal with legal and judicial affairs. This helps them avoid the kind of broad discretion that is
not based on legal grounds. Also, looking at the comparative judicial and jurisprudence trends
regarding the provisions of the liquidated damages clause contributes to the Saudi judges
adopting approaches put forward by legal schools that comply with the provisions of Sharia.
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Many refereed scientific journals have been issued in the Kingdom that are concerned
with jurisprudence and judicial matters.504 Among them are:

4.3.1. Al-Adl Journal (The Justice Journal)
This is a refereed scientific quarterly journal issued by the Saudi Ministry of Justice and
concerned with jurisprudence and judicial affairs.505 It aims to:
•

Disseminate Islamic jurisprudence and contribute to the revitalization of jurisprudence in
the field of jurisprudence and the judiciary.

•

Enrich judicial work with research, studies, and information that helps judges in
performing his work, raises their awareness, and increase scientific output.

•

Develop the documentation tools in courts and notaries and have legal template forms
drove from Sharia.

•

Enhance the judiciary’s methods and procedures.

•

Strengthen relations with judicial authorities in the Arab and Islamic countries by
publishing research and studies for the members of the judiciary in those countries in the
fields of general and Islamic jurisprudence.

•

Promote the level of jurisprudence and judicial awareness among Saudi society through
media communication and answering inquiries of a public nature.

4.3.2. Journal of the Board of Grievances
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This is a semiannual scientific journal concerned with jurisprudence, law, and
administrative judiciary that is issued by the Board of Grievances.506 This journal aims at:
•

Encouraging scientific, jurisprudence, and legal research dedicated to solving problems
related to judicial issues.

•

Making significant contributions to enriching jurisprudence and legal thought through the
dissemination of legal rules, jurisprudential opinions, and distinguished judicial
jurisprudence.

•

Contributing to the development of laws through distinguished scholarship by legal
specialists who study and analyze judicial rulings.

•

Establishing legal communication and dialogue between lawyers, juries, and judges
interested in judicial affairs, which creates a positive interaction that enriches the judicial
field.

•

Creating a sound practical environment for the dissemination of scholars’ research and
ideas in jurisprudence.

•

Nurturing scientific and legal ideas that are based on comparison and originality.

•

Supporting national loyalty and preserving national values by finding legal and practical
ideas that serve this purpose.

•

Disseminating awareness of human rights and upholding the values of justice that Islamic
Sharia is based on.

•

Addressing contemporary humanitarian issues within the framework of Sharia and Saudi
and international law.
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•

Reporting and analyzing new developments and publications in the field of law, human
rights, and related studies through introducing books, recent theses, and other research
presented at conferences and in scientific symposiums.

•

Working to strengthen relations with international judicial and human rights authorities
by publishing the research of specialists from throughout the world.

•

Publishing significant judicial rulings locally and internationally in accordance with the
jurisdictions of the Board of Grievances.

4.3.3. Judicial Journal507
This is a refereed scientific journal that publishes contemporary judicial research and
studies issued by the Saudi Ministry of Justice. This journal aims to:
•

Enrich the judicial content and benefit from its applied aspects.

•

Provide judicial practitioners with knowledge that helps in upgrading their professional
performance to face practical challenges and modern topics.

•

Strengthen the relationship between judges and the academic study of law.

•

Present topics, theses, and unique judicial experiences that will enhance the developing
field of administrative law.

4.3.4. The Judiciary Journal508
This is a refereed journal issued by the Judicial Scientific Society at Imam Muhammad
bin Saud Islamic University and located at the Higher Judicial Institute. It strives to achieve

507
508

See: https://adlm.moj.gov.sa/alqadaeya
See: https://qadha.org.sa/ar/books

259

excellence in providing applied scientific research in the judicial fields through its various
activities and projects, including:
•

Following emerging issues and publishing original research in Saudi jurisprudence.

•

Working on developing jurisprudence by publishing research in jurisprudence and the
law so as to benefit judges, lawyers, and other judicial professionals and others interested
in law.

•

Presenting studies in the field of Islamic principles and rules, as well as their applications.

•

Studying contemporary tort law.

•

Facilitating communication and coordination among judges, lawyers, and researchers
interested in jurisprudence so as to deepen their knowledge of Saudi jurisprudence.
Thus, authorities concerned with the judiciary in the Kingdom have issued a number of

journals concerned with raising awareness of the importance of the judiciary, jurisprudence, and
its role in achieving sustainable development in society. In addition, these journals have linked
the legal system with Islamic law, and with local and international judicial trends on many
issues, including the discretionary power of judges in general and with regard to the
consideration of the liquidated damages agreement in particular.
I believe that the publication of scholarly legal journals indirectly contributes to limiting
judges’ wide discretionary authority when considering cases of the liquidated damages clause.
This is because it will be difficult for the judge to ignore the published research, opinions, and
commentary in these journals related to the clause, especially when the authors have long
experience in the judicial and legal fields. This affects the judge’s conviction and view on legal
matters, and raises his legal knowledge and awareness.
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It might also be appropriate to oblige the Saudi judge, upon appointment and promotion,
to take professional tests that include questions whose answers reflect the judge's knowledge and
follow up on what is published in refereed scientific journals related to Sharia law, and the
workings of the judiciary, as this deepens his knowledge about appropriate responses to
emerging issues in practice that are the subject of jurisprudential and judicial dispute. A key
example is the subject of the liquidated damages clause. In addition to the current state where
Saudi precedents are more widely known abroad, along with the spread of its applications and
judicial precedents from other countries in the Kingdom, studies of comparative legal systems
take on increasing importance through comparative.

4.4. Documenting contracts that contain the liquidated damages clause to make them enforceable
without the need for a court ruling
Relying on documented contracts contributes to the avoidance of resorting to substantive
justice and allows a direct line to the enforcement judiciary in the event of a dispute. This raises
the question of how to deal with the liquidated damages clause in these contracts.
There are many kinds of civil, commercial, labor, and administrative contracts, including
the contract of sale, lease, contracting, work, supply, subsistence, and insurance, and others,
some of which include a liquidated damages clause or what is called the penalty condition. This
condition can be noted in different formulations; however, its parties may neglect documenting it
according to what is stipulated in the laws of execution or authentication in the Kingdom.
Saudi law singles out an executive judge with the power of the judicial forced execution,
but this execution is conditioned on the existence of a document that enables the executive judge
to issue an executive order for the agreed contractual obligations. This is called an execution
document; it was limited in previous Saudi laws to rulings and decisions issued by judicial and
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quasi-judicial authorities. However, the Saudi Executive Law of 2012509 expanded the approval
of executive judges authority to include, in addition to judgments and rulings, documents such as
contractual agreements involving commercial paper, reconciliation minutes, contracts, and even
ordinary documents recognized by a debtor or notarized, which makes the parties dispense with
resorting to substantive litigation.
They can directly resort to the executive judiciary to demand the execution of what they
agreed upon and documented,510 and this opens a wide scope for the liquidated damages clause
in contracts, which provides appropriate compensation if any of the parties breaches his
contractual obligation. Thus, the judge’s discretion is limited or non-existent, which bars him
from interfering in a reassessing of the amount of the compensation agreed upon again; his role
is limited to verifying the existence of the necessary conditions required in the executive bond
stipulated by law, as long as it does not violate the provisions of Sharia or a Saudi laws, together
with ensuring that the right is established as part of the debtor’s liability and that this right is
limited in amount and is due.
Thus, the parties do not need substantive judicial pleading, and the value of the liquidated
damages clause in the contract is not subject to examination by the judge, except within a narrow
scope.
Article 3 of the Saudi Executive law stipulates the competence of the executive judge to
adjudicate execution disputes, regardless of their value. Following the provisions of the summary
judiciary, and Article 3 paragraph 1 of the Executive Regulations of the Saudi Executive law
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indicates that every dispute is related to the verification of the validity of the executive document
and is within the jurisdiction of the executive judge, such as the claim of forging a bond or its
invalidity due to a defect in consent or that the person that the case is filed against is not a party
to it, or he denies signing it. Another instance would entail disputes that are related to the
payment of the debt or its fulfillment. Article 3 paragraph 3 stipulates that if the enforcer pays
against him with payment, release, reconciliation, set-off, assignment, or postponement, the
executive document’s issuance lies within the executive judge’s jurisdiction. The burden of proof
falls on whoever claims that the executive document is invalid.
On the other hand, substantive disputes that arise due to the subject matter of the rights
contained in the executive document are within the jurisdiction of the subject judge, per Article 3
paragraph 6 of the Executive Regulations of the Saudi Execution Law. This states that every
dispute related to the subject matter of the rights is within the jurisdiction of the subject judge,
such as the dispute related to a breach of the two parties to the contract, or of one of them, of
their obligations contained in the contract, such as contracting and supply contracts.
However, the substantive dispute that arises because of the relationship under which the
executive document was issued, or because of the origin of the rights, does not stop executive
documents unless a decision is issued by a court that is considering the case to stop the executive
action. This reinforces the importance of documenting contracts that include the liquidated
damages clause. That is because disputes related to the subject matter of the rights such as a
breach by one of the contracting parties of their contractual obligations does not entail a stay of
execution except based on a decision issued by the subject judge to stop the execution
procedures.
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This ensures that rights holders have their rights fulfilled promptly at the same time it
limits the discretionary power of the judge in examining contractual terms, including the
liquidated damages agreement.
The Saudi Ministry of Justice has created an electronic platform, named “Nafith
System”511” that enables stakeholders to issue and manage electronic executive bonds and
organize them with high efficiency, so that the parties’ rights to commercial transactions are
safeguarded. Another goal is to keep them aligned with the digital transformation plan of the
Kingdom’s Vision to enable e-government and improve the quality of electronic contracts and
commercial transactions along with enhancing transparency and electronic judicial execution.512
This direct electronic link between the executive courts and the Ministry of Justice
facilitates the executive procedures within the administrative courts and links the electronic
executive bonds through the unified national access law. Such a step increases reliability in the
creation of electronic executive bonds issued in accordance with Saudi laws and limits the
discretionary power of judges if a dispute is presented before them.
This constitutes a qualitative leap in facilitating access to justice and speedy settlement of
disputes, in order to achieve the main objective of developing the judiciary, so that it is a “fair
and efficient judiciary,” in a way that ensures an effective contribution to enhancing the
competitiveness of the Saudi judiciary on the international level. This system supports efforts to
provide an attractive environment for foreign investment in the Kingdom, by enhancing the
confidence of foreign investors in an effective litigation mechanism that ensures simplified
procedures and a speedy settlement of disputes as well as anticipation of the nature of judgments
issued in cases in dispute.
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The contracts that are documented and include the liquidated damages clause, other
clauses, and accompanying information become fixed and not subject to denial or challenge in
their essential clauses. The documentation of the contract also entails it being an agreement for
its parties and others, as it shows the elements of every agreement concluded between two or
more persons and guarantees its validity before the law. Also, the dispute between the
contracting parties is settled in a way that explains to each person his rights and his duties toward
the other. The documented contract becomes an “executive document,” and none of the parties
can deny his signature on it nor his lack of knowledge of its content.
Many individuals, companies, and institutions conclude some contracts in the civil or
commercial fields, and they are included in the terms of liquidated damages. But they can be
ignorant or neglectful of the importance of documenting such conditions so that they are
considered executive bonds, enabling the creditor to demand their execution directly and without
being subject to the discretion of a subject judge.
Those concerned can document their contracts themselves or via lawyers. To that effect,
the Saudi Ministry of Justice has initiated the notary service project, which aims to facilitate
documentation procedures for companies and individuals. Toward that end, a number of lawyers
have been licensed as accredited notaries; contracts and declarations issued by notaries are
considered executive bonds that can be submitted by their owners directly to the Executive Court
to request their carrying out according to Article 9 of the Saudi Execution Law,513 which
stipulated that compulsory execution may not be permitted except with an executive deed of a
right with a specified and due amount. Among the executive bonds are contracts, notarized
papers, accredited papers issued in a foreign country, and regular papers whose content is
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acknowledged in whole or in part; its parties, contracts, and other papers have the force of a deed
of execution under the law.
In order for the notarized contract to gain the force of judicial rulings, in terms of
recognizing and executing its content, the existence of the contract agreed upon between the
parties must be undisputed. If the contract is dependent on a conditioned clause that has not yet
been fulfilled, if it is a temporary obligation that is not final, if it is a contingent clause, then it is
not certain, and it is not permissible to execute based on it. However, the mere existence of the
executive document or the documented contract is a presumption of the realization of the value
of the contractual condition; that it includes the creditor is not required to prove that his fixed
clause in the documented contract is realized. Rather, the one who is charged with proof is the
other part who refused to apply, and the latter will not be able to prove that except by filing
another lawsuit before a trial judge and not before the executive judge.
However, a documented contract that includes a right that is dependent on a condition
may not be executed unless the condition is fulfilled. Therefore, before documenting it, the
parties to the contract must ensure that the amount of the clause of the liquidated damages is
fixed in amount and performance at the time of its claim. Also, the breach that results in
requesting compensation is clear and specific so that the executive judge can mandate the
execution of the contract without having to resort to the subject judge to decide on the dispute
that may arise due to non-performance of the contractual obligation.
The significance of documenting contracts that include the liquidated damages clause
entails that documenting gives them the status of an executive bond, which they are executed
directly and promptly. It also encourages the parties to the contract to resort to them and raises
confidence in execution without going through the stages of a substantive court. In this regard,
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Article 15 of the Saudi Authentication Law states514 that it is the responsibility of the notary to
document actions and contracts on trademarks, patents, copyrights, and contracts on movable
assets. Article 41 of the same law emphasized that documents issued in accordance with the
provisions of this law are considered proof and executive documents in the commitment they
contain. Their content must be acted upon before the courts without additional evidence and may
not be challenged.
Moreover, documents issued in accordance with the law should not be canceled except by
a judicial ruling and based on their violation of the requirements of Sharia or legal principles, or
their falsification, after a pleading that completed its legal procedures. These legal texts support
the possibility of agreeing on the liquidated damages agreement in contracts and documenting it,
and then demanding its execution in the event of nonfulfillment of the obligation. This demand is
made through the execution judiciary and without the need to file a case before the substantive
judiciary, where all decisions of the executive judge are final, and all his provisions are subject to
executive disputes. When the plaintiff claimed for liquidated damages clause amount in the
Saudi Execution Court trial, the defendant responded with an insolvency declaration request.
Hence, if the execution judge accepted the defendant’s request, the execution court decision will
be subject to review by the court of appeal.515
The importance of documenting the contract is highlighted in preserving the rights and
obligations between the contracting parties to the contract and reducing conflict between them.
Furthermore, they must be bound by what they agreed upon in the event of resorting to the
executive judiciary. Therefore, it is important that the contract be written carefully and precisely
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so that it exactly reflects the expressed desires of the parties, especially concerning the condition
of liquidated damages resulting from a breach of the contract by any party.
Documented contracts are considered an executive document, on the basis of which an
executive order is issued by the execution judge to be executed immediately, in accordance with
the procedures of the executive law and executive regulations. This procedure saves the parties
from being subject to the discretionary authority of the subject judge in examining the value of
the liquidated damages clause.516
Within the scope of the documented work contract subject to the Saudi Labor Law,517 the
law stipulates the possibility of predetermining the agreed compensation between the parties for
an indefinite period. If one of them decides not to abide by the period specified for notifying the
other party, Article 76 stipulates that “[i]f the party who terminated the contract for an indefinite
period does not observe the period specified for the notice in accordance with Article 75 of this
law, he shall pay the other party for the notice period an amount equal to the wages of the worker
for the same period, unless the two parties agree on more than that.”518 Therefore, the two parties
can agree in advance on a compensation to be applied in the event that either of them decides not
to continue executing the contract, as stipulated in Article 77 of the same law.519 This article
stipulates that unless the contract includes specific compensation in return for its termination by
one of the parties for an unlawful reason, the party affected by the termination of the contract is
entitled to the compensation specified by law.
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This text allows the parties of the contract to determine the amount of compensation in
disagreement to what is stipulated in the law, so that this liquidated damages clause will not be
subject to the judge’s discretionary authority to amend or increase it or to verify the existence of
the damages. Rather, the executive judge will order its execution, considering that work contracts
are documented contracts and constitute an executive document that does not fall within the
authority of the subject judge.
In the field of administrative contracts, those to which the government or the
administration is a party, such as contracting and supply contracts and service contracts with
ongoing execution, like maintenance, cleaning, operation, and catering contracts, the
government520 competition and procurement law regulating them imposes delay-of-service fines
on the contractor or contractor who delays in the execution of works and services and their
delivery by the agreed-upon date. Article 72 of this law stipulates that if the contractor delays in
executing the contract beyond the specified date, he will be subject to a delay fine that will not
exceed 6 percent of the value of the supply contract and shall not exceed 20 percent of the
amount of other contracts. These percentages may be increased with the prior approval of the
relevant Minister, provided that this increase is explained to the competitors before submitting
their offers. Article 73 also stipulates that if the contractor in the service contracts of ongoing
execution fails to execute his obligation, a fine not exceeding 20 percent of the contract value
will be imposed, together with deduction of the value of the unexecuted works. This percentage
may be increased with the prior approval of the relevant minister, provided that this increase is
explained to the competitors before submitting their bids. Article 74 states that it is possible to be
exempt from the fine in some cases specified by the law and its executive regulations.
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The penalty for the delay is imposed by the administration after the completion of the
contract execution date when there is a delay in the delivery of works beyond the date specified
for delivery or the date specified for the supply. Therefore, the administrative body automatically
has the right to impose a delay fine on the contractor, even if it did not suffer any damages.
Therefore, the delay fine is not a compensatory fine imposed to compensate for damages
incurred, but rather is a punitive fine imposed on the contractor because he breached his
contractual obligations and did not deliver the works or deliver the goods on time.521.The
presence and absence of the works to be delivered on the date specified in the contract.
The mere delay, even if it was slight, from the specified date for delivery or the
termination of work justifies imposing the fine. For this reason, one of the administrative
authorities imposed a fine on a company, because it was two days late in delivering the work
specified in the contract,522 and the judiciary supported it in that. One of the objectives of delay
fines in administrative contracts is to fulfill the public interest of the administrative facility, by
forcing the contractor to fulfill his commitment on the specified date more than it intends to
compensate for the damages incurred by said delay.
Therefore, there are many exemptions on the part of the administration from the
application of this fine, given compensation in its general sense is not its main purpose.
Furthermore, administrative contracts in the Kingdom are considered to be compliance contracts
where the contractor’s freedom is restricted by the provisions of the law, and he cannot negotiate
or discuss with the administrative authority to modify the percentage of the fine in public works
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contracts, for example, from 10 to 5 percent, but rather must accept this percentage as it is in the
contract.523
The Board of Grievances, the administrative judiciary in the Kingdom, differentiated
between the delay fine and the penalty clause and concluded that the delay fine is not considered
compensation.524 The board refused the request of the administrative authority to rule in
imposing a delay fine on one of its contractors, seeing as the administration can do so by itself.
The Board of Grievances, in the lawsuit filed by a contractor against the administration claiming
some sum, refused to respond to the administration’s request to impose a delay fine on the
contractor because the administration had the right to impose penalties, including the imposition
of delay fines on the contractor without the need to resort to the judiciary and therefore its
request deserved to be rejected,525 At the same time, the contractor may not demand a decrease in
the value of the fine stipulated in the contract because it exceeds the value of the damages
resulting from his delay.
The Executive Law was issued by the Board of Grievances recently in 2019526 and
regulates how to execute judgments, decisions, and contracts to which the administration is a
party. Article 4 stipulates that an imposition of a fine or other penalty may only be made with an
executive document for a specified due amount. It also identified the executive bonds covered by
the provisions of the law and mentioned the contracts to which the administration is a party and
the documents it issues if they are documented.
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In summary, codifying Islamic jurisprudence, writing and publishing judicial rulings,
expanding the issuance of scholarly journals concerned with jurisprudence, and working on
documenting and verifying contracts that contain the liquidated damages clause all contribute
directly or indirectly to limiting Saudi judges’ discretionary authority. They also further
executing the liquidated damages clause as agreed upon by the parties in the contract.

Chapter Five: Conclusion
Throughout this research, I have reviewed the discretionary authority of the Saudi judge
when deciding on the matter of the liquidated damages clause in light of the provisions of Sharia,
which is the applicable law in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The sources of Sharia are divided in
terms of their applicability into primary sources, the Qur’an, Sunnah, Consensus, and Analogy,
and secondary sources. On the latter, which include the words of the Companion of Mohammad,
Istiṣhāb, Istihsan, Prior Legislation of Those Before Us, Blocking Pretexts, Absolute Interests,
and Customs, there is disagreement on their applicability,
These sources of evidence are also divided into two types, of which the first is:
transmitted sources or evidence that depend on the text or the transmitted action: namely, the
Qur’an, the Sunnah, the Consensus, the words of the Companion, Previous Legislation, and
Custom. The second type is mental sources or evidence that depends on the mindset of the jurist,
his knowledge and opinion based on a text or a transmitted action from the prophet or his
companions; they include Analogy, Absolute Interest, Blocking Pretexts, Istiṣhāb, and Istihsan.
Furthermore, they can also be divided in terms of the strength of the evidence and their
invocation into definitive evidence and presumptive evidence.
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The judiciary in Saudi Arabia relies on the provisions of Sharia that are derived from the
Qur’an, and the Sunnah in settling disputes, especially those related to contracts and their terms,
including the liquidated damages clause.
The diversity and multiplicity of the sources of Sharia have led to differences in
comprehending and interpreting their texts and meanings among the four schools of Islamic
jurisprudence. This discrepancy was reflected in rulings by the Saudi judiciary, which is
entrusted with applying the teachings of the different schools, causing judges to enjoy wide
discretionary authority in assessing and ruling on the value of the liquidated damages clause.
Through the completion of these chapters, the study delivered several results and
recommendations, as outlined below:

5.1. Results
1. The liquidated damages clause falls under the penalty clause in Islamic and Saudi
jurisprudence. It is a clause that the International Islamic Fiqh Academy of the
Organization of Islamic Cooperation has permitted to be applied in all financial contracts,
except for those in which the obligation is debt, because, in this case, it is considered
usury, which Sharia prohibits. The Council of Senior Scholars in Saudi Arabia issued a
fatwa authorizing the liquidated damages clause when stipulated in contracts as a valid
measure that must be taken into account unless there is a solid reason for breaching the
contractual obligation, in which case the clause is suspended until the cause of the breach
is lifted. Given how the liquidated damages clause may be used as a form of penalty
clause, which is far from the requirements set by the Sharia, it must be judged based on
justice and fairness between the parties and have a balance of a benefit that was missed
and the damages that were caused. In this case, the judge rules based on the agreed
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amount of the liquidated damages clause and according to the rules of just and equity
derived from Islamic law, according to the suffered damages by the plaintiff and the gain
he missed. The judge may seek experts’ assistance to determine the actual damages
amount.
2. The Saudi judiciary enforces the liquidated damages clause through a set of standards
that are subject to the discretionary authority of the Saudi judge in cases where the debtor
fails to fulfill his contractual duty and the second party demands its implementation. In
civil and commercial contracts, the liquidated damages clause requires the issuance of a
judicial ruling to go into effect in the event of a dispute between the parties of the
contract. A late fine is applied in administrative arrangements, and the administration
applies it to the contracting party without needing a court ruling.
3. The purpose of the liquidated damages clause in the contract is to limit the dispute
regarding determination of the compensation that may arise from breaching the
contractual obligations. It also gives the judge a baseline for compensation ruling. In the
event of its contract documentation, the liquidated damages clause reduces recourse for
the subject judge and spares the contracting parties from being subject to the judge’s
discretion when assessing the compensation sum. During the dispute procedure, it spares
the stipulating party the burden of proving the damages sustained due to the breach of
contractual obligation.
4. The field study conducted by this researcher on a sample of Saudi judges shows that there
is a discrepancy in the rulings of the Saudi courts and in the position of the Saudi judges
on the matter of the liquidated damages clause due to jurisprudential disagreements
among Sharia jurists in this regard.
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5. The judges’ responses in this study confirmed that judges enjoy wide discretion when
considering cases related to the liquidated damages clause. This study helps us
understand the behavior of the Saudi judge and the methods of his work when applying
the theoretical aspects of legal texts and jurisprudence rules to facts and practical issues
related to the liquidated damages clause.
6. Sharia generally grants the judge wide discretionary authority in the judicial process,
acceptable in past eras when most judges were diligent jurists in the provisions of Sharia
and knowledgeable about even its smallest details. However, today the public interest
requires restricting this authority with clear and specific guidelines that prevent the judge
from ruling unjustly or following whims.
7. The issue of codifying the provisions of Islamic jurisprudence has been the subject of
great controversy among Islamic jurisprudents since ancient times, both with regard to its
permissibility and the obligation of the judge to rule on it. The current consensus is that
codifying the provisions of Islamic jurisprudence in the form of legal articles makes it
easier for judges to rule on the facts in dispute, and to limit judges’ discretionary
authority when considering issues like the liquidated damages clause. This is achieved
through obligating the judge to apply the codified jurisprudential texts, thus removing
confusion regarding the presumption of the text or the appropriateness of applying it to
the issue in question. The codification of Islamic jurisprudence does not prevent the
Saudi judge from using independent reasoning to derive rulings for the issues for which
there is no text in the codified jurisprudence or when the codified texts are unclear or
ambiguous about what the ruling should be. Additionally, codification prevents the judge
from refusing to apply the relevant texts on the pretext that he has the right to
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independent reasoning. This is because the codified articles that all judges have access to
have been supervised by a group of highly qualified jurists, scholars, and specialized
judges, which makes their work more compatible with legal rules and the public interests,
as compared to the subjective reasoning of a single judge. Furthermore, the codification
of Islamic jurisprudence makes it easier for the courts to apply the provisions of Sharia
contained in these articles and reduces the possibility of too many variances in judicial
rulings. It also helps the judge to find the legal rule applicable to the dispute easily. This
provides an opportunity for stakeholders, lawyers, and others interested in judicial affairs
to practice a kind of oversight of judges’ applications of codified texts cases before them,
including those matters related to the liquidated damages clause. They can do so instead
of referring to the sources of various textbooks and references of Islamic jurisprudence.
Therefore, codification prompts judges to limit their discretionary authority and to derive
their judgments in a way that contributes to achieving justice among the disputants. This
increases confidence in the Saudi judicial system, especially from foreign investors, who
often fear the broad discretionary power of the Saudi judge in the absence of clearly
written legal texts.
8. Failure to codify the provisions of Sharia leads to significant discrepancies in
interpretation and application by some judges. As a result, judges have to refer to the
references of the four schools of jurisprudence to search for rulings to be applied to the
issues before them. This is because they are required to base their rulings on clear texts
and jurisprudential rules that relate to the subject of the dispute.
9. There are two directions in the matter of the necessity of the existence of damages to
entitle the amount of the liquidated damages clause. The first direction sees that the
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clause amount is not justified if there are no damages to the plaintiff. However, the
burden of proving this falls on the defendant because the existence of the clause means
that damages are assumed, meaning the plaintiff is not required to prove them; thus, if the
defendant claims that the plaintiff did not suffer any damages, the defendant has to prove
that he did. The second direction sees that the liquidated damages clause is due, even if
there are no damages. The mere agreement of the two directions on the clause and its
amount in case of breach means that they recognize that the defendant’s breach of his
obligation causes damages that require the agreed-upon compensation, and the judge
must rule accordingly.
10. Judicial precedents are recognized in all worldwide legal systems, Latin, Anglo-Saxon,
and Islamic, among others. However, these legal systems differ on the extent to which
these precedents are authoritative or obligatory for judges when issuing their rulings.
Some consider precedents for reference and guidance, which are not obligatory, such as
the Latin school, while others consider it obligatory and an official source for judges’
rulings, such as the Anglo-Saxon legal system. The Islamic legal system, applied in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, takes an in-between position in obligating judicial precedents.
The precedents that form a judicial principle or are issued by the Saudi Supreme Court
are considered binding on judges who have to rule according to them unless the Supreme
Court amends its jurisprudence in this regard. If the precedent is issued by a lower-degree
court, then it is sufficient for a judge to review them only and there is no obligation to
follow them. Also, the rulings of the Saudi Courts of Appeal constitute a kind of
restrictions on judges in first-instance courts so that it is difficult for them to ignore its
content when issuing rulings in similar cases. If they do so, they will fear having their
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rulings repealed, which is why they have to justify the reasons for not following these
judicial precedents.
11. The judicial principles issued by the Supreme Court in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are
similar to those issued by the United States Supreme Court. However, the Saudi judicial
law is a non-federal law, and it has a dual nature because there are two Supreme Courts,
one for the general judiciary, and the other for the administrative judiciary, which
specializes in cases where the state is a party, and all court circuits of each Supreme
Court are bound by the precedents of their Supreme Court.
12. The Saudi judiciary follows precedents, whether in the courts of the general judiciary, or
the judiciary of the Board of Grievances. There are recent rulings of the judiciary of the
Board of Grievances where the judges invoked judicial precedents and pointed to them as
the main reason for their rulings. The new Saudi Judicial Law emphasized the tendency
to adopt the principles and judicial precedents issued by the Supreme Court and made
them mandatory, so they are not amended, except by a decision of one of the circuit
courts, whether the reversal of the principle is from the Supreme Court itself or from one
of the appeals courts.
13. Among the benefits of judicial precedents is their contribution to the unification of
reasoning in judicial rulings in similar cases and the limitation of the wide discretionary
authority of judges. Also, there is more stability in the work of the courts and their
regularity in following a certain rule in similar cases or issues. This helps ensure equality
of treatment before the courts between litigants in the judgments issued. Moreover,
judicial precedents help judges know how to resolve future disputes in advance, while
guiding litigants and lawyers to know what the ruling is likely heading toward from the
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beginning of the case. This in turn saves time and effort for those concerned with judicial
affairs, facilitating the work of the judge and enriching jurisprudence in general.
14. Notation of judicial rulings contributes to clarifying what has been settled on in previous
rulings in a manner that inspires confidence in the Saudi judiciary and clarifies to
interested parties inside and outside the Kingdom, especially foreign investors, the way it
builds on the texts of Sharia. The notation of judgments creates a form of self-regulation
over the judge’s work, which usually makes him eager to review his judgments before
issuing, revising, and mentioning the proper reasoning for them, knowing that his ruling
will be read by many others, and not contradicting previous published rulings. The
notation and publication of judicial rulings also enhances the internal control in the
judicial system, which is carried out through the various levels of litigation, such as
appeals and the Supreme Court. Consequently, published judgments, precedents, and
judicial principles from higher courts serve to limit lower-court judge’s discretionary
authority, which ensures that he is guided by rulings and other judicial precedents when
considering the cases before him. Furthermore, there is a kind of oversight about written
and published rulings when many jurists study them and compare them with others,
which results in benefitting judges through the creation of models for future rulings,
including on the liquidated damages clause. In addition, notation of judicial rulings helps
to spread doctrinal and judicial awareness among judicial circles and helps achieve the
principle of judicial transparency. It also supports applied academic research while
deepening the experience and knowledge of judges.
15. The Saudi judge has a broad discretionary authority in estimating the sum of the
liquidated damages clause during his consideration of a dispute, authority he derives from
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Sharia, which allows the judge considerable discretion in resolving the dispute before
him, as long as his doing so does not conflict with the texts of the Qur’an and the Sunnah.
Judges’ rulings should also be guided by the jurisprudence rules in Sharia and the various
schools of jurisprudence. So, the Saudi judge, when considering the dispute before him,
uses a broad approach that allows him to search in the legal and jurisprudential texts to
choose the appropriate solutions to a dispute, including liquidated damages clause.
16. Saudi Judges rely on jurisprudence rules in addition to other sources of Islamic law to
provide reasons for their judicial rulings. This means that the Saudi judge has wide
discretion in choosing the jurisprudential rule that is applicable to the dispute before him,
despite the sometimes overwhelming challenge of being informed of all the jurisprudence
rules spread in Islamic jurisprudence books, the presence of some codes of Islamic
jurisprudence as compiled and annotated by some schools in one or more printed or
online works, as is the case in the Journal of Judicial Rulings based on the Hanafi school
and the Journal of Legal Rulings based on the Hanbali school.
17. Schools of jurisprudence in Sharia depend on deriving legal rulings from the Qur’an and
the Sunnah in accordance with specific jurisprudential rules and principles. There are a
number of reasons that led to differences among these schools, including semantic ones.
There are words in Arabic that have several meanings, so they can be interpreted
differently. Other reasons are related to whether or not the narration of the Sunnah
transmitted from the Prophet Muhammad  ﷺhave been verified and differences exist in
understanding their meaning. Besides, there are reasons related to the deductive
guidelines adopted by the jurists and the fundamental rules established for independent
reasoning, The jurists differed in the fundamental sources from which subsidiary legal
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rulings are derived from detailed evidence because of their difference in the dependency
of those rules.
18. There are multiple interpretations of the jurisprudence rule by Saudi judges and
sometimes different rulings for the same or similar facts. The Saudi judge enjoys wide
discretion when considering the case before him in choosing the relevant texts or
jurisprudential rules that he deems most suitable. Additionally, the position of the four
Islamic schools of jurisprudence may differ regarding the adaptation of the incident or the
issue at hand, such as in the case of the liquidated damages clause, and therefore the
discretionary authority of the Saudi judge in this regard varies according to the school of
jurisprudence that he applies or considers to be the most compelling evidence.
19. The liquidated damages clause is legally characterized in Islamic jurisprudence as a
restricted condition associated with the contract, one which one of the contracting parties
sets a legitimate interest.
20. It is well established in Islamic jurisprudence and the Saudi judiciary that the contract is
binding and that its conditions are enforceable by its parties. However, some conditions,
such as the liquidated damages clause, may initiate some problems during their
execution. This requires resorting to the judiciary. Hence the judge’s authority begins in
assessing and interpreting what the parties to the contract were unable to express or
define clearly. This means that it is difficult to rely on the rule of pacta sunt servanda
(agreements must be kept) alone before the Saudi judiciary to restrict the judge’s
authority to control the amount of the agreement. That is because of the concept of
predefined compensation. In this case, the liquidated damages between the parties should
consider the rules of justice in Sharia. This means that if the clause amount is exaggerated
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and the requested party proves it, the judge should rule to restore the contract balance.
The purpose of his doing so is to avoid granting one of the parties gains that he does not
deserve in accordance with the Islamic principle of the inadmissibility of enrichment
without a legitimate reason and the principle of eliminating abuse of the right by the
stronger party to the contract. Moreover, this is an application of the saying of the
Prophet: “No damages shall be inflicted or reciprocated.”
21. The Hanbali school of jurisprudence—the most applied by the Saudi judiciary—is
considered the broadest of the four schools in correcting the contracts and their
conditions, as it adopts the jurisprudential rule that “the basis of the contract is validity
and permissibility unless it is forbidden in Sharia.”
22. In the Saudi judicial application, the liquidated damages clause is valid in some contracts
for one of the parties without the other, such as the case of contract construction. The
condition is valid against the contractor not the employer. The same is true in a supply
contract, where it is valid against the supplier and not the importer. This means that if the
contractor or supplier does not fulfill what he is committed to, or delays in its execution,
the other party may obligate him to pay what is stipulated in the liquidated damages
clause; however, it is not permissible for the other party to the contract to demand that
because that is considered usury, prohibited by Sharia.
23. The discretionary power of the Saudi judge with regard to judging the sum of the
liquidated damages expands and narrows according to his view of the nature of the
contract and the extent to which there are damages to the plaintiff. The Saudi judiciary
monitors the sum of the liquidated damages clause; its amount may increase if the
creditor proves that the damages incurred by him exceed its value, and the sum of the
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clause may decrease if the debtor proves that the creditor did not suffer damages
equivalent to that specified in the liquidated damages clause. The sum of the clause may
be ruled as is, without an increase or decrease, if none of the parties to the contract
dispute the fairness of the specified amount or if the judge finds that the value of the
clause is fair and not excessive. This judicial approach is in line with the fatwa of the
Council of Senior Scholars in Saudi Arabia, which authorizes the application of the
liquidated damages clause and gives the judge the discretion to monitor its application in
the event of a complaint by any of the parties to the contract.
24. Islamic jurisprudence and the Saudi judiciary subsume the liquidated damages clause
within the scope of the penalty clause, unlike the situation in US and UK law, where a
distinction is made between liquidated damages compensation, which may not be reduced
or increased, as it is binding on the parties to the contract, and the penalty clause that can
be modified.
25. The Saudi judiciary distinguishes between the liquidated damages clause in civil and
commercial contracts and the delay fine in administrative contracts. It requires the
verification of the incurred damages to rule with the clause in civil and commercial
contracts, whereas damages are not required in relation to the entitlement of the specified
delay fine.
26. Most comparative legislations allow the judiciary to monitor the amount of the
liquidated damages and reestimate the compensation to be appropriate to the damages
actual suffered by the plaintiff due to the breach of contractual obligations.
27. The cultural, social, religious, and scientific nature of each Saudi judge affects the nature
of his judicial ruling when considering the liquidated damages clause. The lack of
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codification of the provisions of Islamic jurisprudence, the weak notation of past judicial
rulings, coupled with the limited number of validated contracts that have the status of an
executive document have contributed to the expansion of the discretionary authority of
the Saudi judge and have affected foreign investors’ choice of Saudi law as applicable to
their contracts with Saudi merchants. This latter fact is because of the lack of clarity in
their provisions regarding the nature of the applicable Saudi law and the extent of the
discretionary authority of the judge in its application.
28. It can be observed that many in the Saudi judiciary are hesitant about ruling for
compensation for moral damages. The Saudi judge has a wide discretionary authority in
estimating the amount of compensation for moral damages in the event that an agreement
is not fulfilled. In the Kingdom, it is necessary to achieve fair and equal compensation for
damages, regardless of the plaintiff’s claim. That is why we can observe a scarcity of
judgments for compensation for future damages in the Saudi judiciary.
29. The penalty clause has a threatening function, a compensatory function, and a third
function that combines the two; it is noted that the Saudi judiciary agrees with the
opinion that the threatening function of the liquidated damages clause has begun to
diminish in comparison to the compensatory function. The clause’s penalty function is
achieved only when the value of the condition agreed is greater than the due
compensation. In such cases, the clause serves its penalty function when the party has to
pay in excess of the damages that were incurred as a result of breaching the original
agreement. As for the compensatory function of the penalty clause, it is achieved when
this clause is estimated at an amount equal to the amount of damages expected to occur
because of such breaching.
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5.2. Recommendations
1. Codifying the provisions of Islamic jurisprudence in the form of sequenced and arranged
legal articles in general, and the provisions related to contracts and the conditions they
contain, including the liquidated damages clause in particular, ensures that judges will
apply them when considering disputes. It also and allows them to benefit from the legal
wealth contained in the major schools of jurisprudence in Sharia while helping judges to
select legal texts that are relevant to the present time and do not conflict with the
peremptory provisions of Islamic law. Moreover, codification helps limit the wide
authority of Saudi judges when considering contract issues, especially those related to the
liquidated damages clause. To ensure the benefits of such codification, a group of highly
qualified jurists, scholars, and specialized judges must supervise the preparation and
review of this code, which guarantees the computability of their work more with Sharia
rules and the public interest.
2. The importance of establishing a judicial principle or a legislative code becomes apparent
when it comes to the main mechanism for how a judge exercises his discretion when
dealing with a vague legal text or rule that requires interpretation or contradicts another
rule or principle. The code helps him reach an appropriate solution to a conflict.
Moreover, it allows the Supreme Court to monitor the extent of the judge’s commitment
to follow the guidelines that have been established to interpret a text or jurisprudential
rule. This guarantees the highest degree of court supervision of the judge’s use of his
discretion in choosing appropriate jurisprudential rules for resolving the dispute. This
involves gradual monitoring that varies according to the Sharia or selected legal solutions
according to the degree to which the subject judge exercises his discretion. When there is
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a clear text or a jurisprudential rule that is appropriate to apply to the dispute in question,
the supervision of the highest court is strict on the necessity of applying the text. That
contrasts with a case where the dispute resolution requires the judge’s independent
reasoning to choose an appropriate jurisprudential rule due to the ambiguity surrounding
the alleged facts. In this case, the supervision of the higher court over the authority of the
subject judge is less strict.
3. The parties to the contract should clearly formulate the function of the liquidated
damages clause. Clearly stating its function, such as considering it a conciliatory
agreement between the parties to the contract on the amount of compensation in the event
of a breach of contractual obligations, limits the judge’s authority to contemplate
amending its value in a judicial dispute.
4. The obligation of a nominated the Saudi judge to pass a test upon his appointment or
promotion means that he must be knowledgeable about what is published in specialized
scientific journals on jurisprudence in Saudi laws and comparative law. He must know
their positions on the judge’s discretionary authority in general and when considering the
terms of contracts, including the liquidated damages clause, in particular. This contributes
to the judge’s adoption of more just provisions, consistent with the international reality in
which economic interests are intertwined. Among other things, this includes contracts
that feature terms of an agreement between individuals and entities belonging to different
countries.
5. Notating the judicial rulings and continuing to record and publish them, or posting on a
website existing ones in judicial notations issued annually or on another regular basis and
distributed to judges, ensures the deepening of their knowledge and limits their wide
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discretionary authority when considering cases, including cases of the liquidated damages
clause.
6. It is important to adhere to judicial precedents issued by higher courts, and that there be
careful overview by the Saudi Supreme Court of judges who do not abide by judicial
precedents by obligating judges to provide sufficient reasons to their rulings that are
contrary to what was previously issued in judicial precedents.
7. There is a need for validated electronic contracts that are recognized as executive
documents because they represent effective ways to limit the discretionary authority of
judges when considering what the parties have agreed upon, including the liquidated
damages clause.
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